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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the use to which mathematical modelling
techniques can be put in answering hard questions in social science. The specific
area that this thesis focuses on is the development of an individual’s propensity for
crime or terrorism, with the primary research question answered being: are the pro-
cess by which an individual develops the propensity to commit crime and the radi-
calisation process indistinguishable? The answer to this question may assist policy
makers and practitioners in the fields of counter-terrorism and crime prevention
develop more effective interventions, but it is a difficult question to answer using
techniques rooted in social science alone, as crime and terrorism are the outcomes
of complex social processes that form part of large socio-ecological systems.
The thesis answers this question through the use of mathematical modelling. A
model is developed based on the Individual Vulnerability, Exposure and Emergence
(IVEE) theoretical framework for radicalisation. This model is realised as a com-
puter simulation imitating the process by which an individual develops the propen-
sity to commit an act of crime or terrorism, and is parameterised using data from
secondary sources. The behaviour of the simulation is then explored to determine
whether, with sufficient data, it could potentially be of practical use to practitioners:
for example, the simulation is used to explore whether crime prevention interven-
tions might also be effective for countering radicalisation, or vice versa.
It is concluded that while the simulations developed in this thesis are still theo-
retical, the models themselves have the potential for further development, and the
methodology could be applied to a range of alternative fields.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mathematical modelling has played a key role in the advancement of human knowl-
edge and civilisation throughout history. Without the heliocentric model con-
structed by Nicolaus Copernicus the human race might have continued believing
the earth to be at the centre of the universe for many centuries, while models based
on Isaac Newton’s laws of motion were an essential precursor to the industrial revo-
lution. More recently, mathematical models have been used for a range of purposes
across many disciplines, and have been essential for advancing fields as varied as
aeronautical engineering (for example, by establishing the most aerodynamic shape
for aircraft wings or turbine blades), meteorology (such as providing early warnings
prior to extreme weather events) and economics (to predict the impact of changes
in fiscal or monetary policy). And yet despite the proven record of mathematical
modelling across so many fields, its use as an aid to social scientists remains to be
substantiated.
The purpose of this thesis is to develop mathematical models that could be of prac-
tical use to practitioners in the fields of crime prevention and counter-radicalisation.
Radicalisation in particular is an area that has been of increasing interest to aca-
demics and policy-makers since the events of 11th September 2001. However
the process by which people become radicalised has long been acknowledged by
experts in the field as being incredibly complex: people who have become radi-
calised have originated from a range of ethnicities, religious groups, nationalities,
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and socio-economic backgrounds. A similar argument can be made for those who
choose to commit acts of crime: while there may be correlations between some of-
fenders’ backgrounds and the types of crimes they choose to commit, these correla-
tions do not amount to causal factors explaining why people develop the propensity
to commit crime in the first place. The processes by which people develop such
a propensity are complex, but it is only by truly understanding the causal mecha-
nisms in these processes that policies can be put in place to effectively reduce the
likelihood that people develop the propensity to commit crime or acts of terror-
ism. It is for this reason that the author hopes that by taking the approach of using
mathematical modelling to further understanding of these processes, the use of this
methodology as a tool in the discipline of social science may be demonstrated.
The models described in this thesis are based on a theoretical framework for rad-
icalisation that has been put together by experts in the field, and they make use
of data from empirical studies wherever possible to ensure that they are closely
aligned to reality. It is hoped that these models will be able to further understand-
ing of the criminality development and radicalisation processes, with the ultimate
intention that models such as these could one day be useable by policy-makers and
practitioners in the fields of crime and terrorism prevention to help them test the
effectiveness of potential interventions so that they can use their limited budgets in
the most effective way.
Understanding such complex social processes as radicalisation and criminality de-
velopment so that effective interventions can be implemented is a difficult problem,
and because of this it is inevitable that constructing the mathematical models will
involve making simplifications that may lead to spurious results. However this re-
search aims to show that the risk of failure is no reason not to attempt to build
useable models, and that even relatively simple models can serve a useful purpose.
The models developed here can be built upon with subsequent research, and with
every further insight into the causes of radicalisation and criminality development
they can be improved. But for that to happen there needs to be a first step, and that
is what this thesis provides.
1.1. Current State of the Field 21
1.1 Current State of the Field
A wide range of mathematical modelling techniques already exist across a variety of
fields. Some models are designed with a specific application in mind and their use
never strays from that; such models are likely to have been developed within very
specialist fields, such as nuclear physics or quantum field theory. However, there
are many examples of models developed for one field which have then proved to
be applicable to other areas. One example is the predator-prey model, the equations
for which were originally developed to describe the dynamics of chemical reactions,
but which were later adapted to describe the dynamics of biological systems con-
sisting of two species where one is the predator and one is the prey. However this
adaptation was not without its problems, as the predictions of the classical predator-
prey model were later found to be inconsistent with field observations, resulting in
the original theory needing to be re-worked and extended (Berryman, 1992).
A second example comes from the basic SIR model, used in epidemiology to de-
scribe the spread of infectious diseases such as influenza or ebola. This model
can be expressed as a set of ordinary differential equations describing the rate at
which people transition from state S (“susceptible”) to state I (“infectious”) to state
R (“resistant”), with extra states added for models of diseases following different
transmission patterns (Keeling and Rohani, 2008). While developed with epidemi-
ology in mind, this SIR model has also been used to model the spread of informa-
tion and ideas, and of human behaviours through imitation (Landau and Rapoport,
1953; Goffman and Newill, 1964). However these alternative models have never
been validated, and have remained interesting theoretical exercises carried out by
mathematicians that have been largely ignored by the world of social science.
These two cases highlight a key problem faced by the discipline of mathematical
modelling as a whole: that the individuals developing the models may have a good
knowledge of mathematical modelling techniques, but their knowledge of the field
that the model is seeking to replicate may be lacking, resulting in a model which
at best serves no useful purpose and at worst is misleading. An alternative would
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be to approach mathematical modelling from the other direction — for example for
a sociologist to develop a model describing a social process in which they have an
interest. However then there are two hurdles: firstly the sociologist needs to have
an interest in developing a model in the first place, and secondly they need to have
sufficient technical knowledge of different modelling techniques to build the model
best suited to their needs. This first hurdle will only be cleared if the sociologist has
faith that modelling can be of use to him — which is unlikely if all previous models
in their field have been ineffective — while the second relies on them additionally
being a polymath, a feat which is increasingly difficult to achieve in the complex
world of the 21th Century.
A multi-disciplinary approach must therefore be taken for it to be shown that math-
ematical modelling can have a role to play in social science. The author hopes to
demonstrate that with the right blend of technical mathematical modelling and so-
cial science knowledge this gap can be filled, even for very hard problems in social
science. The research area of crime and radicalisation has been deliberately cho-
sen as one that is of practical interest to social scientists and policy-makers, while
additionally pushing the boundaries of what mathematical models can achieve in
cases where data is severely limited. This thesis aims to develop models that go
further than those developed by researchers such as Landau and Rapoport (1953)
or Goffman and Newill (1964), by transitioning from models of purely theoretical
interest to ones that could be of use to social scientists. It does this by starting not
with an abstract theory or a model developed for an alternative discipline, but with
the relevant social science itself.
1.2 Thesis Overview
The multi-disciplinary methodology adopted by this thesis is reflected in the ap-
proaches taken by the different chapters.
The first three chapters set the scene for the research: this introductory chapter has
provided a general overview, including the motivation behind why this topic is of
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interest and the current state of the field. Chapter 2 focuses on the social science
literature and explores the IVEE theoretical framework that will be used to underpin
the models developed later in the thesis. This chapter also introduces the research
question that it will be hoped that the models can answer. Chapter 3 then describes
the methodology that will be followed in order to answer this research question,
and in particular considers whether mathematical modelling is the right method to
use.
Chapters 4 to 7 discuss the research in depth. Chapter 4 describes the process of
developing the first model, which is a simulation replicating the process by which
people develop the propensity to commit acts of crime. This chapter explores what
data is available to quantify the relationships between different causal factors in the
criminality development process, then considers how this data can be used in the
model. The model then undergoes a series of stress tests in Chapter 5 to understand
how it behaves when changes to its parameters and inputs are made.
Chapter 6 charts the development of a similar model describing the process of rad-
icalisation. The development of this model follows a different approach to that of
the development of the first model, due to the limited amount of data available on
which the model can be based. A first attempt at answering the research question
comes at the end of this chapter.
In Chapter 7 both models are extended so that they incorporate a number of inter-
ventions that could be implemented to try and prevent the spread of criminality or
radicalisation. This chapter follows a similar approach to Chapter 4, as it starts by
investigating what is known about interventions in the real world before considering
how these interventions can be depicted in the simulations.
The final chapter brings together the insights gained from the previous four chapters
to answer the research question. A discussion then follows as to whether mathemat-
ical modelling was indeed a suitable approach to answering this question, and what
the limitations of the research are. Finally, further work and potential applications
for the research are considered.

Chapter 2
Literature Review
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of previous research that has
been conducted and theories that have been developed concerning radicalisation
and the process by which people develop the propensity to commit crimes more
generally, with the aim of locating gaps in the current body of knowledge that this
thesis can seek to fill.
This chapter is not a conventional literature review, in that it does not start with the
definition of radicalisation then conduct an appraisal of all the academic literature
available that uses the term. Instead, the first section of the chapter consists of a
derivation of the definition of radicalisation that this thesis adopts. The wide variety
of ways that researchers have used the term makes this deviation highly worthwhile.
This approach allows for the scope of what is meant by “radicalisation” to be made
explicit, and in particular how (or rather whether) it is distinct from the process by
which people develop the propensity to commit crime, and it additionally provides
the context in which the literature can be evaluated by introducing the Individual
Vulnerability, Exposure, Emergence (IVEE) theoretical framework for propensity
development.
The second section of this chapter looks at the IVEE framework in detail. This is
then followed by an appraisal of the wider radicalisation literature, during which
the IVEE framework is used to synthesise the literature and highlight any discrep-
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ancies. This section ends with a brief discussion of the relevance of ideology in
radicalisation research. The chapter concludes with a review of the strengths and
weaknesses of the IVEE framework when compared with other theories, a summary
of the knowledge gaps pertaining to how radicalisation can be distinguished from
the process by which more general criminality develops, and introduces the primary
research question.
2.1 Derivation of the term “Radicalisation”
2.1.1 Definitions
This chapter has already stated an intent not to define the term “radicalisation” at
this point. This is because radicalisation is an ambiguous term with almost as many
definitions as there are radicalisation researchers. However, even without a formal
definition, one thing that can be said about radicalisation is that it is generally con-
sidered to be a cause of terrorism. A good starting point therefore might be to define
“terrorism”, but terrorism is also a term with many meanings. Instead we shall start
one step further back with a definition of a more general (but related) concept —
“crime”.
2.1.1.1 Crime
It is a surprising fact in the history of criminology that not much attention has been
paid to what exactly crime is. In 1981 Stanley Cohen published a report on the
current state of the field of criminology in Britain, in which he espoused that crimi-
nology seeks to understand the answers to three questions: “Why are laws made?”,
“Why are they broken?”, and “What do we do or what should we do about this?”
(Cohen, 1988, p. 9). These questions have shaped the direction criminology has
taken over the course of the past three decades (Maguire et al., 2012), but in that
time the question “What is crime?” has seldom been mooted.
Cohen’s three questions highlight that there is more than one approach that can be
taken when defining crime: his first two questions focus on legalities, while his third
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question is more concerned with public policy. The dictionary definition of crime
as “an action which constitutes a serious offence against an individual or the state
and is punishable by law” also emphasises legalities (Oxford, 1999). But where this
definition breaks down is in the lack of a universal understanding of what is right
and what is wrong.
While some laws are the same worldwide, many more are culturally dependent: for
example adultery is illegal in Saudi Arabia but not in the UK, although many UK
citizens would still consider adultery to be morally wrong. The same is true of many
other activities that are legal in the UK but that are considered to be unacceptable
by certain groups or individuals, such as gambling and drinking alcohol. Such
individuals will choose to refrain from these activities not because they face the
possibility of arrest and imprisonment, but because it is against their own moral
code. If they do succumb to temptation and try gambling or drinking, for them
this would be akin to breaking the law. For such individuals, these behaviours —
gambling or drinking alcohol — are analogous to crime. And yet some of these
individuals will go ahead and carry out such activities anyway. Understanding the
reasons behind why they choose to do so therefore provides some insight into why
people choose to commit crime in general, but without the added complication of
the impact that the risk of arrest may have on people’s decision making.
The utility of studying these analogous behaviours was highlighted by Gottfredson
and Hirschi in their seminal work “A General Theory of Crime” (1990). Gottfred-
son and Hirschi noted the resistance in criminological research to tackle the ques-
tion of what crime is, and attempted “to construct a definition of crime consistent
with the phenomenon itself and with the best available theory of criminal behavior”
(Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990, p. 3). They put forward that the concept of crime
can be derived from the classical theory of human behaviour: that “people pur-
sue self-interest by avoiding pain and seeking pleasure” (Gottfredson and Hirschi,
1990, p. 14). They further suggested that, contrary to the views of many earlier re-
searchers, no distinction should be drawn between different types of crime. While
the law distinguishes between a violent offence and a parking offence there is no
28 Chapter 2. Literature Review
empirical reason for the criminologist to do so, as both events require the offender to
make a conscious decision to disobey their society’s rules (Gottfredson and Hirschi,
1990, p. 43)
Gottfredson and Hirschi were bold in their attempt to create a general theory of
crime that transcends both culture and time, and their way of defining crime has
been much quoted by criminology textbooks (Maguire et al., 2007; McLaughlin and
Newburn, 2010; Felson and Boba, 2010). However their definition is not without its
critics. In particular, Wikstro¨m has argued against the utility of both the purely legal
definition of crime and the definition suggested by Gottfredson and Hirschi. He
argues that the legal definition does not make it clear what crime actually is, making
this definition of limited use when trying to understand the reasons behind why
people commit crimes (Wikstro¨m, 2011b, p. 61). However he dislikes Gottfredson
and Hirschi’s definition on account of the fact that it already includes an element of
explanation — the pursuit of self-interest.
Wikstro¨m argues for a definition of crime that clearly delineates between a cause
and its resulting effect. His solution is to consider crime as a moral action — that
is, an action guided by rules that state what is the right or wrong thing to do in a
particular circumstance — and he defines crime to be “the breach of a moral rule
of conduct stated in law” (Wikstro¨m, 2011b, p. 62). Wikstro¨m defends his position
by arguing that the concept of crime as “moral rule-breaking” is more precise than
concepts such as “delinquency” or “antisocial behaviour”, and that it makes clear
that such rules may vary across time and space (Wikstro¨m, 2009b, p. 63).
Wikstro¨m’s definition addresses the difficulties posed by the purely legal definitions
of crime, as it focuses on an individual’s own sense of morality rather than just the
morality enshrined in legislation. His definition’s focus on rule-breaking also treats
crime purely as an effect, not a cause, eliminating any potential ambiguities that
may emerge when seeking to understand the causes of crime. For these reasons,
this is the definition this thesis will use.
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2.1.1.2 Terrorism
Definitions of terrorism are many and varied, as are acts of terrorism themselves.
Violent acts such as shootings, bombings and arson are clearly crimes in their own
right. In the UK, non-violent terrorist activities such as joining a global terrorist or-
ganisation and the distribution of extremist material have also been criminalised in
specific legislation, such as the Terrorism Act 2000 and Terrorism Act 2006 (Sim-
cox et al., 2010). Terrorist offences are therefore enshrined in law in the same way
as any other crime. So what makes terrorism distinctive?
Elworthy and Rifkind consider terrorism to be “a tactic rather than a definable en-
emy” (2006, p. 27): terrorism is a means to an end, and that means happens to be
a violent criminal one. Shaftoe et al. (2007) among others agree, noting that terror-
ism is above all a crime, that acts of terrorism should be treated as such through the
criminal justice system, and that in order to prevent terrorism happening practition-
ers need to understand what makes people offend and what makes people desist.
In this sense, these researchers consider terrorism to be no different from any other
crime.
However some academics do put more emphasis on terrorism’s differences rather
than similarities with other forms of crime. Victoroff examined many definitions
and noted two underlying principles across them all: that of aggression against non-
combatants, and that the action is not intended to accomplish a political goal in itself
but instead to influence and change the behaviour of a target audience (2005, p. 4).
But do these principles mean that acts of terrorism should be considered distinct
from other crimes?
Recall that in this thesis crime is defined to be the breaking of a moral rule that is en-
shrined in law. If we take terrorism to be a concept entirely distinct from crime, what
would an equivalent definition of terrorism look like? Victoroff’s first principle —
that terrorism consists of aggression towards non-combatants — requires no alter-
ation of our definition of crime: aggression towards non-combatants is certainly an
act that breaches moral rules in most (if not all) human societies. Victoroff’s second
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principle is however more interesting, as it refers to the intention behind the crim-
inal (terrorist) act. But all offenders will have some form of intention behind their
criminal activity, be it financial gain in cases of armed robbery, personal power for
many domestic violence cases, or influence in cases of blackmail (Taylor and Hor-
gan, 2006). These different intentions do not alter the definition of the offender’s
actions as being crimes. The effect that different intentions might have would be on
the offender’s sense of morality and the way their propensity to commit a crime or
an act of terrorism has developed. Therefore what makes terrorism different from
other crimes is how the offender’s criminal propensity develops, not the act of ter-
rorism itself. This distinction is highlighted by the fact that the development of an
individual’s propensity to commit acts of terrorism is given a name — “radicalisa-
tion” — while no equivalent term exists for individual propensity development in
the case of general crime.
In summary, terrorism is the word used to describe crimes perpetrated by individuals
whose intent is to influence or change the behaviour of a target audience using
methods of fear or intimidation of non-combatants. A terrorist act is therefore just
a normal criminal act, but the causes behind the act may be different. This will be
explored in the next section.
2.1.2 Causes of Crime
Before considering the causes of crime (including terrorism) it is important to draw
a distinction between causation and correlation. Correlation merely demonstrates
that two variables are related: that when one goes up in value the other also goes up
in value, for instance. However causation requires more than merely being able to
predict the outcome of one variable from another variable: for example, a barometer
predicts weather conditions, but it does not cause them (Wikstro¨m, 2011b, p. 57).
In that particular example, it is a change in atmospheric pressure that causes both
the reading on the barometer and the change in the weather; the barometer reading
is therefore a marker, not a cause, of a change in weather.
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It is not possible to consider causes without also considering effects. A cause must
be a cause of something. An effect can be anything for which an explanation is
sought — an increase in antisocial behaviour, for example, which may have a num-
ber of causes that a researcher might want to identify. But how can one tell whether
a variable correlated with this effect is a marker or a cause? The answer lies in how
the cause and the effect are related, not the mere fact that they are related. This
“how” is the causal process, which is a mechanism that not only provides a logical
link between the cause and the effect, but also brings about the effect (Wikstro¨m,
2011b, p. 58).
2.1.2.1 Proximal Causes of Crime
Where the logical link between a cause and an effect is direct, we call this a prox-
imal cause. An example from the physical sciences is that heating a gas results in
it expanding: the mechanism by which this happens is through the increase in the
kinetic energy of the molecules that comes with the increase in temperature. How-
ever, this effect on the volumne of gas only happens if pressure is kept constant;
if the gas is heated and simultaneously the pressure is increased, the gas will not
expand in the usual way. This is an example of a causal interactions.
In the social world causal processes are rarely simple, and there are generally many
factors and many causal interactions to take into consideration. The factors and
interactions that make up the proximal causes of crime are a key research inter-
est of environmental criminologists, and a number of theories have emerged from
this school such as routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979), crime pattern
theory (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993), and rational choice theory (Cornish
and Clarke, 1986). The first of these, routine activity theory, suggests that it is the
routine day-to-day activities of offenders and victims that lead them to be in certain
places at certain times, and that it is the convergence of a motivated offender and a
suitable target at the same place and the same time (and with no capable guardians
present) that causes crime to happen. These three elements — the offender, the
victim, and the place — have been called the “crime triangle” by environmental
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criminologists (Clarke and Eck, 2003). Crime pattern theory extends these ideas;
this theory notes that spatial patterns of crime are not random, and that crime is
more likely to occur where the “activity space” of an offender overlaps with the
activity space of a potential victim. Rational choice theory concerns the decision
making of the offender: it assumes that offenders are rational actors who weigh up
the costs and benefits of their decisions before they choose to offend.
Applying these ideas to an example, one can put forward a hypothetical argument
that football matches cause an increase in pick-pocketing. In order for the pres-
ence of a football match to be a cause rather than a marker of pick-pocketing there
also has to be a causal mechanism; this could be that the football match results in
large crowds, which provides plenty of targets and cover for pick-pockets, attracting
them to the location. As the crime triangle illustrates, for pick-pocketing to happen
there needs to be an offender present, some potential victims, and an appropriate
environment in which the offence can take place; it is the confluence of these three
elements at the same time, brought about as a result of the football match, that
causes the increase in pick-pocketing.
The precise confluence of these elements varies enormously from crime to crime,
but it can always be argued that crime occurs as a result of an offender encountering
a particular setting, and therefore that the immediate cause of crime “is always
a question of a person-environment causal interaction” (Wikstro¨m, 2011b, p. 58).
It should therefore come as no surprise that terrorism — as a form of crime —
has similarly been observed to be “a product of its own place and time” (Post,
2005).
2.1.2.2 Situational Action Theory
Situational Action Theory (SAT) is a general theory of crime causation proposed
by Wikstro¨m that builds upon these ideas. It seeks to explain why people choose
to breach moral rules. The question of why people commit crime then becomes a
special case of the more general theory explaining the breaches in moral rules: it is
simply the cases where the moral rules that are broken have been enshrined in law
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(Wikstro¨m, 2009b, p. 63). SAT argues that crime — the breaking of moral rules
enshrined in law — is an action that an individual may choose to take when inter-
acting with a certain environment. When the individual is in that environment they
will perceive a number of different action alternatives, and if one of these action
alternatives is to commit a crime then they may then choose to do so (Wikstro¨m,
2009b, p. 93).
To return to the football match example, a person who carries out the act of pick-
pocketing at a match will have both identified that pick-pocketing is an action al-
ternative and chosen to carry it out. This tells us something about their sense of
morality and their levels of self-control: they may consider pick-pocketing to be
a perfectly acceptable act, or they may accept that it is morally wrong but decide
to do it anyway because of the ease of carrying out the act in a large crowd and
the low risk of being caught. Wikstro¨m notes these two attributes — morality and
a person’s ability to exercise self-control — as the key components in a person’s
criminal propensity. Many previous researchers have shown that these personality
traits are strongly correlated with criminal activity (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990;
Grasmick et al., 1993; Pratt and Cullen, 2000; Hawkins et al., 1998; Jan Stams et al.,
2006), but Situational Action Theory explains why.
However it is not merely the presence of a person with the propensity to pick-pocket
that causes the crime to take place. As the crime triangle shows, there also needs to
be an appropriately criminogenic setting and some potential victims. These are the
situational factors that need to be present for an individual with the right propensity
to choose to commit a crime then and there. And so, according to SAT, the direct
causes of crime are an individual with a sufficient criminal propensity, and the right
environment.
2.1.2.3 Causes of the Causes
One criticism of SAT is that it is entirely focussed on the present and ignores broader
social conditions that are associated with higher levels of crime, such as poverty, low
levels of education, and family break-up. Wikstro¨m’s defence is that these factors
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are the causes of the causes of crime; they should certainly not be ignored, but as
their effect on crime is indirect they do not form part of the SAT model. SAT is
concerned with the direct proximal causes of crime, being the interaction between a
person’s criminal propensity and their environment, resulting in an act of crime. The
causes of the causes are what leads the person to have such a criminal propensity
in the first place, what makes a setting criminogenic, and what causes the person to
be present in the setting. Wikstro¨m refers to these as “person emergence”, “social
emergence”, and “selection” respectively (Wikstro¨m, 2011b, p. 69).
As previously discussed, a person’s criminal propensity can be broken down into
their morality and their ability to exercise self-control. What causes “person emer-
gence” to happen can therefore be divided into the process of a person’s moral edu-
cation, and the process of the development of cognitive skills relevant to self-control
(Wikstro¨m, 2011b, p. 69). The underlying causes of each will vary from person to
person and may be biological or environmental in origin, or a combination of both
(the well-known “nature versus nurture” debate). But the causes will be specific to
each person.
“Social emergence” is the question of how a setting becomes criminogenic — that
is, what is it about the setting that encourages those with a propensity for crime to
go there and commit crime. This question has two sides: firstly, which wider envi-
ronmental factors are relevant to making a setting criminogenic, and secondly, how
do certain settings become distinct from other settings in relation to these factors,
and thus become more criminogenic (Wikstro¨m, 2011b, p. 69). Relevant factors
could include levels of heterogeneity in the population, residential segregation, or
the amount of official monitoring of certain settings. These factors are broad in
their nature, as the causes of social emergence lie in factors that affect wider soci-
ety. These indirect causes thus operate at the systemic level.
“Selection” refers to the processes that lead certain people to be present at certain
settings. There could be a variety of reasons why people go to certain settings, in-
cluding both individual factors such as habits and lifestyle preferences (which them-
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selves are the outcome of a social process), and socio-demographic factors such as
age, occupation, religion and ethnic group (Wikstro¨m, 2011b, p. 70). Selection has
a role both as a direct and an indirect cause of crime: if the settings an individual
chooses to go to are criminogenic then the individual may decide to commit a crime
there (the direct cause). But even if they do not commit crime when at a crimino-
genic setting, they will still become exposed to criminogenic moral contexts, which
may influence their moral development (the indirect cause).
The causes of the causes of crime can therefore be considered to comprise three lev-
els: the individual level, the ecological level, and the systemic level. The individual
level is concerned with the impact of a person’s individual vulnerability, consisting
of their moral development, ability to exercise self-control, and individual factors
that influence selection such as lifestyle preferences. The ecological level relates to
the environment — the settings to which a person becomes exposed, and in partic-
ular criminogenic ones. The systemic level is about the wider societal issues that
lead to the emergence of criminogenic settings. All three levels are necessary to
provide a full explanation for the causes of the causes of crime.
2.1.3 What is “Radicalisation”?
The previous section presented the three levels of the causes of the causes of crime,
which illustrate how an individual can develop the propensity to commit crime when
they are in a setting conducive to criminal behaviour. Separately the argument has
been put forward, supported by Elworthy and Rifkind (2006) and Shaftoe et al.
(2007) among others, that terrorism is simply a type of crime — albeit a crime that
has a specific underlying reason behind it. By combining these ideas, a definition
of radicalisation presents itself: radicalisation is the process by which an individual
develops the propensity to commit an act of terrorism (Bouhana and Wikstro¨m,
2011).
As with more general crimes, the process by which an individual’s propensity to
commit acts of terrorism develops is a “cause of the cause” of crime (specifically
36 Chapter 2. Literature Review
terrorism), and is a slow, developmental process. If the assumption is made that the
process of radicalisation is analagous to the process by which criminal propensity
develops, the three levels described in the previous section can be used to syn-
thesise what is known about radicalisation from the wider literature (Bouhana and
Wikstro¨m, 2011). Bouhana and Wikstro¨m used the three levels to create a model of
radicalisation called the Individual Vulnerability, Exposure and Emergence (IVEE)
theoretical framework for this very purpose.
2.2 The IVEE Theoretical Framework for Radicali-
sation
In this section the three levels of IVEE — individual vulnerability, exposure, and
emergence — will be explored in more detail to establish what each represents, how
the causal factors are linked, and ultimately how each contributes to the process by
which radicalisation happens.
2.2.1 Individual Vulnerability
In the context of IVEE the term “individual vulnerability” specifically refers to an
individual’s vulnerability to a change in their propensity to commit an act of terror-
ism, where propensity comprises the individual’s level of morality and their ability
to exercise self-control. There are two factors that need to be present for a change
in individual vulnerability to happen: the first is for the individual to be cognitively
susceptible to being influenced by a radicalising moral context when they have been
sufficiently exposed to one, and the second is for them to find themselves in an en-
vironment where such a context exists, or susceptibility to selection.
2.2.1.1 Cognitive Susceptibility
Individuals who are cognitively susceptible to developing the propensity to commit
terrorist acts display specific cognitive difficulties. These cognitive difficulties make
them less able to exercise self-control, and more easily influenced by radicalising
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moral contexts. But what makes some people more likely to suffer these difficulties
than others?
This first issue, an inability to exercise self-control, is a consequence of impaired
cognitive skill development (Bouhana and Wikstro¨m, 2011). Previously, some crim-
inologists including Gottfredson and Hirschi in their seminal work on construct-
ing a general theory of crime, had supposed capacity to exercise self-control to be
environmentally-driven. However more recent work in the field of neuroscience has
questioned this and suggested that there may be a genetic component.
Neuroscientists have determined that capacity to exercise self-control resides
largely in the brain’s prefrontal cortex (Beaver et al., 2007). The co-ordinated ac-
tions of the prefrontal cortex are known by neuropsychologists as “executive func-
tions”, and capacity for self-control is just one of a larger cluster of functions such as
planning, cognitive flexibility, and decision making, all of which reside in this part
of the brain (Suchy, 2009). The prefrontal cortex is the last part of the brain to de-
velop, only becoming fully mature when an individual is in their early to mid-20s,
which does potentially support Gottfredson and Hirschi’s theory that self-control
develops in accordance with an individual’s environment. However, in a study on
American kindergarten children, Beaver et al. (2007) found that problems with ca-
pacity to exercise self-control were largely already determined by the time children
start school.
This finding does not necessarily contradict the possibility that capacity to exer-
cise self-control arises from environmental factors; brain development starts in the
womb, and exposure to toxins such as alcohol and other drugs during gestation can
impede brain growth and lead to later problems in executive functioning. How-
ever, findings from twin studies have largely invalidated this theory, with one study
conducted on 17 year old American youths finding that differences in executive
functions are “almost entirely” genetic (Friedman et al., 2008).
The second feature of a cognitively susceptible individual is that they are more
easily influenced by radicalising moral contexts. This is essentially a matter of
38 Chapter 2. Literature Review
differences in a person’s moral education (Wikstro¨m, 2011b, p. 69). But from where
might such a difference originate? Moral psychologists believe that moral reasoning
comes from a combination of an intuitive or affective response, and a reasoned or
cognitive response (Haidt, 2001; Greene and Haidt, 2002). Of these two reactions to
a situation the affective response occurs first, with the cognitive response happening
in slower time: a person will first feel a “gut” reaction to a situation, and then use
their reasoning to either justify this reaction or override it. If they have reasoned
their way to a different response from the initial affective response, when faced
with the same situation another time their affective response may have changed
accordingly. A change in morality thus comes about as a result of a considered
argument for a different course of action than the one initially supported. This may
emerge from an internal thought process, or from discussing the situation with other
people who offer a different perspective (Haidt, 2007). This latter reason depends
on the ability of other people to influence the individual, and in the context of IVEE
relates to how radicalising the setting is to which the individual is exposed. But in
the former case — an internal thought process — people are more likely to change
their minds when a situation activates certain brain regions associated with internal
conflict (specifically, the anterior cingulate cortex and the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex), which makes them slower to respond (Greene et al., 2004).
A review of neuropsychological studies into morality conducted by Fumagalli and
Priori offers further insight into which parts of the brain are responsible for different
aspects of morality, again highlighting in particular the roles of the anterior cingu-
late cortex and parts of the prefrontal cortex (2012, p. 2008). The key conclusion of
importance for this thesis is that a brain network for morality does exist, and thus
that an individual’s cognitive susceptibility to moral change is at least in part due
to biological factors. Fumagalli and Priori’s work also notes that the brain regions
affecting morality are different for those diagnosed with psychopathy than they are
for the general population, suggesting that it is perfectly possible for someone to
be highly cognitively susceptible to moral change without them showing signs of
psychopathy. This supports the observation that neither criminals nor terrorists are
2.2. The IVEE Theoretical Framework for Radicalisation 39
generally psychopaths.
It should also be noted that these two cognitive traits — differences in capacity to
exercise self-control and in morality — are not entirely independent of each other.
In particular, Gino et al. (2011) conducted research into the effect that reducing
people’s capacity to exercise self-control has on their moral behaviour. The authors
of this paper made two relevant findings: firstly that an individual’s reserves of
self-control do get depleted when the individual is continually exposed to situations
where they are have to exercise restraint, and secondly that when the person’s self-
control reserves have been depleted, they are more likely to behave unethically.
These are significant findings for the current research, as they demonstrate that even
an individual with great capacity to exercise self-control will still be influenced
by radicalising moral contexts if they receive enough exposure. Gino et al. did
however note one important exception, which is that individuals with very high
personal moral standards are less influenced by self-control depletion. The authors
suggested that this may be because such individuals “have strongly internalized
moral standards and thus do not need to expend cognitive resources when thinking
through the decision of how to resolve ethical dilemmas” (2011, p. 193).
To summarise, it is possible to present a biological definition for what it means for
someone to be cognitively susceptible to moral change, which is that the person’s
anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are more likely to be
activated when presented with a difficult situation. When this is combined with im-
paired executive functioning skills, indicative of an inability to exercise self-control,
this describes the cognitive condition of a person who would be highly susceptible
to radicalisation.
2.2.1.2 Self-Selection and Lifestyle Choices
An individual’s susceptibility to selection is also a key component of their indi-
vidual vulnerability, as an individual may be inherently persuadable, but if they
never come into contact with a radicalising moral context they will never develop
the propensity to commit terrorism. The personal characteristics that lead some-
40 Chapter 2. Literature Review
one to be more likely to come into contact with radicalising environments include
socio-demographics, social networks, and the person’s lifestyle preferences such
as whether they enjoy a trip to the pub or visiting bookshops (Wikstro¨m, 2011b,
p. 70).
Self-selective factors are difficult to model precisely, as by their very nature they
are individualistic. However, one logical hypothesis that can be put forward is that
a person is more likely to want to go to locations where similar people also go. This
is a phenomenon called homophily: that a person seeks out like-minded company
(Kandel, 1978; Kandel et al., 1990). It can also be assumed that individuals are
more likely to go to places that are located closer to where they live or work — their
“activity space”, to use the language of routine activity theory. Additionally, a place
that attracts a larger number of people will attract people from a wider catchment
area, so the size of the setting may also be an important factor influencing a person’s
decision to go there.
2.2.2 Exposure
For exposure to radicalising settings to happen there is a requirement both for rad-
icalising settings to be present, and also for the individual to find themselves in
their vicinity. Selection is therefore key to exposure, as is the environment itself.
Self-selective factors were covered in the previous section under Individual Vul-
nerability, but the ecological level provides further selective factors through socio-
demographics — this is social selection.
The concept of an individual’s activity field is a useful way to explain the exposure
aspect of the IVEE framework. An activity field is the configuration of different
settings to which a person is exposed during a given time period (Wikstro¨m et al.,
2010, p. 59). Analysis of the activity fields of adolescents has enabled conclusions
to be drawn regarding the effects that exposure to criminogenic settings has on the
likelihood that the adolescents commit crime (Wikstro¨m et al., 2010). An individual
at a higher risk of developing the propensity for crime is one whose activity field
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leads them to encounter a higher number of criminogenic settings, resulting in that
individual finding themselves repeatedly exposed to criminogenic moral contexts.
An activity field can be represented as an array or a table of settings for each person,
where each entry in the table indicates the likelihood that the person visits that
setting.
The concept of an activity field is very similar to the idea of an activity space in
routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979). While RAT seeks to explain the
proximal causes of crime rather than the distal developmental causes that IVEE is
seeking to explain, the fundamental idea of an activity field or an activity space
as being a representation of where people spend time on a day-to-day basis is the
same.
2.2.2.1 Social Selection
An individual may find themselves in the vicinity of a radicalising setting due to
their own social networks or lifestyle preferences, as already discussed. However
preferences work at the ecological level as well as the individual level, as members
of particular groups are more likely to find themselves in some settings than others:
for instance, students will be more likely to attend special interest groups on a uni-
versity campus, while Muslims will more likely go to a mosque or Islamic commu-
nity centre. This form of selection, social selection, constrains self-selection by de-
termining the settings in which an individual is most likely to find themselves.
2.2.2.2 The Environment
Of course, one cannot consider either self- or social-selection without considering
the wider environment in which the person’s activity field is situated (Bouhana and
Wikstro¨m, 2011; Wikstro¨m et al., 2010). For instance, a university student at a rural
campus may have a similar daily pattern to a university student in the centre of a
large city in terms of how long they spend at lectures, in halls, or socialising. But
the likelihood that they encounter radicalising settings in the course of their daily
lives would likely be very different.
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Radicalising settings can be either physical spaces such as a cafe´ or a leisure centre,
or they can be virtual settings such as web forums. These locations attract individ-
uals with the propensity for terrorism because they offer some degree of privacy
(or at least the perception of privacy), enabling these individuals to carry out illegal
activities without interruption or identification.
The local environment forms a key part of the exposure element of IVEE, as a
person cannot be exposed to radicalising moral contexts unless they are located in
places the person actually visits. However the question of how these radicalising
moral contexts come to appear in any particular environment is a question of emer-
gence.
2.2.3 Emergence
The final element in the IVEE framework is concerned with how radicalising set-
tings emerge. Some settings are evidently more radicalising than others: for in-
stance Al Qa’ida’s recruiters are more likely to hand out leaflets near a mosque than
at a rural village feˆte. But what features of a setting lead to it becoming an attractive
location for those with the intent to radicalise?
A setting can be considered radicalising if a radicalising moral context is routinely
found there (Bouhana and Wikstro¨m, 2011). Some of these contexts are not physical
locations — websites, for example, or even television programmes that normalise
types of terrorist behaviour. However as radicalising settings are thankfully ex-
tremely rare, the reasons behind why some settings become radicalising and other
do not is under-researched. Some parallels can however be drawn with the emer-
gence of criminogenic settings — that is, settings in which a criminalising moral
context is routinely found (Wikstro¨m and Treiber, 2009; Wikstro¨m, 2011b).
A number of suggestions have been put forward for why certain settings become
criminogenic while others do not. One of these comes from social disorganisation
theory, a sociological theory developed in the 1940s that became a popular explana-
tion for why crime rates vary across different locations (Shaw and McKay, 1942).
2.2. The IVEE Theoretical Framework for Radicalisation 43
Social disorganisation theory argues that certain community-level variables that had
been shown to be correlated with increased crime rates, such as the socio-economic
status of local inhabitants and ethnic heterogeneity, only have an indirect effect on
crime. According to the theory, such variables have a direct effect on the level of
social disorganisation in the area, and it is this social disorganisation that leads to
increased levels of crime (Sampson and Groves, 1989, p. 783).
Sampson and Groves (1989) sought to test the veracity of this theory using data from
the 1982 British Crime Survey. Their research tested two links: the first is the link
between five exogenous factors thought to lead to social disorganisation (low socio-
economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, family disruption and
urbanisation), and three variables used to measure social disorganisation (sparsity
of local friendship networks, low levels of participation in local organisations, and
high numbers of unsupervised teenage peer groups). The second is the link between
these social disorganisation variables and crime.
The crime variable was measured both by victimisation numbers and self-reports of
offences. This distinction is important because it tells us something about the lo-
cations of the offences themselves (and therefore the situational factors) versus lo-
cations that influence an individual’s propensity for crime (developmental factors).
If the social disorganisation variables were shown to have a statistically significant
effect on victimisation levels that would suggest that offences are more likely to
take place in settings that suffer from social disorganisation — meaning that social
disorganisation is a cause of the situational factors leading to crime. However a
link between the social disorganisation variables and self-reported offences (which
would not necessarily take place in the neighbourhood in question) would suggest
that exposure to socially disorganised settings affects the development of the of-
fenders’ crime propensity.
Sampson and Groves concluded that there were statistically significant relation-
ships between all three social disorganisation variables and the victimisation data.
However only two of the social disorganisation variables affected self-reports of
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offences: the presence of unsupervised teenage peer groups and the density of lo-
cal friendship networks. Organisational participation had an effect on victimisation
levels but not on self-reports of offences, suggesting that local participation in such
groups may counter crimes at the situational level, but may also cause a displace-
ment effect, with offenders more likely to commit offences outside the commu-
nity.
More recent research by Sampson (2004, 2009) has superseded his previous results
on the effects of social disorganisation on crime. This came as a result of a new
concept called collective efficacy, dubbed the “offspring” of social disorganisation
theory (Sampson, 2009, p. 41), and originally developed by Sampson et al. in 1997.
Collective efficacy is defined to be “social cohesion among neighbors combined
with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good”. Collective ef-
ficacy theory considers that certain exogenous factors lead to a lack of order and
cohesion in a community, and making that community more likely to develop un-
monitored locations that could become safe havens for those engaging in crime.
The factors regarded as likely to cause a lack of collective efficacy are high levels of
segregation, sparsity of social ties, sparsity of local organisations/civic structures,
and “routine activities” — that is, how the ecological distribution of daily routine
activities affect crime (Sampson, 2009).
There is evidently some overlap in the indicators of collective efficacy and social
disorganisation. Sampson acknowledges this, but considers social disorganisation
to be a marker for low collective efficacy, in the same way as crime itself is, and that
collective efficacy is the true causal factor behind the emergence of criminogenic
settings (2009, p. 51).
2.2.4 The Complete IVEE Framework
The interactions of the causal factors making up the IVEE framework can be
summarised as a flowchart, as shown in Figure 2.1 (Bouhana and Wikstro¨m,
2011).
Figure 2.1: The IVEE model of radicalisation (Bouhana and Wikstro¨m, 2011). The left half of the diagram shows how socio-demographic, cognitive
and selective factors contribute to an individual’s overall vulnerability to moral change. The right half of the diagram shows the envi-
ronmental factors that contribute to the emergence of a radicalising setting, with the top right quadrant indicating that when a vulnerable
individual becomes exposed to such a setting they develop an increased propensity to commit acts of terrorism. The red arrows indicate
parts of the model affected by feedback: increased exposure to radicalising settings increases the self-selective factors contributing to an
individual’s vulnerability to moral change, and also increases that vulnerability directly.
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2.3 Radicalisation Literature Review
This section comprises a literature review of radicalisation research. The sub-
sections below are structured so that each introduces a different theory behind
radicalisation that has been suggested by academics from different fields of study.
For theories where a complete explanation for radicalisation has been proposed the
IVEE framework will be used to analyse the theory and identify any areas of con-
tradiction or where current knowledge is lacking. This also allows for the IVEE
framework to be compared with alternative theories.
2.3.1 Moral Shocks
A number of convicted Islamist terrorists have cited as the reason for their radical-
isation some atrocity in which they consider Western governments to be complicit.
For example, O’Duffy relates the story of Nizar Trabelsi, a Tunisian arrested for
plotting an Al Qa’ida bombing mission against US Forces (O’Duffy, 2008, p. 37).
Trabelsi told the court at his trial that he was inspired to become a martyr for Bin
Laden after he saw pictures of a Palestinian infant girl killed by Israeli forces in
Gaza in 2001. A second example comes from Ed Husain’s autobiographical account
of his involvement with the Islamist movement, when in 1993 he used a video de-
picting the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims to encourage students to become
involved with the Islamist cause (Husain, 2007). The importance of such “moral
shocks” is a known recruitment tool for other extremist movements too: in their
research on the animal rights and anti-nuclear protest groups Jasper and Poulsen
(1995) observed that those recruited into these social movements would either join
due to their existing social networks, or following a moral shock. These moral
shocks instil a sense of purpose in an individual and cause them to seek a way to
take action, which the individual then does by joining the movement.
However a moral shock can only take a person so far down the path of radicalisation.
These shocks may cause them to join a movement, and may be cited afterwards as
the individual’s reason for committing terrorist offences, but across the radicalisa-
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tion literature it is recognised that there is more to the process than this. Very few
people could honestly say that they have never experienced a moral shock — the 11
September 2001 attacks or the Beslan school massacre in 2004 are clear examples
that horrified the Western world. But for the vast majority these shocks do not cause
a change in their morality or behaviour. So why are some people affected differently
from others?
2.3.2 Rational Choice Theory
One key question is whether those who have been radicalised had a pre-disposition
to terrorism prior to being exposed to the radical narrative. Are those who are
radicalised inherently different from the rest of us on a psychological level? Many
psychologists have explored this question, with the consensus being that terrorists in
general do not suffer from psychopathy (Victoroff, 2005; Post, 2005; Borum, 2011b;
Pisoiu, 2013). The actions of terrorists may seem insane from the point of view of
an outsider, but terrorists do behave rationally in the sense that (to them) they are
making logical decisions. This observation is supported by Rational Choice Theory,
a theory promoted by criminologists Cornish and Clarke (1987) who considered
criminals to be rational actors able to weigh up the costs and benefits of participating
in crime. When applied to terrorism, Rational Choice Theory considers terrorist
action to come from a conscious, calculated decision that carrying out the action is
the optimum strategy to achieve a socio-political end (Victoroff, 2005, p. 14).
If one assumes Rational Choice Theory to be correct, the question of why some peo-
ple become radicalised and others do not becomes instead one of why some people
consider terrorist action to be a rational alternative and others do not. But rationality
itself is very subjective, in that two rational people can decide on different actions
because they consider different things to be important. For example, suppose two
people have the same journey to work and the same information about the health
benefits and risks of cycling. Based on this information Person A chooses to cycle
to work because of the health benefits, while Person B opts for the bus because they
fear becoming involved in a road traffic accident if they cycle. Neither decision is
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necessarily more rational than the other, but the two people have come to different
decisions over whether to cycle because they have different attitudes to risk. By
thinking about radicalisation in similar terms it becomes easier to understand why,
when exposed to a moral shock or radical narrative, some people become motivated
to take action in response while others do not (Purves et al., 2008, p. 606).
This individuality becomes even starker when one considers the different starting
points terrorists have. Terrorists come from a multitude of different socio-economic,
ethnic, and religious backgrounds, and one cannot assume that individuals belong-
ing to certain sectors of society are more vulnerable to becoming radicalised than
others (Sageman, 2004; Victoroff, 2005). Even if this were the case, the problem of
specificity still applies, as Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) discovered when they
explored the case of two brothers with the same upbringing and exposure, only one
of whom went on to become involved with terrorism. Every person’s experience of
radicalisation is highly individual (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010, p. 38).
2.3.3 The Conveyor Belt Theory and Radicalisation Path-
ways
From the previous two sub-sections it can be concluded that a moral shock can
provide the trigger for someone to join a group that provides them with radicalising
influences, and that those who have been radicalised are rational actors making
choices that seem, to them, to be logical ones. But neither theory has yet provided
a coherent explanation for what is actually happening when somebody experiences
radicalisation.
One theory that has gained media attention (Elliot, 2002; Malik, 2005; The Week,
2015) and traction among some US Government organisations (U.S. Department
of State, 2006) following 11 September 2001 is the idea of radicalisation as a con-
veyor belt, whereby an individual who feels a grievance starts along a trajectory
that ends in violence (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009). Supporters of this theory
suggest a mechanism which sees terrorist recruiters deliberately seeking “to convert
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alienated or aggrieved populations, convert them to extremist viewpoints, and turn
them, by stages, into sympathizers, supporters and, ultimately, members of terror-
ist networks” (U.S. Department of State, 2006). This suggests someone who holds
“extreme” views but has never committed any acts of violence is on the way to
becoming a terrorist.
Proponents of this view suggest that non-violent activist groups that hold extreme
views provide a fertile recruiting ground for terrorist organisations. However op-
ponents highlight that attitudes and behaviours are different, and that non-violent
activist groups who hold the same views as terrorist organisations actually provide
an alternative outlet for people (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009, p. 240). For ex-
ample, the radical Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami has been regarded by some
as an organisation that contributes to violence and requires surveillance; others sug-
gest that Hizb ut-Tahrir competes with Al-Qa’ida, as both are trying to recruit from
the same pool of individuals, with Hizb ut-Tahrir providing a non-violent option
(Karagiannis and McCauley, 2006).
Moskalenko and McCauley conducted a study to establish which school of thought
was better supported by empirical evidence; their methodology suffered from a lack
of rigour as they measured only the intentions of participants rather than their ac-
tions, but their results showed conclusively that it is only a small minority of those
with “activist” (non-violent) intentions that also have “radical” (violent) intentions
(2009, p. 256). It is reasonable to suppose that even fewer of those with violent
intentions actually went on to carry these out. Moskalenko and McCauley con-
cluded that the evidence refutes the conveyor belt theory, and considered it to be an
“unhelpful metaphor”.
2.3.4 Radicalisation as a Multi-Stage Process
Despite its shortcomings, the conveyor belt theory does introduce the notion of
radicalisation as a pathway. The pathway approach has been endorsed by psychol-
ogists Taylor and Horgan who, having noted that the state of being a terrorist is
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not in itself a psychopathology, have pushed for researchers to move away from
profiling terrorists and instead to view involvement in terrorism as a process (Tay-
lor and Horgan, 2006; Horgan, 2008). Taylor and Horgan define a process to be a
“sequence of events, involving steps or operations that are usually ordered and/or
interdependent”, however they distinguish this from the conveyor belt metaphor by
emphasising that the elements of the process do not need to follow each other deter-
ministically (2006, p. 586). They add that there is not one single route to terrorism,
and that every individual who is radicalised follows their own trajectory. But despite
these individualised trajectories, researchers have attempted to synthesise the data
from actual cases of radicalisation and produce a definitive description of what the
radicalisation process looks like. Many of these have taken the form of multi-stage
process.
One example of these mutli-stage processes comes from Silber and Bhatt, who pro-
duced a report for the New York City Police Department in which they provide a
simple and much-quoted four stage process for (Islamic) radicalisation:
• Stage 1: Pre-radicalisation, consisting of the period before people become
exposed to jihadi-Salafi Islam;
• Stage 2: Self-identification, when people come to associate themselves with
the ideology;
• Stage 3: Indoctrination, where their belief deepens and they decide action
must be taken; and
• Stage 4: Jihadisation, when they consider themselves to be holy warriors or
mujahedeen. (Silber and Bhatt, 2007)
In another example, Wiktorowitcz applied social movement theory to the phe-
nomenon of recruitment to militant jihadist groups and also developed a four stage
process. These four stages are:
• Stage 1: Cognitive opening, whereby an individual becomes receptive to new
ideas;
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• Stage 2: Religious seeking;
• Stage 3: Frame alignment, where the narrative of the radical group “makes
sense” to the individual;
• Stage 4: Socialisation into the group. (Wiktorowitcz, 2005)
These two examples are the most cited multi-stage processes in the radicalisation
literature, and have been developed by individuals who are well-respected in the
field, either through experience as practitioners (in the case of Silber and Bhatt) or
through an extensive academic career (Wiktorowitcz). How do they sit with the
IVEE framework?
Taking Silber and Bhatt’s process first. Recall that in this thesis radicalisation is
defined to be the development of an individual’s propensity to commit an act of
terrorism. As explained in Section 2.1.2.2, an individual has a propensity to commit
an act of crime (or terrorism) if, when in a particular situation, they see a criminal
(terrorist) act as one of their action alternatives and choose to carry out this act.
This propensity develops through the individual’s moral education, and through
the development of their cognitive skills in relation to their ability to exercise self-
control.
Examining Silber and Bhatt’s process in detail, Stage 1 is actually the point before
the person starts on the path to radicalisation, and therefore does not form part of
the process itself. Stage 2 is about the individual identifying with an ideology. The
concept of “ideology” will be explored in greater detail later, but the way Silber
and Bhatt use the term here, its importance lies in the way it affects an individual’s
lifestyle preferences, leading them to choose to spend time in particular settings
and with particular (probably like-minded) people. In the language of IVEE, Stage
2 is thus about selection. Stage 3, indoctrination, is where the person decides to take
action. Relating this to the IVEE framework indoctrination can be considered as the
individual having received sufficient exposure to a radicalising narrative for their
morality to start to change. Stage 4 then sees the completion of this process.
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Wiktorowitcz’s process refers to recruitment rather than radicalisation, but by exam-
ining it through the lens of the IVEE framework we can explore whether any parts
of this process relate to radicalisation as this thesis has defined it. Stage 1, where
an individual becomes receptive to new ideas, clearly relates to the individual’s vul-
nerability at a psychological level. While Wiktorowitcz’s process does not consider
how such a cognitive opening happens in the first place, through IVEE it can be sur-
mised that it may have been as a result of the individual being exposed to ideas that
challenge them — a moral shock or a radical narrative, for example — and make
them wish to explore these ideas further (selection). Stage 2, religious seeking, is
about exactly that — the individual’s deliberate search for new ideas, causing them
to potentially increase their exposure to radicalising moral contexts. The concept of
“frame alignment” in Stage 3 is an idea that originates in social movement theory,
and has been explored by a number of political sociologists interested in radicalisa-
tion. It therefore deserves its own discussion (see the following section). The final
stage is socialisation into the group; again this relates to the amount of exposure the
individual gets to radicalising moral contexts. The more integrated an individual is
into a group, the more time they will spend with them, and the more likely it is that
the group’s ideas will penetrate the individual and influence their sense of morality.
For law-abiding activist groups this would not result in radicalisation, but for groups
intent on carrying out acts of terrorism it could.
2.3.5 Social Movement Theory
The previous section introduced the idea of frame-alignment as part of Wiktorow-
itcz’s four stage recruitment process. Wiktorowitcz comes from the school of polit-
ical sociologists that promote the use of social movement theory as an explanation
for terrorism and political violence. Social movement theory is interested in large
groups — “social movements” — and examines individuals’ relationships with such
groups, and the groups’ relationships with society (Crossett and Spitaletta, 2010).
The concept of frame-alignment comes from a sub-branch of social movement the-
ory which is known as framing theory. Framing theorists such as Wiktorowitcz fo-
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cus on “the social production and dissemination of meaning and on how individuals
come to conceptualize themselves as a collectivity” (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). A
frame describes an individual’s worldview, values and beliefs, and frame-alignment
refers to the process whereby one reduces the cognitive dissonance between one’s
own frame and that of a group. When these two frames are aligned there is res-
onance between the two parties, and this process explains what makes ideas and
beliefs in social movements so powerful.
From this description of frame-alignment it is not clear where it might fit in the
IVEE framework. However this does not mean that the social movement theoretical
approach conflicts with or is incompatible with IVEE; it simply means that the the-
ory must be approached from a different angle. Recall that IVEE considers causal
factors at different levels — the individual, ecological and systemic levels. The
problem with a concept such as frame-alignment is that it is not clear at which level
it sits, because it is in itself a complex process that works on more than one level.
In order to understand whether the insights offered by social movement theory are
compatible with IVEE it is necessary to separate out the analysis into different lev-
els.
Renowned political scientist Della Porta has done just this, analysing radicalisa-
tion at what she calls the macro, meso and micro levels (Della Porta, 2009). In the
course of her research she has examined political violence and extremism in Italy,
Germany, the Basque region and Ireland over the 1970s-1990s, and conducted com-
parative analyses between these groups and with the more modern phenomena of
global Islamism. Through this she has identified several key concepts at each level.
To what extent can these concepts be synthesised using IVEE?
At the macro level Della Porta proposes two key factors influencing radicalisation:
the closing down of political opportunities, and experience of violent interaction
on the streets (2009, p. 11). Across a variety of states Della Porta observed that
closing down political opportunities has often preceded a rise in political violence.
However, this is a situational factor. Recall that Situational Action Theory con-
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siders crime as a moral action that comes as a result of a person identifying an
act of criminality as an action alternative and then choosing to act on it. Where
political opportunities are closed down, this reduces the possible legal action alter-
natives a person has available, thus making them more likely to choose a criminal
action rather than a non-criminal one. In other words, this factor does not at first
affect a person’s propensity for criminal activity, and hence it does not actually form
part of the radicalisation process. It does however increase the likelihood that they
would choose a criminal action, due to the limited number of options available to
them.
The second factor, experience of violence on the streets, builds on the first. If a
person, through the limited options available to them, chooses to engage in violent
political action, this will have an effect on their environment and their own expo-
sure to criminalising influences. Other people present will also become exposed
to that violence, possibly affecting their moral development, as they may be influ-
enced by what they have seen and experienced and consider violence to be morally
acceptable. This forms part of the IVEE process in that when violence happens a
radicalising setting emerges, and the people who take part or witness that violence
become exposed.
At the meso level, Della Porta proposes that three factors are relevant to radicalisa-
tion: these are competitiveness, encapsulation, and narrative (2009, pp. 13-15). The
first of these, competitiveness, is the idea that different groups compete with each
other in terms of their methods, with some resorting to far more violent means than
others. An individual who supports a cause may have a choice of several groups
to associate with; it is likely that they will choose to associate with the group of
whose methods they most approve. Looking at this phenomenon using the IVEE
framework, an individual in a group that uses peaceful means would not have much
exposure (if any) to radicalising moral contexts, while a person associating with a
group that often resorts to violence would have plenty. Additionally, a person who
already considers violence acceptable according to their own personal moral code
would likely be attracted to groups where violence is a normative behaviour, thus
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becoming further exposed through a self-selective mechanism.
Della Porta’s second idea, encapsulation, refers to the idea of a group having to
go “underground” to escape law enforcement. When this happens, group members
become increasingly cut off from the wider world, and therefore from ideas that
might challenge them. Some groups examined by Della Porta had to resort to fur-
ther criminal activity to raise funds as a result of their going underground, such as
robberies or kidnappings. Encapsulation therefore creates another situational factor
in the SAT model, encouraging group members to engage in criminal activity they
otherwise would not. This creates further criminogenic settings, to which group
members become further exposed, possibly influencing their moral development,
and so the cycle continues.
The idea of the narrative is popular among radicalisation scholars, and it links in
with the notion of a terrorist ideology, which will be explored in greater detail later.
According to Della Porta, a narrative provides targets for the group which, in the
case of groups supportive of violent methods, enable them to legitimise their vio-
lence. However it could be equally argued that the same narrative, when placed be-
fore a non-violent activist group supportive of the same beliefs, would not make the
group consider violence to become legitimate. It might provide targets for peaceful
demonstrations or the writing of angry letters, but it would not on its own encour-
age previously non-violent activists to change their moral standards and become
violent. This argument suggests that narrative is not an inherent part of the radical-
isation process as defined in this thesis.
The final level examined by Della Porta is the micro level, and at this level she iden-
tifies two concepts: affective focussing and cognitive closure. Affective focussing
concerns the changing of an individual’s social network as they become more and
more part of a group. In IVEE this relates to the increased exposure to radicalis-
ing ideas that a person gets from spending more time with their group. Cognitive
closure is where an individual comes to believe the version of reality that the group
puts forward, as opposed to the view of reality accepted by the wider public. Again
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this relates to the increased exposure to radicalising ideas, but cognitive closure fur-
ther implies that these ideas are actually taking hold and affecting a person’s view
of the world. In this way a person’s moral education becomes determined by those
in the group around them, and (unless they are very strong-minded) their views on
what is morally acceptable will be affected.
The social movement theoretical approach to understanding radicalisation offers a
range of concepts to explain how radicalisation happens. Analysing these concepts
through the lens of SAT and IVEE allows us to distinguish between the direct and
indirect causes of political violence and of radicalisation, along with gaining an
increased understanding of how these concepts interact with each other and the
effects they have on the wider person-environment system. The ideas put forward
by social movement theory are compatible with both SAT and the IVEE framework,
and thus add further credence to their usage in this thesis.
2.3.6 Social Psychological Theories
Social psychology is a sub-discipline of psychology that looks to transactions
among groups of people to explain individual behaviour. The field is “an attempt
to understand and explain how the thought, feeling and behavior of individuals are
influenced by the actual, imagined or implied presence of others” (Mitchell, 2010,
p. 246). Its relevance to the study of radicalisation comes from the observation that
terrorism is more often than not a group phenomenon — for instance Post (2005)
has observed that it takes a charismatic leader and a group culture of martyrdom
to inspire people to commit suicide attacks. Psychologists who criticise the social
psychological approach such as Taylor (2010) consider the field to be too concerned
with “propensities to commit violence or their presumed social context” instead of
concentrating on actual violence, however as this thesis is focussed on the develop-
ment of an individual’s propensity, the criticism is irrelevant here. It is also worth
noting that even researchers in the field of lone-actor terrorism concede that they
are seldom entirely socially isolated, and often influenced by a wider group or so-
cial movement (Gill et al., 2014). The potential importance of social psychology in
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radicalisation thus deserves some attention.
This section considers some mechanisms explaining radicalisation that have
emerged from the social psychological school, and examines to what extent the
IVEE framework can be used to synthesise these ideas.
There are a number of key tenets in social psychology that can been applied to
radicalisation. The tenets of particular relevance are:
• Group contexts cultivate extreme attitudes;
• Group decision making is more biased and less rational than individual deci-
sion making;
• In-group/out-group bias, where the behaviour of those within the group is
treated more positively than that of outsiders;
• Decreased sense of individual responsibility for actions;
• Perceived incentives and rewards of group membership, such as social affili-
ation or a personal sense of meaning;
• Group internal norms and rules that control member behaviour (Borum,
2011a).
The background to many of these phenomena has already been made clear through
Della Porta’s work on the relevance of social movement theory to radicalisation.
But what more can these phenomena tell us about the mechanisms within the rad-
icalisation process? McCauley and Moskalenko have suggested five mechanisms
they believe to be responsible for group radicalisation, which are inspired by these
social psychological tenets. These are:
• Group polarisation: extremity shift in like-minded groups;
• The multiplier: extreme cohesion under isolation and threat;
• Outbidding: competition for the same base of support;
• Condensation: competition with state power;
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• Fissioning: within-group competition (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008,
p. 418).
Again there is some similarity with the mechanisms suggested by Della Porta of
the social movement school. However, recall that radicalisation is the development
of an individual’s propensity to commit acts of terrorism. Groups do not commit
terrorist attacks — individuals do. So how do these group mechanisms affect the
state of mind and sense of morality of individual group members? We can turn to
McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) again to answer this question, as they have also
produced a set of individual radicalisation mechanisms:
• Individual radicalisation by personal victimisation;
• Individual radicalisation by political grievance;
• Joining a radical group — the “slippery slope”;
• Joining a radical group — the “power of love” (McCauley and Moskalenko,
2008).
Taking these in turn: individual radicalisation by personal victimisation is “a path
much cited in explanations of suicide terrorists” (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008,
p. 418), for instance in the case of the suicide branches of the Tamil Tigers who
were described as the survivors of Sinhalese atrocities. Data is scarce, but the social
psychological view is that personal victimisation is unlikely to account for group
sacrifice unless a process of frame alignment has taken place. As discussed above,
frame alignment is a concept that works on a number of levels and is difficult to ex-
press in terms of IVEE. In terms of personal victimisation, the IVEE interpretation
would be that an individual’s sense of morality changes through their experience of
being victimised, and they may come to see revenge as a morally justifiable action.
When such people then have exposure to others who share their personal grievance
and contemplate revenge, this strengthens their sense of the justification of their
cause, making them more likely to take violent action.
Individual radicalisation by political grievance describes what happens when an in-
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dividual acts alone (the “lone wolf” terrorist) in response to a political trend or
event. McCauley and Moskalenko suggest that for this type of radicalisation more
than others, “there is a probability of some degree of psychopathology” (2008,
p. 419), a view supported by Corner and Gill (2015) in their research showing the
higher prevalence of mental illness among lone-actor terrorists when compared with
terrorists who act as part of a group. From an IVEE perspective, this suggests that
radicalisation of this type occurs among people who have a very high level of cog-
nitive susceptibility to radicalisation, and require relatively little exposure to radi-
calising influences to develop the propensity to commit a terrorist act. According
to our definition of terrorism some form of cause is still needed, however, in order
to distinguish these individuals as terrorists rather than general criminals, and this
comes from the political grievance.
The “slippery slope” returns to the idea of the conveyor belt which, although gener-
ally regarded as an unhelpful metaphor, does still apply in some cases. The “slippery
slope” follows the principle that if an individual considers one act to be acceptable,
and the rest of his/her peer group consider a slightly more extreme act to be ac-
ceptable, that the individual will come to accept the position of the group. This
process then continues and escalates. It is easy to explain this idea in the language
of IVEE, as it simply sees an individual with one view of morality gain exposure
to people with a slightly different view, and this affects the moral education of the
individual.
The “power of love” idea is more related to social network theory, which will be
examined in more detail later. Suffice to say at this point that when an individual
joins a group they develop a social attachment to the other people in the group.
This attachment gives those people a high degree of influence over the individual,
and as a result the individual may act counter to their actual beliefs because of
the strength of the bonds they have with members of the group. This mechanism
works at the situational level rather than the developmental level, and therefore
does not constitute “radicalisation” as defined in this thesis. However the “power
of love” may act in conjunction with the “slippery slope” as a way of changing an
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individual’s sense of morality after they have taken part in an activity.
Borum (2011a) adds two more mechanisms to this list: individual radicalisation in
status and thrill seeking, and individual opening to radicalisation (or “unfreezing”).
Both relate to the reasons why an individual may choose to join an extreme group
— either due to the perceived excitement of being involved, or due to some desta-
bilising life event. In the language of IVEE, these are reasons why an individual
chooses to become exposed to a radicalising narrative in the first place.
This section has examined the theories put forward by social psychologists as to
how and why radicalisation happens. The suggested radicalisation mechanisms can
all be reformulated in terms of IVEE and support it as a theoretical framework.
It is worth noting that the social psychological mechanisms all tap into either the
individual vulnerability or exposure parts of IVEE, with no consideration given to
the systemic level (emergence). This supports this thesis’ decision to use IVEE as
the theoretical framework on which to build, as it presents the most general and all
encompassing theory of radicalisation currently in existence.
2.3.7 Conversion Theories
Conversion is a word that refers to an individual acquiring a new religion, but
there are some aspects of how this happens that are also applicable to radicalisa-
tion. Much has been written about conversion in the sociological and psychological
literature over the past few decades, making it a rich body of research on which to
draw (Borum, 2011a, p. 22).
Of this research, the “developmental” or “stage” model has generally been the most
popular approach — much like the multi-stage radicalisation processes discussed
in Section 2.3.4. However the linear approach taken by these models was overly
simplistic, and they were ultimately superceded when Rambo (1993) introduced a
model comprising seven components, which is more cumulative and allows each
component to recursively affect the others. These components are:
• Context: the field of cultural, historical, political or social factors that either
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impede or speed up the conversion;
• Crisis: a state of disequilibrium, usually caused by personal or social disrup-
tion;
• Quest: a process of seeking solutions to restore equilibrium, often precipi-
tated by a crisis;
• Encounter: the initial contact between the seeker and the proponent of a spir-
itual option;
• Interaction: exchanges between the seeker and proponent;
• Commitment: a decision to invest in the new religion, accompanied by a
promised bond to identify the person as part of the movement;
• Consequences: the effects of the actions and decisions made in service of the
belief, constantly monitored and evaluated (Rambo, 1993).
There are similarities between this conversion model and the radicalisation process
put forward by Wiktorowitcz (2005), and indeed it is similarly simple to determine
how each component fits into IVEE. Context affects the environment, including
both emergence and selection; a crisis makes a person more cognitively vulnera-
ble; a quest increases the likelihood that they self-select to expose themselves to a
converting (or radicalising) influence; an encounter is the start of this exposure; and
interaction leads to an increase in exposure. Commitment represents the individual’s
conscious decision to become part of the movement, and therefore in the case of ter-
rorist movements it is the culmination of the radicalisation process: once a person
has officially committed in their own minds, they have developed the propensity
to act as the terrorist group wishes them to act. The consequences component of
Rambo’s model is then part of the situational action process — that is, whether a
person actually chooses to take a certain action when in a certain situation.
Other approaches to understanding conversion include that of Kilbourne and
Richardson (1989), who noted that conversion theories can be divided into two
categories: passive and active. The passive theory of conversion sees the convert
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as a passive target whose will is overpowered by brainwashing. The active the-
ory considers the convert to be a rational actor who seeks out the movement and
joins of their own volition. These two types of theory are as equally applicable to
radicalisation as they are to religious conversion but, as Kilbourne and Richardson
found in the case of religious conversion, the majority of research evidence supports
the active theory over the passive one. Interestingly, however, both the active and
the passive schools can be synthesised using IVEE, as they simply describe differ-
ent people and different situations. A passive radicalisation (or conversion) would
come about as a result of the individual being highly receptive to new ideas, so that
very little exposure is required for them to then become sufficiently influenced that
they integrate themselves with the group, receive more exposure, and ultimately be-
come indoctrinated. Active radicalisation is of course similar, in that it requires both
individual vulnerability and exposure, but one would expect to see greater emphasis
on selection and exposure than on cognitive vulnerability.
Another side of radicalisation that has received greater media attention in recent
years is self-radicalisation; that is, radicalisation over the internet with seemingly
no personal contact. This is another area where conversion theory has the upper
hand in terms of previous research conducted, even from before the era of the in-
ternet (Borum, 2011a, p. 24). Lofland and Skonovd (1981) observed that someone
considering a new path will undertake their own research into it first, by reading
books, watching television, or (more recently) searching the internet for relevant
material. They add that “in the course of such reconnaissance, some individuals
convert themselves in isolation from any interaction with devotees of the respective
religion” (Lofland and Skonovd, 1981, p. 376). This phenomenon can be described
in IVEE terms by the individual having immersed themselves sufficiently in the
available material (i.e. gained enough exposure), and having sufficient initial cog-
nitive susceptibility that personal connections are not necessary to complete their
conversion (or radicalisation).
In summary, there are several strands of research into religious conversions that res-
onate with radicalisation, and some theories that are almost entirely directly trans-
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ferable. The two fields are not identical, however, with the key difference being that
during radicalisation the individual experiences a change in their morality, whereby
they end up considering criminal actions to be morally acceptable, when they would
not have thought so before. While this holds true for a small minority of religious
cults, such as the Solar Temple that promoted mass suicide among its followers
(Hall et al., 2000), for the vast majority of religious conversions the moral code pro-
moted by the religion remains compatible with the law, making substantial change
to an individual’s personal moral code unnecessary. However where similarities be-
tween religious conversion and radicalisation do occur, the theories presented are
easily synthesised using IVEE, therefore lending further support to its use as the
theoretical framework on which this thesis relies.
2.3.8 Social Network Theory
Social network theory regards society as a structure consisting of person-to-person
linkages. A social network model is a diagrammatic representation of all the ties be-
tween the different actors, which is often written as a graph (Crossett and Spitaletta,
2010). The nodes of the graph frequently represent individuals, but can also be or-
ganisations or other entities; the graph’s edges represent the relationships between
different actors, which in a simple model might purely indicate acquaintance, but a
more complex model could differentiate between positive and negative relationships
and give an indication of each relationship’s strength (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
When applied to radicalisation, social network analysis can provide an indication of
who the most influential individuals in a social network are; all individuals linked to
the key influencer would then be considered most at risk of being radicalised.
One of the primary proponents of social network theory in relation to radicalisation
research is Marc Sageman (2004), who examined two case studies in particular:
that of the Hamburg cell who were responsible for 9/11, and the Montreal cell who
sought to bomb Los Angeles International Airport in 1999. For both these cells
Sageman observed that the groups developed from the bottom up, starting out as
just a “bunch of guys” who felt alienated in the societies in which they lived, who
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then began to develop an interest in jihad after a chance encounter with a radicalised
individual.
From an IVEE perspective it is clear that the social network approach emphasises
the importance of exposure to radicalising moral contexts. In particular social net-
work theory emphasises the nuances in the exposure element of the IVEE frame-
work, as it highlights that it is not just the amount of exposure an individual has
to radicalising ideas, but also the quality of the exposure, as a radicalising narra-
tive will have more impact when it comes from a person the individual trusts and
respects than it would from a stranger or a person whose opinion the individual
disregards.
Social network theory also offers some interesting insight into the different likely
trajectories of differently structured groups. For example Crossett and Spitaletta
(2010) compared the Egyptian Islamist groups Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and
Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG). EIJ’s leadership is intolerant of dissent and ensures
that EIJ is highly compartmentalised. This makes the movement less vulnerable to
interdiction, and also limits the flow of ideas and opinions across the group as a
whole. This compartmentalisation therefore forces the disparate cells within the
EIJ to experience encapsulation (to use a term from Della Porta’s social move-
ment work) and thus the individuals in each cell only gain exposure to the ideas
of the others in the cell and those of EIJ’s leadership. EIG, on the other hand,
favours a much larger network that is open to recruitment and expansion. EIJ are
a proscribed terrorist group thought to be responsible for attempting to assassinate
Egypt’s former president Hosni Mubarak and interior minister Hassan Al Alfi, while
EIG have openly criticised Al Qa’ida’s violent interpretation of jihad (Kamolnick,
2013). While these differences are unlikely to have arisen solely because of the
groups’ structures, it is a hypothesis that merits further investigation.
Social network theory has its advocates and clearly can add some interesting contri-
butions to the field. However it is limited in its scope, examining only the exposure
strand of the IVEE framework. While individual factors are still acknowledged
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as having an impact on radicalisation, “[s]ocial network theory considers the at-
tributes of individuals less important than their relationships and ties with other ac-
tors within the network” (Crossett and Spitaletta, 2010, p. 16). O’Duffy (2008) also
criticises social network analysis’s narrow view for ignoring macro-level factors
such as social policies that alienate minorities, causing them to develop grievances.
IVEE is far wider in scope, incorporating the impact of grievances through selec-
tion mechanisms that cause a person to become more likely to seek out radicalising
settings, while also giving weight to individual cognitive factors.
2.3.9 The Role Of Ideology
One cannot listen to news reports of terrorist attacks without hearing the term “ide-
ology” frequently used in relation to why an attack has happened. But it is impor-
tant to note that the way the term is used in the media is not necessarily the same
as the way it is used in academia. Among scholars, ideology is a term that was
much debated during the 1960s in the sociological and political science arenas in
relation to certain political schools of thought, such as the “Soviet ideology” (Mi-
nar, 1961; Putnam, 1971; Huaco, 1971). Other academic fields emphasise certain
nuances of the term, leading to disputes within disciplines: for instance, a social
anthropologist might interpret “ideology” to be “a part of culture concerned with
a representation of the social and a commitment to central values”, while another
may use a definition of ideology inspired by Marxism which considers ideology to
be an explanation for why workers are willing to be exploited by a capitalist minor-
ity (Barnard and Spencer, 2010). Away from academia, journalists and politicians
using the word “ideology” do not specify their meaning, but one assumes that most
intend a dictionary definition such as “the set of beliefs characteristic of a social
group or individual” (Oxford, 1999).
Such a range of meanings is one reason for avoiding using the word “ideology”
altogether — as with all terminology, ideology is only a helpful notion if it is well
defined. However, the terms “terrorism” and “radicalisation” can be similarly crit-
icised for having a wide range of meanings, but this does not prevent this thesis
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using them (though ensuring that they are properly defined first). It follows that if a
case can be made for ideology’s importance in the radicalisation process, the term
should be incorporated.
From the literature review above, ideology has only been specifically mentioned
as a part of Silber and Bhatt’s four stage process (see Section 2.3.4). It is worth
noting that the authors of this paper are practitioners, not academics. Silber and
Bhatt place great emphasis on the importance of the jihadi-Salafi ideology in rad-
icalisation, noting that it is “the driver” that motivates people to carry out acts of
terrorism such as the Madrid 2004 bombings and London’s 7/7 bombing. Silber
and Bhatt do not define what they mean by ideology, but they state that the jihadi-
Salafi ideology is underpinned by the writings of Sayyid Qutb in the 1960s, who
believed that Islam was under attack from the West and that militant jihad could
be used to attack institutions and societies to overthrow non-Islamic governments
(2007, p. 19).
What Silber and Bhatt are essentially describing is the Islamist narrative. Narrative
is a concept that was discussed in Section 2.3.5 with regard to social movement
theory; it is more rigid and better defined that ideology, referring as it does to the
message put across by terrorist recruiters justifying an individual to take action
(Della Porta, 2009). However, as explained in Section 2.3.5, when a narrative is
placed in front of non-radicalised individuals, it does not of its own accord lead
those individuals to want to commit terrorist attacks, and therefore it does not in
itself cause radicalisation.
However an alternative argument in favour of the importance of ideology in the rad-
icalisation process is connected to the idea of moral shocks, discussed in Section
2.3.1. The argument is that when someone hears the ideology (by which we mean
narrative), this inspires them to join an activist group in the same way as a moral
shock would. That activist group may be peaceful and law-abiding, in which case
one would not expect radicalisation to occur. Or the activist group may have radi-
calised individuals among its members, in which case radicalisation may occur due
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to the non-radicalised group members becoming exposed to a radicalising moral
context. The point however is that the only role of the ideology (or narrative) is
that it inspires an individual to join a group; it is the moral education that they then
receive once in the group that influences whether or not they develop the propensity
to become radicalised.
A further anecdotal case against the relevance of ideology in radicalisation comes
from one of the attacks cited by Silber and Bhatt as being driven by ideology: the
2004 Madrid bombings. Terrorists associated with Al Qa’ida attacked Madrid on
11th March 2004 because, they claimed, they opposed Spain’s stance on the war in
Iraq. Three days later Spain had voted in a new government, who announced that
they intended to withdraw their troops from Iraq as soon as possible, thus meeting
the demands of the terrorists. But despite this, on 2nd April 2004 another bomb was
found and a police raid on the terrorist cell the following day uncovered intent to
carry out further attacks (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010). This evidence of the terror-
ist cell having the capability and intent to conduct further attacks on the Spanish
population suggests that the reason given by the terrorist cell for the original attack
was untrue; it may have been the initial “hook” to get them started on the road to
radicalisation, but after they had been radicalised the ideology itself was no longer
important.
To summarise, the role that ideology plays in radicalisation is restricted to the effects
that extremist narratives can have. A narrative can act in the same way as a moral
shock, giving an individual a reason to involve themselves in a particular cause,
which then may increase the likelihood that they become exposed to radicalising
moral contexts. However the narrative itself does not cause radicalisation, and so
we conclude that “ideology” is not a part of the radicalisation process. It is therefore
not a relevant concept for this thesis.
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2.4 Conclusion
Since 11th September 2001, social researchers and practitioners together have pro-
duced a plethora of literature seeking to answer the question of what the radicali-
sation process looks like. Much of this research has centred around a number of
social theories that have been explored in the course of this chapter. Using a defi-
nition of radicalisation as the development of an individual’s propensity to commit
acts of terrorism, this chapter has introduced the IVEE theoretical framework for
radicalisation developed by Bouhana and Wikstro¨m (2011), and considered how the
theories suggested by the literature can be synthesised using this framework.
2.4.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of IVEE
IVEE goes some way to explaining the causal mechanisms behind an individual
developing the propensity to commit acts of terrorism, but it is not the only way
to express the causes of radicalisation as a theoretical framework, and several oth-
ers were explored over the course of the radicalisation literature review. However
one of the great strengths of IVEE is that while it is a theoretical framework, it has
been developed from the bottom up from multiple empirical studies and thus it has
considerable empirical validity (Bouhana and Wikstro¨m, 2011). The framework is
flexible and allows for causal factors across the individual, ecological and systemic
levels to interact, explaining how these interactions ultimately lead to a change in
propensity. It can therefore be used to synthesise the existing theoretical and em-
pirical knowledge-base across these three levels, as demonstrated over the previous
sections.
However there are some areas where IVEE lacks clarity, in particular concerning
emergence. Of all the levels in IVEE emergence is the least well-researched, and
so the number of sources upon which the framework relies is considerably smaller
for emergence than for individual vulnerability or exposure. The work conducted
by Sampson (2004, 2009) provides some background to the heterogeneity of geo-
graphical locations by introducing the concept of collective efficacy, but there are
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other aspects of geography which the framework ignores — most notably, the role
of the road network and other infrastructure, and the use of land. Previous research
has determined that such geographical features do have a role to play in crime pat-
terns (see for example, Bowers (2014)), and it is entirely plausible that they have
a causal effect in the propensity development process in addition to the situational
action process. However, although the IVEE framework does not currently make
provisions for the potential importance of such geographical features in the radi-
calisation process, with further work it could be extended to incorporate them. In
their paper describing the framework Bouhana and Wikstro¨m admit that while it is
key to the process, “the understanding of emergence is underdeveloped” and further
research is required.
2.4.2 Radicalisation Versus Criminal Propensity Develop-
ment
The IVEE framework for radicalisation uses the assumption that there is no funda-
mental difference between the process of radicalisation and the process by which
propensity for crime more generally develops. However Section 2.1.1.2 stated that
the only difference between an act of terrorism and an act of crime is in how the
offender’s criminal (or terrorist) propensity has developed. This raises a question
over whether the assumption upon which IVEE relies is reasonable. So can we
determine what actually is the difference between radicalisation and more general
criminal propensity development?
There appear to be three areas where an argument could be made for radicalisation
being markedly different from the way that an individual’s propensity to undertake
criminal activity more generally develops. These are in the types of crime the in-
dividual might ultimately commit, the level of morality required for an individual
to consider such acts to be action alternatives, and the rarity of radicalising moral
contexts when compared with general criminogenic contexts.
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2.4.2.1 Type of crime
As already discussed, the term “crime” covers a wide spectrum of activities, from
shop-lifting to mass fraud, and from parking infractions to murder. While the term
“terrorism” could technically include any activity that is a criminal offence, one is
more likely to associate the word with the intent to kill or cause significant damage
to property. Indeed, taking homicide as an example, it is a very rare crime in general
— in England and Wales there were only 515 homicides out of over three million
victim-based crimes for the year 2014, which is a rate of 0.02% (Office for National
Statistics, 2015). According to the Global Terrorism Database (2015) there were
712 incidents branded “terrorism” in United Kingdom between 2000 and 2014, of
which 32 have resulted in fatalities — a rate of 4.5%. While the comparison is not
perfect, the difference between the two percentages strongly suggests that terrorist
offences are more likely to consist of homicide. Similar comparisons can be made
for crimes related to property damage.
At the other end of the spectrum, one does not expect crimes such as parking in-
fringements or burglary to be regarded as terrorism. However, in certain circum-
stances they might be: for instance, someone planting a car bomb may park on a
double yellow line, and someone intending to make their own explosive may steal
fertiliser from a farm. But for incidents such as these, the relatively minor crime
(parking infringement or burglary) is part of a bigger plot that includes a more se-
rious crime. From the perspective of the individual’s propensity for crime, even if
they are simply caught stealing fertiliser, for this to count as being part of a ter-
rorist plot there would have to be evidence that they had intent (and therefore the
propensity) to carry out a far more serious crime.
It is therefore proposed that one difference between radicalisation and the develop-
ment of an individual’s propensity to conduct other criminal acts is that the individ-
ual must have developed the propensity to commit a severe crime such as homicide
or significant property damage.
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2.4.2.2 Level of morality required
This distinction between types of crime is all very well, but there are still plenty of
instances of homicide and property damage that are not considered to be linked to
terrorism. In order to fully differentiate between homicide or property damage at-
tributed to terrorism and that associated with general crime, it is necessary to return
to Victoroff’s definition of terrorism (discussed in Section 2.1.1.2). One of Victo-
roff’s principles was that a terrorist action is intended to influence and change the
behaviour of a target audience using methods of fear among non-combatants. Does
this distinction translate into a difference between what it means for someone to
have the propensity to commit acts of terrorism versus a general act of crime?
Recall that according to Wikstro¨m an individual’s criminal propensity consists of
two attributes: an individual’s morality and their ability to exercise self-control.
However the contribution of these two attributes to an individual’s criminal propen-
sity is not necessarily a simple one. For example, if an individual’s level of morality
is such that they consider acts regarded by most as highly unethical to be perfectly
acceptable, then even if this individual did exercise self-control this would not stop
them committing crimes. Their ability to exercise self-control would thus be im-
material. However an individual with a strong sense of morality but only a weak
capacity to exercise self-control would be more tempted to commit a criminal act on
an impulse than an individual of the same morality with better self-control. Some
crimes are considered to be more likely the result of an impulse than others — in
particular violent crimes including homicide (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). But
a homicide committed on an impulse would be regarded as a crime unrelated to
terrorism, as there would be no intent to influence a target audience as a result of
the act.
This raises the idea that a significant amount of premeditation is necessary for terror-
ism, and therefore that an individual intending to carry out an act of terrorism would
require a certain level of morality regardless of their ability to exercise self-control.
Can it therefore be argued that capacity to exercise self-control is completely ir-
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relevant to radicalisation? If self-control only had an impact on behaviour at the
situational level this might be the case. However, as the interconnectedness of the
levels in the IVEE framework illustrates, propensity development is a recursive pro-
cess. An individual with weak capacity to exercise self-control but a higher sense of
morality may, impulsively, take part in an activity they consider to be unethical. At
this point they may regret their action and amend their behaviour according, or alter-
natively they may change their view of the ethicality of their action — thus affecting
their moral education (Gino et al., 2011). They may as a result have fewer qualms
about repeating the activity, or even regard other activities previously considered
unethical to now be acceptable to them. Thus, a weak capacity to exercise self-
control can still contribute to radicalisation, by making an individual more likely to
become exposed to radicalising moral contexts.
In conclusion, for general crime (as previously discussed) an individual’s criminal
propensity comprises their ability to exercise self-control and their level of moral-
ity. However, it is proposed that for an individual to count as “radicalised” they
must have a certain “level” of morality, regardless of their capacity to exercise self-
control. While their levels of self-control may play a role in how the person comes
to be radicalised, it is suggested that low capacity to exercise self-control is not
necessary in a radicalised individual.
2.4.2.3 Rarity of radicalising moral contexts
Criminogenic moral contexts can be found all over the UK. They include such di-
verse locations as nightclubs where people take recreational drugs, a park popular
with adolescents, or even the Houses of Parliament during the MP’s expenses scan-
dal. However radicalising moral contexts are far harder to find. Even settings that
might at a first glance be thought of as radicalising, such as a street corner where
someone is handing out leaflets promoting an Islamist narrative, are not in them-
selves radicalising. As already discussed, a narrative or a moral shock might inspire
an individual to develop an interest in joining a movement, but it does not in itself
radicalise people. In order to find a radicalising moral context in the UK a person
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has to actually seek them out — they have to join a covert group advocating vi-
olent action, or search the internet for websites posted by people who are already
radicalised.
The rarity of radicalising moral contexts in UK society when compared with crim-
inogenic moral contexts presents a significant difference between the two processes
of propensity development. For radicalisation, as most individuals would have to ac-
tively seek out a radicalising moral context, selection mechanisms play a far greater
role than they do for general criminal propensity development, which many people
happen across on a relatively regular basis.
In the IVEE framework selection mechanisms were separated into individual selec-
tion (or self-selection) and selection that is due to social or demographic factors.
Self-selection is determined by individual lifestyle preferences, while social selec-
tion dictates the locations that certain groups are more likely to frequent — for ex-
ample, local community centres or youth clubs favoured by people from a particular
ethnic or religious background. The greater importance of selection mechanisms in
radicalisation (as opposed to general criminal propensity development) thus makes
the influence of socio-demographics all the greater, and goes some way to explain-
ing why certain groups have been more prevalent in terrorist organisations — Irish
Catholics or 2nd generation South Asian Muslims, for example — while people
across all sectors of society commit crime.
It is therefore proposed that the rarity of radicalising moral contexts in UK society,
and the resulting heightened importance of selection mechanisms in the radical-
isation process, are a key difference between the development of an individual’s
criminality and radicalisation. This does, however, raise the question of how — if
at all — the radicalisation process would be affected if the prevalence of radicalising
moral contexts were to increase significantly.
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2.4.3 Primary Research Question
In this chapter the literature has been explored in such as way as to enable com-
parisons to be drawn between how a person’s propensity to commit general acts
of crime develops, and the radicalisation process. The key differences between the
two have been identified as the severity of the crimes, the level of morality required
of a radicalised individual, and the rarity of radicalising moral contexts. However,
each of these factors lie on a spectrum, with a significant grey area in the middle. Is
planting a hoax bomb sufficiently severe to count as terrorism, if the offender never
intends to cause any physical damage or harm? How about the offender who is
radicalised enough to store equipment for a terrorist attack, but who still considers
taking life themselves to be morally wrong? And what would happen if the preva-
lence of radicalising moral contexts in the UK were to increase significantly, as it
has in parts of Syria and Iraq in recent years?
The IVEE framework relies on the assumption that there is an equivalence between
the radicalisation and criminality development processes. If this assumption holds,
the extensive literature on the development of criminal propensity can be used to
augment our far more limited knowledge about radicalisation. It is therefore the
intention of this thesis to test this assumption and determine whether there is re-
ally a difference between the development of criminality and radicalisation. It will
do this by answering the research question: are the radicalisation and criminality
development processes indistinguishable?
Chapter 3
Methodology
At the end of Chapter 2 the primary research question was presented; in this chapter
we consider how best it can be answered. The first section of the chapter examines
what further research questions arise as an immediate consequence of the primary
research question and considers potential approaches to tackling them. The second
section looks in particular at the method of mathematical modelling, questioning
whether the criminality development and radicalisation processes can be modelled
effectively and if so how it could be done. The third section presents an overview
of the research design and establishes its validity, then finally the chapter ends with
a short section on ethical considerations.
3.1 Further Research Questions
As stated at the end of the previous chapter, the primary research question to be
answered by this thesis concerns whether there really are any fundamental differ-
ences between the process by which an individual develops the propensity to com-
mit crime, and radicalisation. In order to answer this it is first necessary to answer
the question of what are the individual, environmental and systemic factors that con-
tribute to the radicalisation and criminality development processes. This question
has partially been answered by the IVEE framework and the literature examined in
Chapter 2, but there remain many unknowns which need to be determined before we
have enough information about both processes to be able to compare them.
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The IVEE framework itself provides a means of grouping these unknowns into sub-
questions to be addressed in order for the primary research question to be answered.
These sub-questions are as follows:
• On selection mechanisms:
– What attributes of a person cause them to have a preference for certain
settings over others?
– What attributes of a setting attract or deter people from visiting?
• On the emergence of criminogenic or radicalising settings:
– To what extent does the presence of criminally-minded or radicalised
people at a setting cause it to become criminogenic or radicalising?
– What environmental factors affect how likely a setting is to become
criminogenic or radicalising?
• On exposure to criminogenic or radicalising moral contexts:
– What psychological characteristics cause a person to be more easily in-
fluenced by any criminogenic or radicalising moral contexts to which
they become exposed?
Many if not all of these individual sub-questions can be answered by existing re-
search conducted by social scientists or psychologists. However even if all the indi-
vidual questions can be answered this way, the research question as a whole cannot
be in its entirety. As the previous chapter explained, the processes of criminality
development and radicalisation form a part of a wider socio-ecological system, and
understanding and predicting the behaviour of processes within that system is ex-
tremely difficult. Answering the research question using conventional social science
methods alone would require a large number of cases to be studied in depth over
a significant period in order to allow the effects of seemingly random factors to be
averaged out. The resources required before such a study would start yielding even
the most tenuous of results would be considerable, and by the time results are being
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produced the social system may have altered.
However this does not mean that the research question cannot be answered; it sim-
ply means that it may have to be done in an unconventional way and draw on tech-
niques from disciplines outside the social sciences. A starting point for where we
can turn for an appropriate methodological approach comes from the 18th century
philosopher David Hume’s 1739 work “A Treatise of Human Nature”. In this Hume
considers the ideas of cause and effect extensively, arguing that “whatever has a be-
ginning has also a cause of existence”, but he concedes that for effects dependent
upon “an intricate machinery or secret structure of parts” that “we make no difficulty
in attributing all our knowledge of it to experience”, giving the example that no-one
would assert that they can give the ultimate reason as to why milk or bread are
nourishing for men but not for lions or tigers (Bailey, 2004, p. 167). What Hume is
describing here is the difficulty of understanding causality when the causal relations
are within a system which is itself poorly understood or multifaceted, meaning that
such knowledge would simply be put down to “experience” because those causal
relations could not be determined. However science and human knowledge have
advanced considerably since then.
A good example of the progress made in determining causal relations in a system
that Hume would have counted as “an intricate machinery” comes from weather
forecasting. Weather forecasters for centuries have understood the basic causal
mechanisms within weather systems: for instance that the build-up of certain types
of cloud causes rain, or that high pressure suggests stability in weather for a time.
But despite understanding the individual interactions of the component parts in a
weather system it is very difficult to predict what will happen further than a few days
into the future because there are too many unknowns and too much uncertainty in
the system. Modern weather forecasters have combatted this problem through using
computer simulations to establish how weather is likely to develop given what we
know about the weather at a particular moment in time and the causal mechanisms
that lead to change (Met Office, 2015).
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Weather forecasting is an example of a complex system. Understanding how one
part of a complex system behaves is not enough to allow the behaviour of the whole
system to be predicted — to do that we need to understand every causal relation-
ship in the system and how each component part interacts with each other. Human
social systems can be extremely complex, as the process by which people become
radicalised or develop the propensity for crime described in Chapter 2 shows. The
mathematical modelling approach adopted by modern weather forecasters may pro-
vide a way to turn that complexity into something understandable, and enable the
primary research question to be answered.
3.2 Mathematical Modelling
3.2.1 Modelling Social Systems: A Brief History
A “model” is simply a representation of the real world. The term “mathematical
model” is used when a real world problem is turned into an abstract mathematical
problem that is intended to approximately replicate the original (Clapham, 1996).
Mathematical modelling techniques have been in use for centuries and have sought
to replicate many different aspects of everyday life. One of the simplest and oldest
examples is a map, which is essentially a model depicting three dimensional terrain
as a two dimensional diagram. More obviously mathematical examples still date
back several centuries: for example in the late 17th century physical scientists used
Newton’s laws to better understand and predict physical phenomena. Even in the
social sciences mathematical modelling has a long history: Adam Smith’s 1776
treatise “The Wealth of Nations” gave birth to modern economics, a field that seeks
to use mathematical rules to explain and predict production and consumption in
society.
However economists have long been accused that their models suffer from a lack
of realism due to them relying on overly simplistic assumptions about social be-
haviour (Gintis, 2009). While more recent economic models are more sophisticated
than before, they were still unable to predict large events such as the 2008 economic
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crisis, with reasons cited including a lack of ability to model hierarchical networks
of interdependency and herding behaviour (Ball, 2012, p. 33). With the benefit of
hindsight today’s economic modellers are making up for the failures of the past;
considerable progress is now being made towards constructing models able to pre-
dict stock market crashes (Sornette et al., 2015), and more focus than ever before is
being put on multi-disciplinary research such as econophysics in order to achieve
this (McCauley et al., 2016).
Econophysicists McCauley et al. observed that economic systems are “complex or-
ganizations of interacting adaptive agents whose interconnections with institutions
can generate unexpected patterns, feedback loops, and diffusion processes”. The
same can be said of other aspects of the social world, leading some social scientists
to question whether social systems are so complex that they cannot be modelled
at all with sufficient accuracy for them to be of any use. However with increas-
ing multi-disciplinary interest in how physical science techniques can be used to
formalise social science theories such as rational choice and the impact of cul-
tural norms, a formalised analytical core for sociology is now starting to develop
(see, for example, Gintis and Helbing (2015)), making complex social models more
grounded in theory. And as modelling techniques have developed and technology
improved, systems that would never have been possible to model a few decades ago
are now providing guidance to policy-makers in a variety of fields such as traffic
management and public health (Keeling and Rohani, 2008; Ball, 2012).
Models vary according to their purpose. Some models are designed to classify
datasets into classes — for example dividing a population into socio-demographic
groups as an aid to predicting voting patterns. Classification algorithms have de-
veloped in complexity over the decades, with techniques such as neural networks
and decisions trees forming a key component of artificial intelligence (Gahegan and
West, 1998). However the only role of these models is classification; they can nei-
ther explain a cause nor predict a future outcome. In order to do that a model needs
to describe the relationships between the different variables.
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Some models simply describe direct relationships, while others involve a number of
entities that interact with each other in different ways. Sometimes a simple model
is enough, even for something as seemingly complex as human behaviour. An ex-
ample would be the relationship between the daily maximum temperature in a lo-
cation and the number of ice creams people in that location purchase on a given
day. By collecting data covering a sufficiently long period of time, this data can
be used to conduct a statistical analysis and then create an equation allowing us to
predict how many ice creams are likely to be purchased given the temperature on
a particular day. However, for complex systems involving multiple variables with
inter-dependencies it is not possible to predict an outcome using just one equation,
and instead a simulation must be used (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999, p. 16).
A simulation is a specific type of model. In the same way as the basic statistical
model used to predict sales of ice creams has an input (in this case temperature)
and an output (the predicted number of ice creams), simulation models also have
inputs and outputs. However the difference between simulation and other types
of models is that a simulation model can be “run forward” through (simulated)
time to allow the researcher to observe its behaviour at some point in the future
(Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999, p. 16). The quality of the simulation can then be as-
sessed by comparing its behaviour with that of the real world system it is trying
to replicate. Simulations are particularly appropriate for modelling non-linear sys-
tems where analytical reasoning would be very difficult or even impossible; human
social systems that are complex in nature would therefore best be modelled with a
simulation.
Simulation models are often also referred to as “computer simulations”, because
the calculations conducted by the simulation are generally extensive and are far
more easily done by a computer than by hand. For this reason the development of
simulation as method has largely mirrored the development of computer processing
power. The earliest social simulations originated in the 1960s, and include queuing
models and models that calculate how long it takes an emergency vehicle to get to
an incident. In 1971 Schelling developed a simulation of social segregation with
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no computing power whatsoever; this influential paper illustrated that stark patterns
of racial segregation emerge when individuals have only a slight preference for
living among those of the same race, and demonstrated “the dynamic relationship
between individual behavior and collective results”. While computationally simple,
the simulation produced by Schelling was sophisticated enough to incorporate het-
erogeneity across the agents in the model and introduces the concept of a tipping
point — where a minority gets sufficiently large that the majority decide to leave
the area and the minority takes over.
Many of these early simulations suffered from being over-ambitious and relied
heavily on quantitative assumptions that were backed by very little evidence, lead-
ing to the simulations producing unreliable results and the entire credibility of sim-
ulation as method being questioned (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999, p. 6). However,
50 years later simulation models have been developed that are actively assisting
policy-makers in fields as varied as climate change, migration, and the influence of
social media (Ball, 2012).
3.2.2 Simulation Models for the Study of Crime
Crime science and criminology have been relatively late adopters of the use of sim-
ulation models when compared with other social science disciplines (Brantingham
and Brantingham, 2004). However simulation models have an enormous amount to
offer the field. As has previously been noted, the analysis of the causes of crime re-
quires understanding extremely complex socio-ecological systems, and traditional
research methods are resource-intensive, expensive and time-consuming due to the
level of detail required in the data and the longevity of interventions, while conduct-
ing actual experiments raises significant ethical concerns (Groff and Birks, 2008;
Johnson, 2009). Simulation provides a solution to all these issues, as the effects of
different interventions in different environments can quickly and cheaply be tested
in silico. It also provides an easy means of comparing different implementations
of an intervention to determine, for example, whether rolling an intervention out
quickly is significantly more effective than rolling it out over the course of a year
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(Johnson, 2009). Simulation can also give an indication of the “dosage” of an inter-
vention required for a desired effect to be achieved (ibid).
A further benefit that simulation offers crime science researchers is a means of pro-
viding generative explanations for phenomena (Epstein, 1999; Eck and Lui, 2008;
Birks et al., 2012). A simulation comprises a set of rules and a set of inputs; if
a phenomenon emerges from one set of rules and inputs but not from another, the
researcher can draw conclusions as to what variables are required to generate the
phenomenon. Limitations with simulations remain however; for instance an ar-
tificially generated phenomenon can demonstrate the sufficiency of the variables
in generating that phenomenon, but not the necessity: alternative rules and inputs
could generate the same phenomenon (Eck and Lui, 2008, p. 203). Additionally, as
is the case with other fields, a simulation model can only be as good as the data that
is used in its development (which will be discussed further in Section 3.2.4) and
must be validated in order to demonstrate that it is a realistic representation of the
real world (to be discussed in Section 3.2.6).
These problems aside, simulation as method has now gained traction in the fields
of crime science and environmental criminology in particular. Examples of how
simulations have been developed and used to good effect in this discipline include
Brantingham and Brantingham’s (2004) model of routine activity theory showing
how people interact with their environment, Groff’s (2007) model of street robbery
also based on routine activity theory, Birks et al.’s (2012) burglary model which
is used to test the sufficiency of routine activity theory, rational choice theory and
crime pattern theory in generating credible burglary patterns, and Hill et al.’s (2014)
poaching simulation, in which the interactions of animals, poachers and rangers are
replicated and their movement analysed.
3.2.3 Types of Simulation Model
Simulation modelling techniques can broadly be divided into equation-based and
agent-based models (Parunak et al., 1998). The key difference between these two
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methods is in whether it is the observables or the individuals in the system that are
being modelled. Equation-based models (EBMs) work by constructing equations
that describe the relationships between the observables: for example the relation-
ship between the time somebody arrives in a queue and the length of time they stay
in it. Agent-based models (ABMs) work the opposite way, instead starting with the
behaviours of individual “agents”, defining the rules by which they interact with
each other, and then simulating these interactions to enable assessments to be made
about the observables. ABMs have some advantages over EBMs, as they can be
easier to construct and understand, they allow for the exploration of “what if” sce-
narios through changing the interactions and behaviours at the individual levels, and
they have an extra level of validation available as the model can be tested at either
the system or individual level (Penny et al., 2013). ABMs are extremely flexible
as they allow for heterogeneity across the individual agents in the model, which is
especially important in social science where individuals can be allocated different
attributes, such as socio-demographic characteristics, personality traits, or even dif-
ferent levels of information with which to make decisions (Epstein, 1999). However
where the rules by which individual agents behave are too complex or where there
is insufficient data for these rules to be determined, equation-based models can be
more appropriate.
Within these broad categories are a range of specific techniques that have been
developed to suit particular applications. Agent-based models can be spatial or
organisational, or a combination of both. Spatial ABMs provide a representation
of a geographical area, most usually using cellular automata — an array of cells,
where each cell has a state associated with it — to represent the spatial part of
the model (Gilbert and Terna, 2000). Organisational ABMs are more abstract and
can be thought of as a graph; these are a popular way to describe social networks,
with nodes representing individual people or organisations, and links representing
some form of affiliation or other relationship between the entities, all of which may
change over time. ABMs are first and foremost theoretical models, although re-
searchers have noted that the role of empirical research in model calibration and
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validation has been increasing (Hedstro¨m and Manzo, 2015), making today’s ABMs
more relevant and realistic than previously.
Numerous non-agent based approaches have also been developed: types of
equation-based model include models based on queuing theory, and system dy-
namics models which represent social systems and processes in terms of levels and
rates (Cioffi-Revilla, 2014). Alternative categories of models also exist, such as
state-transition models (STMs). These models describe how entities in a system
transition from one state to another, sometimes with probabilities attached to each
transition (Siebert et al., 2012). They can operate either at the individual level,
where each individual follows their own state-transition process, or at the cohort
level, in which case the model is an example of a Markov model. The output from
an individual-level STM would be how many people are in each state, while the
output from a cohort-level STM is the probability that the cohort is in each state.
STMs have the advantage over other types of simulation model that they are able
to reflect the passing of time, and in particular that time-dependent parameters can
be included in the model. An STM can generally also be written as either an EBM
or an ABM (depending on whether it is a cohort or individual-level STM); it is
therefore simply a different way of representing a model.
Non-computational simulation methods also exist, although these are generally
more limited in scope: an intriguing example is the biological approach taken by
Adamatzky et al. (2012) using an organism called “slime mould” to simulate effi-
cient networks, such as the motorway network in the Netherlands. While such a
method presents an interesting alternative and shows that computational models are
not the only solution to research problems, such an approach would be unable to
provide a generative explanation for a social phenomenon — and this is one of the
key benefits of using simulation models for crime science research.
It can be concluded therefore that there exist a large number of mathematical tools
that could potentially be of use when building a simulation model of a social system.
Additionally, a model can be deterministic, where an effect always follows a cause,
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or stochastic, where an element of randomness exists (Keeling and Rohani, 2008,
p. 190). How then to determine what is the most appropriate modelling method
for a particular problem? The answer to this question depends on the system being
modelled, but it also depends on the reason for constructing the model in the first
place.
There are a number of reasons why one might want to construct a simulation model,
such as:
• to better understand a system;
• to predict a future state of a system;
• to act as a substitute for a human — for instance to allow non-experts to make
use of expert knowledge;
• for training — for example flight simulation;
• for entertainment — some simulations also act as computer games; and
• to assist scientists to formalise a system (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999, p. 5-6).
A model designed for one purpose may not be suitable for another, and it is likely
that the modelling techniques used will vary accordingly. However these different
purposes are not necessarily completely incompatible with each other — for in-
stance, a model that successfully predicts the future state of a system should also
facilitate the understanding of that system, and may also assist with formalisation.
Predictive models need to be sufficiently accurate in their imitation of the real-world
system they are representing to produce realistic results. Models designed for un-
derstanding have lower requirements in terms of their accuracy and complexity,
but clearly must be accurate enough to include the most important causal relation-
ships within the real-world system. So what level of accuracy is sufficient? An
entirely accurate model is impossible to achieve by definition, as every model sim-
plifies reality to some extent, but care must be taken that the right simplifications
are made and that variables affecting the system’s outcomes are not accidentally
ignored.
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The decision over to what extent to simplify a system when constructing a model
can be described in terms of levels of abstraction. For high levels of abstraction
more details are left out of the model and a larger conceptual leap must be made
when interpreting the conclusions from the model in a real world context (Gilbert
and Troitzsch, 1999, p. 19). At the extreme of this, the model may be so simple
that it fails to contribute anything new to the field of knowledge, or it may even be
so unrealistic that incorrect conclusions are drawn from it. At the other end of the
spectrum, a model with very low levels of abstraction will include far more details of
the real world system, but it may be too complex to be useful — as the developers of
the early simulation models from the 1960s discovered. As a model’s complexity
increases the requirement for the accurate estimation of the model’s parameters
and the relationships between different system components also increases. If these
parameters and relationships cannot be estimated from our knowledge of the real
world, the model will be impossible to parameterise correctly and its conclusions
will be misleading.
In order to strike the right balance one must refer back to the main purpose of
the model, consider what assumptions will need to be made for the model’s con-
struction, and determine what data needs to be collected for its parameterisation
(Keeling and Rohani, 2008). If, in order to serve its purpose, the model needs to
be more accurately parameterised than is possible to do given the available data,
then the justification for modelling the system must be called into question. It is
therefore essential before proceeding to examine what the requirements for data are
in the current case.
3.2.4 Data Requirements for Models of Social Systems
As the previous section made clear, to create a model one first needs data on the
real world system that the model aims to replicate. This data is used at a number of
different stages in the model building process.
The first application for data in model-building is to generate a hypothesis as to
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what the relationship(s) between the component parts of the system might be. In the
simple ice cream selling example the modeller would have needed a certain amount
of real-world knowledge in order to guess that there might be a relationship between
the weather and sales of ice creams in the first place. This is what Hume would have
termed “experience”, and it is this that allows the possible causal relationships in
the system to be hypothesised.
With further data the modeller can proceed to the second application: quantifying
the relationships between the independent and dependent variables. In the ice cream
selling example this is the stage where data on the number of ice cream sales and
the temperature each day is collected and a statistical analysis conducted in order to
establish what equation best describes the relationship between them. Exactly the
same is true for a simulation model of a complex system, the only difference being
that more complex systems require more statistical analyses to be conducted on a
greater number of variables.
Once the modeller has reached this stage they would then be able to put together the
simulation model, run it, and observe the results. A third application for data would
then be to test or validate the model by comparing the results generated by the sim-
ulation with the real world (Cioffi-Revilla, 2014). In the ice cream selling example,
the researcher would do this by predicting the number of ice cream sales figures for
each different daily temperature using their model, and then establish whether the
calculated sales figures are a good approximation to the real sales figures using a
suitable statistical test such as a χ2 test.
The ideal situation for the model builder is to have unlimited, perfect data to use at
each stage. However, when the modeller is seeking to model something as complex
as a human social system, the data available will be limited and far from perfect.
Indeed the social systems that this thesis is seeking to model — criminality develop-
ment and radicalisation — are ones where social scientists have long acknowledged
difficulty when it comes to collecting good data (Tilley, 2002; Lum et al., 2006;
Knutsson and Tilley, 2009). Part of the problem lies in the difficulty of observing
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when somebody actually does have the propensity to commit an act of crime or
terrorism; as the direct causes of crime and terrorism include situational factors,
there will be cases when somebody with the propensity for crime does not actually
commit a crime, and conversely when someone who does commit crime actually
has a relatively low propensity for it. These complicating factors are part of what
makes the research question a difficult question to answer using conventional social
scientific methods in the first place.
Does this mean that the criminality development and radicalisation processes cannot
be modelled? This is essentially a question of whether a model can be developed
that has sufficient “construct validity”. Construct validity is one of a number of
different threats that all scientific experiments face, and it relates to whether the
way the model has been constructed accurately describes the system it is intended
to represent (Townsley and Johnson, 2008). As already stated, there will inevitably
have to be some simplifications made when a system is modelled, so the construct
validity of any model will never be total. But if the construct validity is too low,
the model will not be fit for purpose and will not be able to answer the research
question. It is therefore essential to refer back to what we want to use the model for,
and then to use this to decide what simplifications can be made.
In this case the main purpose of the model is to gain a better understanding of the
criminality development and radicalisation processes. In terms of data requirements
for the models, this means that there is certainly a requirement for data at the ini-
tial stage (Hume’s “experience”, which is needed to generate hypotheses). This we
have already done, by using the IVEE framework to generate the research ques-
tions listed in Section 3.1. Additionally, there needs to be enough data to quantify
the key relationships between the components of the criminality development and
radicalisation processes, particularly where these relationships differ across the two
processes. The literature examined in Chapter 2 includes a number of studies car-
ried out by social scientists who have sought to do this for many of the different
components of the processes. Consolidating the results of these should therefore
provide the necessary data for the parameterisation of the models.
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Finally, there needs to be sufficient data for the models to be validated. For a pre-
dictive model this would usually take the form of statistical significance testing of
the model’s outputs against real-world data which, as we have already discussed, is
rather lacking in this field. However the main purpose of the models in this thesis is
understanding rather than prediction, so a less rigourous validation method should
be sufficient. A minimum requirement for data for model validation is the existence
of a set of “stylised facts” against which the model outputs can be compared. The
concept of stylised facts was introduced by Kaldor (1961) as a way to identify key
observations that demanded explanation, with a stylised fact being a stable pattern
that emerges from multiple empirical data sources (Heine et al., 2005). An example
of a stylised fact in the field of crime science would be, for example, that relatively
few offenders are responsible for the majority of crimes (Groff, 2007). Methods for
validating models using stylised facts is described in Section 3.2.6.
In conclusion it is assessed that there should be sufficient data available for the
models to be constructed in such a way that they will be able to answer to research
question.
3.2.5 Which Modelling Technique To Use?
Now we have established that the criminality development and radicalisation pro-
cesses can be modelled, and that doing so would answer the research question, it
remains to decide which modelling technique would be the most appropriate. In or-
der to determine this we need to consider the nature of the system we are modelling
and the purpose of the model. The criminality development and radicalisation pro-
cesses are processes that take place both in certain places and at certain times, and
so an STM would be suitable. However STMs can be either individual-level (i.e.
ABMs) or cohort-level. In this case the basis of the model will be the IVEE fram-
work, which operates on three levels — individual, ecological and systemic. As the
framework includes detail of interactions and causal mechanisms at the individual
level, an ABM would therefore be the most appropriate modelling technique.
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Next we need to consider the purpose of the model, in order to determine the data
requirements and whether the model should be deterministic or stochastic. In a de-
terministic model the entities change states with certainty, while a stochastic model
incorporates randomness in the system by attaching a probability to each transi-
tion (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999; Keeling and Rohani, 2008; Cioffi-Revilla, 2014).
Stochastic models are particularly useful where a model of a complex system is
needed for prediction, as they account for uncertainty and the fact that not every
causal factor in the real world system may be included in the model. However
where a model is developed for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of a
real world system a deterministic model is preferable, as they enable the direct im-
pact of changing causal factors in the system to be assessed. The primary purpose
of the model in this thesis is one of understanding, as the model must enable an
improved understanding of two complex social processes in order to allow them to
be compared. A secondary purpose, if it can be shown to be achievable, would be
for the model to have some predictive capabilities that might prove to be useful to
practitioners in the fields of crime prevention and counter-radicalisation, as this is
ultimately the cause that, through answering the research question, this thesis hopes
to assist. However as the primary purpose is one of understanding, for this project
the models to be developed will be deterministic.
3.2.6 Model Validation
The challenge of how to validate a model describing a complex social process such
as the development of propensity for crimes and terrorism was mentioned briefly
in Section 3.2.4. However this problem is unique neither to this area of social sci-
ence nor to simulation models, and a considerable literature concerning methods
for validation in fields with little or no quantitative data exists. In particular this
problem has been explored by social scientists using qualitative methods such as
ethnography and phenomenology, and this is a good place to begin considering po-
tential validation techniques for the models in this thesis. Elliott (1999) sought to
consolidate the work that had been done in this area for qualitative research, and put
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forward a set of “evolving guidelines” for reviewing such research. The guidelines
included ensuring adequate credibility checks, with suggestions for how this could
be done comprising:
(a) “checking these understandings with the original informants or others similar
to them;
(b) using multiple qualitative analysts, an additional analytical ‘auditor’, or the
original analyst for a ‘verification step’ of reviewing the data for discrepan-
cies, overstatements, or errors;
(c) comparing two or more varied qualitative perspectives; or
(d) where appropriate, ‘triangulation’ with external factors (e.g. outcome or re-
covery) or quantitative data.” (Elliott, 1999, p. 222)
The end goal, says Elliott, is not to replicate the methods for validation that exist
for quantitative data, but simply to show that the research provides meaningful and
useful answers about the phenomenon under study.
A similar approach can be adopted when seeking to validate simulation models.
Instead of attempting to validate the model’s outputs against quantitative data that
does not exist, a better approach is to consider the purpose of the validation exercise
and use a technique suited to that purpose. In the case of validating a simulation
model developed to further the understanding of a social process such as criminality
development, the purpose of validation is to test whether the model replicates the
desired phenomenon. In order to do this, we need to establish the features of the
phenomenon — or, as Kaldor (1961) would call them, the stylised facts — and
compare the model outputs with these. Ormerod and Rosewell (2009) explored
how this might be done in the validation of ABMs of macro-economic processes,
and noted that “the key aspect to validation is that the outcomes of the model explain
the phenomenon. If the model explains the phenomenon under consideration better
than previous models do, it becomes the current best explanation. This is the best
we can expect to do.” (p. 135)
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The question then is how to undertake a model validation using stylised facts in
practice. With the growth in popularity of modelling as a social science method-
ology in recent years more examples of model validation using stylised facts are
emerging, but the technique is still in its infancy and no standard approach exists.
The field of economics holds the most examples from which to draw. Ormerod and
Rosewell (2009) is such an example, though their paper is more concerned with the
legitimacy of using stylised facts for validation than the development of the method
itself. Heine et al. (2005) however does demonstrate how it can be done in practice,
by using the method to compare four models of collusion in a business environ-
ment. Heine et al. derive a list of six stylised facts; the authors state that ideally
these would have emerged from a wider community of experts, but for their field
these do not exist and they instead have to derive their stylised facts from the liter-
ature. They then proceed to assess how many of the stylised facts are addressed or
partially addressed by each of the models they test, and they use this to determine
which of the models best explains the desired phenomenon overall.
In the field of crime science there have also been some examples of the use of
stylised facts. Hill et al. (2014) used stylised facts to test the realism of an ABM
describing the behaviour of poachers in a Ugandan national park: for example, the
authors noted that it is known that poachers typically place snares very close to wa-
ter points. When the ABM failed to replicate this phenomenon, this suggested that
the mechanisms in the process were not being faithfully replicated and the model
needed modification. This demonstrates that using stylised facts for validation is a
technique strong enough to fulfil the Popperian requirement that a theory (or in this
case, model) can be falsified.
However in order for the models in this thesis to be able to be validated using
stylised facts, a suitable list of stylised facts about the phenomena being modelled
needs to exist. First let us take the phenomenon of the development of criminal
propensity. By drawing on the literature discussed in Chapter 2, the following list
describing features of criminal propensity that the model should seek to replicate
can be put forward:
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1. The agents in the model should be heterogeneous with regard to criminal
propensity (i.e. the people in the model should not all have the same propen-
sity for crime);
2. The distribution of propensities across the population should be positively
skewed (i.e. a small proportion of people should have a high propensity for
crime);
3. An individual’s propensity for crime can increase or decrease over time;
4. A steady state for the system overall should not be reached (i.e. individual
propensities can continue to change throughout);
5. Average propensity for crime reduces with age.
A similar list can be constructed for stylised facts associated with radicalisa-
tion:
1. The agents in the model should be heterogeneous with regard to radicalism
(i.e. the people in the model should not all have the same propensity for
terrorism);
2. The distribution of propensities for terrorism across the population should be
much more positively skewed than the distribution of propensities for crime
(i.e. a very small proportion of people should have any propensity for terror-
ism);
3. An individual’s propensity for terrorism can increase or decrease over time;
4. A steady state for the system overall should not be reached (i.e. individual
propensities can continue to change throughout);
5. Radicalising moral contexts (i.e. settings) should be far rarer than crimino-
genic moral contexts.
There is considerable overlap between these two lists, as should be expected follow-
ing the literature review into how people develop the propensity to commit acts of
crime or terrorism. The key differences between the two lists are that radicalisation
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— both in terms of the propensity of the people and the settings — is far less com-
mon than criminality, and that the stylised fact concerning the negative correlation
between propensity and age need not apply to radicalisation. This last difference is
because there is not enough data about radicalised individuals to demonstrate that
there is a correlation with age; such a correlation may exist, but due to the rarity of
radicalisation in society this cannot be proven or disproven at the current time.
These lists of stylised facts will be compared with the models’ outputs, and if the
models are found to successfully produce these effects they will be considered suf-
ficiently validated for the purposes of answering the research question.
3.3 Research Design
3.3.1 Overview
The research design for this project can be broken down into a series of stages as
follows:
1. Establish the theoretical framework that will form the basis of the simulation
models (i.e. the IVEE framework)
2. Use secondary sources to determine the precise relationships between dif-
ferent component parts in the IVEE process for the criminality development
model.
3. Define the criminality development model.
4. Decide on a computer programming language to use and then code the crim-
inality development model.
5. Run the simulations, changing the parameters in order to establish the sensi-
tivity of the model.
6. Validate the model against the list of stylised facts in Section 3.2.6
7. Determine from any available secondary data sources in what way the crim-
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inality development model would need to be altered to make it applicable to
radicalisation.
8. Define the radicalisation model and code it.
9. Run the simulations for the radicalisation model and validate the outputs
against the list of stylised facts in Section 3.2.6.
10. Compare the model descriptions and outputs for the criminality development
and radicalisation processes and use these to answer the research question.
11. As further work, incorporate interventions specifically designed to target each
process, and test their effectiveness against the other process. This will pro-
vide additional clarity as to the extent to which the processes are alike.
3.3.2 Validity of the Research Design
There are a number of threats to the validity of all science experiments that should
be considered for every proposed methodology, and this project is no exception. If
inadequately mitigated these threats call into the question the validity of the experi-
ment and thus the accuracy of the conclusions that can be drawn from it (Campbell,
1957). Construct validity was discussed and addressed in Section 3.2.4, but there
are several other threats to validity to consider.
3.3.2.1 Internal Validity
Internal validity is primarily concerned with causality: that is, whether a change
in independent variable x really causes a change in dependent variable y (Bryman,
2012, p. 47). The threat to internal validity of greatest concern in this project is over
whether the causal chains in the model describing the criminality development and
radicalisation processes can be supported. The model describes a complex social
system and assumes that, for instance, exposure to a radicalising narrative in some-
one cognitively susceptible causes them to experience an increase in radicalisation.
How can it be determined whether this causal link is true?
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The mathematical model that will be constructed is based on the IVEE framework
for criminality development that was introduced in Chapter 2. The IVEE frame-
work was in itself developed with the specific aim of understanding the causes and
causal processes in criminality development, and was built from the bottom up with
sound empirical backing. It is therefore safe to conclude that if the final mathemat-
ical model is a fair representation of the IVEE framework that it will be strong on
internal validity from the perspective of causality.
There is another side to internal validity that is particularly important for projects
involving simulation, and that is verification (Townsley and Johnson, 2008, p. 6).
Verification involves ensuring that a computer model does not contain programming
bugs and that it formalises theory correctly. There are a number of ways to address
this issue, such as having a second party check over the computer program, and
inputting some extreme or trivial examples into the simulation to check that the
results come out as expected. These should be done as a matter of course.
A final aspect of internal validity of particular relevance to modelling is avoiding
“the logical fallacy of the circular argument, where an assumption is used to prove
itself” (Townsley and Johnson, 2008, p. 7). This would be a concern in this project
if the data used to develop and parameterise the model were also used to validate
the model. However in this project the models being developed are only intended
to provide a better understanding of the criminality development and radicalisa-
tion processes rather than act as predictive tools, and so they will not be validated
against real-world data. The logical fallacy of the circular argument will therefore
be avoided. This does however have implications for empirical validity (discussed
later).
3.3.2.2 External Validity
External validity is concerned with generalisability (Bryman, 2012, p. 47-48). How
applicable are the findings of the research to other settings? In this project this
question must be answered at two levels, as external validity is equally necessary
for both the underlying IVEE framework and the computer simulation itself.
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IVEE is an analytical framework that enables observations on the complex social
processes of criminality development and radicalisation to be synthesised and expla-
nations found. The importance of the geographical environment as a causal factor in
these processes is a key part of IVEE, implying that the framework is applicable in a
variety of settings. As has already been noted, it was developed from the bottom up
and is based on a number of empirical studies which themselves have taken place
in different settings, suggesting that IVEE is high on external validity. However as
the framework is still relatively new (having only been developed in 2011) the full
extent of its applicability is yet to be determined.
The computer simulation itself is far easier to assess in terms of external validity.
As it will have both a geographical input and a population input, it can be made
applicable to other settings and situations simply by changing these inputs.
3.3.2.3 Ecological Validity
Ecological validity asks whether the findings in a research project are applicable to
natural social settings (Bryman, 2012, p. 48). This threat to validity is more a con-
cern in physical science experiments where certain results occur under laboratory
conditions that cannot be replicated in the world outside. The sociological studies
that have contributed to the development of IVEE such as Wikstro¨m (2011b) and
Sampson (2009) have taken place in natural settings and are therefore themselves
high on ecological validity, so it only remains to ask whether the computer simu-
lation is applicable to natural settings — and that is more a question of empirical
validity.
3.3.2.4 Empirical Validity
Empirical validity is a concern exclusive to research that uses modelling as part
of the research design. It relates to the fact that a model will only be considered
credible if it can be shown to replicate reality (at least to a certain extent) (Townsley
and Johnson, 2008, p. 10). The notion of empirical validity thus has some overlap
with construct validity, in that it highlights the need to use empirical data for model
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parameterisation. However empirical validity goes further, as there also has to be
some means of testing whether the model outputs are realistic. Methods for how
this could be done were discussed in Section 3.2.6, and this potential threat to the
validity of the models will be addressed by validating the model outputs against the
stylised facts listed in that section.
As has already been noted, a model will never precisely replicate reality as some
simplifications will always be made. It is therefore also essential for the assump-
tions made during the construction of the model to be made clear, so that the results
can be put into context.
3.4 Ethical Considerations
All research projects with an interest in the social world faces ethical issues. How-
ever as the research design does not require any data collection from human partici-
pants the usual ethical concerns associated with social research (such as the protec-
tion of participants’ data and ensuring their privacy or anonymity) are not an issue
in this project. Instead the key ethical issues to be faced involve the potential uses of
the outcomes of the research, and especially if it could be open to misinterpretation.
There is also the possibility of dual use arising from the outcomes of the project,
for instance if the research is used by policy-makers in government to support a
controversial policy that might have other negative consequences for society, such
as a policy restricting the personal liberty of the public.
Misinterpretation of the results of the project might occur if the simulations were
thought to resemble reality more closely than they do. This could result in the
simulations’ outputs being mistaken for predictions and, as a worst case scenario,
used as the basis for policy decisions in the fields of crime prevention and counter-
radicalisation that are actually counter-productive. This would damage the credibil-
ity of the research, and could also potentially have a detrimental social impact. In
order to prevent this it is essential that the limitations of the models are made clear
and the results kept in context.
3.4. Ethical Considerations 99
The second ethical issue over the potential for dual use of the research is connected
to the first, as it also involves the research being used to influence policy in a way
that is not intended by the researcher. The actions already suggested — that of
ensuring that the limitations of the models are known and the results interpreted
within the intended context — provide some mitigation against this. Additionally,
the researcher can take positive action to prevent this by promoting the research
directly among interested stakeholders, be they academic researchers or those in-
volved with public policy, and in so doing ensure the context of the research is fully
understood.

Chapter 4
Modelling the Criminal Propensity
Development Process
Chapter 2 examined how the process of radicalisation can be thought of as a special
case of the process by which an individual’s propensity for crime more generally
develops, and proposed the IVEE theoretical framework for radicalisation as a suit-
able basis upon which a computer simulation describing the process of criminal
propensity development can be built. This chapter describes the development of
such a computer simulation. A full description of the final model developed over
the course of this chapter is at Appendix A.
The first section of this chapter analyses the available data that may enable the
causal factors in the IVEE process and the relationships between them to be mea-
sured. The second section provides an overview of the resulting mathematical
model representing the whole process. The chapter concludes with a short appraisal
of the changes that would need to be made to the model to make it applicable to the
specific case of radicalisation.
4.1 Building The Computer Simulation
Chapter 2 examined the theory behind IVEE and established what the different lev-
els in the model are and how they interact. But in order to turn this theoretical model
102 Chapter 4. Modelling the Process
into a computer simulation it is necessary to determine the precise relationships be-
tween the causal factors and find ways to measure them. In particular:
• How can someone’s propensity for criminal behaviours be measured?
• How can exposure to criminogenic moral contexts be measured?
• How can someone’s cognitive susceptibility be measured?
• How do cognitive susceptibility and exposure to criminogenic settings inter-
act and relate to propensity for criminal behaviours?
• What environmental factors make a setting more or less likely to become
criminogenic?
• How are these environmental factors to be measured?
The following sections seek to answer the above questions using data where it ex-
ists, and this will then be used to construct the computer model. However it must be
re-iterated that all models are simplifications of reality, and that reality can never be
completely replicated by a computer simulation. Additionally, the field of crime re-
search is particularly challenging with regards to the collection and analysis of data
due to the complexity of the social and environmental factors involved, and the fact
that the only way to know whether someone has a propensity for crime is after they
have been convicted of a criminal offence — and even then, the situational factors
at the time of the event may be just as significant as the offender’s criminality.
The following sections will therefore make a number of assumptions and generali-
sations in order to enable the construction the computer simulation. These will be
stated explicitly and will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8 when examining
the limitations of the research more generally.
4.1.1 Measuring Propensity for Criminal Behaviours
In order to study crime and to better understand the effectiveness of interventions,
criminologists have proposed a number of different metrics. Some metrics have
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been developed with the aim of comparing crime rates across different locations;
others have been developed for research investigating offenders’ desistance from
crime. All require some form of measurable outcome, which may consist of in-
stances of crime from official police data, self-reports of offences committed, or
self-reports of victimisation. All have different advantages and disadvantages, and
serve different purposes for researchers.
Crime metrics invariably involve some form of count data, but the specifics of what
is being counted varies. Some studies simply count whether an offence has been
committed, others look at the frequency of offences, while still others create ag-
gregate measures. However no method is without flaws. Metrics that simply count
whether a person has committed a particular type of offence hide potentially sig-
nificant differences in offender behaviour: a person who has committed common
assault once is judged the same as someone who commits it every month. But in-
cluding the frequency of the crime still ignores situational factors that may cause
someone to commit a crime more often. It can also be argued that if it is the person’s
propensity to commit a crime that is of interest, then the frequency of the offence
is not important — if an offender has committed an offence a couple of times they
must have sufficient propensity to do it in certain situations, but the fact that they
may have committed the offence more often than this would not provide any more
insight unless far more is known about the situational factors surrounding each of
the crimes.
Also to take into consideration when using count data is the reliability of the un-
derlying data that is being counted. Are the crimes self-reported or are they official
data based on convictions? Again, both have flaws. Official records of convictions
will always underestimate the number of offences, as not all incidents will have
been identified and processed by the criminal justice system (MacDonald et al.,
2014). However self-reported data depends on individuals being open and honest
about their involvement in illegal activity, and on them accurately remembering past
events (Piquero et al., 2002).
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Victimisation data adds another dimension again. For offences against static targets
such as property, victimisation data tells you about the locations that encourage
someone with a certain criminal propensity to commit a crime. However victimisa-
tion data against people is less useful unless combined with data about the victim’s
pattern of life, which might then enable the researcher to build up a picture of the
situational factors surrounding the crime. For research seeking to understand how
the propensity of offenders develops, however, victimisation data is less useful than
official crime statistics or self-reports of offences.
Despite their limitations, counts of criminal incidents do provide an important mea-
sure of what proportion of a population might have the propensity for certain crim-
inal behaviours. Additionally, this data can be enhanced by considering what other
offences an individual might have the propensity for, if they have already demon-
strated through their actions that they have a propensity for one offence in particular.
There are two ways in which such inferences could be deduced: firstly by consider-
ing the relative severities of the crimes, and secondly by considering the similarity
of different crimes
A number of metrics exist for measuring the severity of a crime, such as how tough
the sentence is for the crime in question, the extent of the harm done to the victims,
or the economic impact on society (MacDonald et al., 2014). While there are differ-
ences in the scores these ranking systems give to different crimes, there is enough
similarity between them to objectively conclude, for instance, that homicide is a
“worse” crime than vandalism. By taking a small step of logic it can be deduced,
at least from a moral perspective, that someone who has committed arson would
also have the propensity to commit more minor forms of vandalism, such as graffiti.
Much care must be taken in drawing such conclusions however; for instance, while
the general public in the UK would probably agree that homicide is a worse crime
than drug-taking, some convicted murderers may object to drug-taking on ethical
grounds and would not have the propensity to do it.
A second way to use count data to infer the prevalence of criminal propensities
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in the population is to use crime similarity, which is a concept put forward by
MacDonald et al. (2014) in their study on whether crime specialisation in crimi-
nal careers is related to the severity of their offences. The authors’ definition of
crime similarity is entirely empirical, in that it is simply the likelihood that two
offences are committed by the same person. This avoids the difficulty of trying
to decide, for instance, whether all property crimes are more alike than all violent
crimes. Massoglia (2006) conducted a similar study, in which he developed a ty-
pology of offenders determined by the activities they were more likely to engage
in. For example his “predatory” offenders were more likely to be involved in theft,
vandalism, and general violence, while his “drug” offenders were much less likely
to be involved in any of these actions, but would likely take both marijuana and hard
drugs.
Such measures as crime similarity and scales of offence severity enable deductions
to be made as to whether a person convicted of offence A might also have a propen-
sity for offence B, and hence go some way to tackling the problem of underesti-
mation that is inherent in data consisting of counts of criminal incidents. How-
ever, there is an alternative way to measure an individual’s propensity for crime,
which goes back to the way crime propensity was originally defined in Section
2.1.2.2.
That definition of criminal propensity was taken from Wikstro¨m’s Situational Ac-
tion Theory. According to this definition, criminal propensity has two components:
morality and self-control. It therefore follows that a metric measuring an individ-
ual’s criminal propensity can be constructed by creating a composite measure based
on scales measuring an individual’s morality and their capability to exercise self-
control. And indeed, this is precisely how Wikstro¨m measures criminal propensity
in his research on the effects of the environment on the criminal behaviour of ado-
lescents in the UK city of Peterborough (Wikstro¨m, 2009a). He measures both
morality and self-control by means of a questionnaire, where respondents are asked
to answer questions about how wrong they consider certain behaviours to be (to
measure morality) and how able they are to control their actions (to measure self-
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control). Each score is then converted into a z-score, and the criminal propensity
measure is the sum of these two z-scores.
This measure has been shown to be significantly correlated with crimes actually
committed (calculated using a self-report questionnaire). Further, statistical mod-
els featuring this measure of crime propensity along with a measure of exposure to
criminogenic settings show that both variables are statistically significant predictors
for crime involvement (Wikstro¨m, 2009a, p. 260). This finding not only supports
Wikstro¨m’s Situational Action Theory, it also suggests that his way of measuring
crime propensity has considerable construct validity. However, it is worth noting
that the dependent variable (self-reported crimes actually committed) only includes
a small number of types of crimes — for instance, crimes of fraud, sexual crimes
and traffic crimes are excluded. Additionally no distinction is made between the
different types of crime that an individual has the propensity for in the measure,
which prevents the ability to examine whether Wikstro¨m’s crime propensity mea-
sure correlates better with some crimes than others.
It can be concluded that there are a number of ways to measure an individual’s
propensity to commit crime, each of which have advantages and disadvantages.
However it is important to recognise the differences between the methods used by
different researchers, as these differences may impact on how the causal factors that
each researcher is testing correlate with their chosen measure of criminal propen-
sity.
4.1.2 Measuring Exposure to Criminogenic Moral Contexts
In order for a person to be exposed to a criminogenic moral context there are two re-
quirements: firstly, a setting needs to have developed a criminogenic moral context,
and secondly, a person needs to go there. There are therefore two sides to measuring
the amount of exposure that a person has to criminogenic moral contexts: the first is
the extent of the criminogenity at the setting, and the second is the amount of time
the person spends in such an environment.
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For simplicity, during the initial development of the model only physical locations
will be considered; extending the model to incorporate non-physical locations will
be explored in Chapter 6.
4.1.2.1 Extent of criminogenity
As was the case with measuring criminal behaviours, when seeking to find a way
to measure the extent of criminogenity to which an individual becomes exposed it
is possible to draw on previous research conducted by criminologists in this area.
In particular, a number of studies have investigated the relationship between peer
delinquency and an individual’s own delinquent behaviour (Brendgen et al., 2000;
Elliot and Menard, 1996; Farrington, 2004; Heinze et al., 2004; Lipsey and Derzon,
1998; Patterson et al., 1991), with more recent work seeking to distinguish between
cause and effect — that is, whether a delinquent person chooses delinquent peers,
or whether they are influenced by those peers (Monahan et al., 2009; Miller, 2010;
Meldrum et al., 2013).
These studies use a variety of ways to measure the extent of delinquent behaviour
among respondents’ peers. Many are based on the “Peer Delinquent Behavior
Scale”, which is an eight-item scale developed by Thornberry et al. (1994). Re-
spondents are asked how many of their friends had committed delinquent acts in
the past six months, with delinquent acts ranging in severity from skipping class to
armed robbery. The responses are then coded from 4 (for “Most of them”) to 1 (for
“None of them”). This measure therefore relies on an individual’s perception of
the delinquency of their peers rather than the peers’ actual delinquency. This could
arguably be either a strength or a limitation: if it is supposed that the criminogenic
influence of peers is based only on an individual’s perception of their behaviour
then it would be a strength, but if a peer still exerts criminogenic influence regard-
less of the individual’s knowledge of their actions then it would be a weakness. A
second weakness is the requirement for the individual’s peers to have already com-
mitted a delinquent act; a peer with the propensity for delinquency but who has
not yet committed a delinquent act (perhaps due to situational factors) might still
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have an antisocial influence on the individual, but this would not be captured in the
delinquency scale.
An alternative to asking individuals about the behaviour of their peers would be to
use data about the actual behaviour of their peers, which could either be based on
official crime figures or on self-reports of behaviour. This has the advantage that
it does not require the individual to know all the details of their peers’ behaviour
which, as previously discussed, may be viewed either as a strength or a weakness
of the measure.
Recall, however, that the IVEE framework focuses on the settings that attract people
with the susceptibility to commit crime, and the selection mechanisms that lead an
individual to go to these same settings. This adds an element of complexity, as
the studies using peer delinquency measures only consider the influence of social
networks, not of settings. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, crime happens as a
result of a person-environment interaction. People are always in settings of some
form or other, and so if a person is influenced by their peers this influence will
happen when they are in some setting. Indeed, the level of influence a peer has on
an individual is unlikely to be uniform across all places and all times; in particular, if
the influence is criminogenic in nature it is more likely to take place in unsupervised
locations (Wikstro¨m, 2009a). IVEE’s focus on settings rather than social networks
therefore provides additional flexibility, as it allows for people to be influenced by
more than just their social network (for instance by something they read online), and
it enables the influence of their social network to vary according to the setting.
It is necessary therefore to determine a measure for the criminogenity of a setting
that incorporates both the influence of peers and of other features in the environ-
ment. The influence of peers can be integrated into the computer simulation by
generating activity fields for each individual (the method for which will follow in
the next section). When a (simulated) individual regularly goes to the same setting
as another (simulated) individual, the two individuals can be considered affiliates
and their respective propensities for criminal behaviours can be made to contribute
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to each others’ exposure to criminalising moral contexts.
The question of how to incorporate environmental features in measuring the extent
of the criminogenity of settings relates to emergence and in particular how levels of
collective efficacy can be measured. This will be examined in more detail in Section
4.1.5.
4.1.2.2 Time spent in criminogenic settings
Social selective factors can be incorporated into the model by making assumptions
about the activity fields of individuals based on socio-demographic information,
such as a person’s age, religion and occupation. For instance, if the average British
school pupil attends school between 8:30am and 3:30pm every Monday to Friday,
we can assume that the average length of time they spend at school is approximately
35 hours per week. Similar estimates can be made for other socio-demographic
groups, such as:
• Students over 18 spend approximately 40 hours per week at university;
• Employed people spend approximately 40 hours per week at their work-
places;
• Religious people attend their place of worship for approximately 2 hours per
week;
• Unemployed people and those with no religion spend their extra time at home,
at friends’ houses, or in public social centres (equally distributed);
• Only those aged under 20 go to youth clubs.
These estimates can be combined with individual factors such as lifestyle choices
and personal preferences to create a model simulating each person’s activity field. In
Section 2.2.1.2 several assumptions were put forward as to why an individual would
be more likely to go to one setting over another. In particular it was suggested that
people are attracted to places closer to where they live, places that are large, and
places where like-minded people go. How can these factors be combined in such a
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way as to enable an individual’s activity field to be estimated?
The first two assumptions have been used in a number of previous studies that have
sought to understand how many people go to certain locations, such as studies mod-
elling the popularity of retail centres (Harris and Wilson, 1978), and research into
the locations that attracted rioters in London in August 2011 (Davies et al., 2013).
This previous work provides the basis for a model describing how likely it is that a
person visits a certain setting.
The original model, developed for retail modelling by Harris and Wilson (1978),
suggests that given a flow fi j of money from location i to location j:
fi j = AiQiWαj e
−βci j
where Ai = 1∑k Wαk e−βcik
so that ∑ j fi j = Qi.
In this equation Wj is the “attractiveness” of the setting and relates to its size; ci j is
a measure of the cost of travel from i to j, for instance the distance between the two;
Qi is the retail demand in location i, which is a measure of how much the people in
location i go out to buy things in general; and α and β are model parameters (Harris
and Wilson, 1978, p. 371).
This equation can be used to estimate the likelihood that each individual person i
visits each setting j. In other words, the fi j function provides a means of estimating
a person’s activity field.
In order to calculate fi j some further information is required: in particular about
the location of each setting (to calculate the cost ci j of going there for each per-
son), and about the setting’s size (to calculate the attractiveness Wj). However, the
original retail model is very limited in the way it calculates the attractiveness Wj
of setting j, as it implies all settings of the same size are equally attractive to peo-
ple from all originating locations i (which is why Wj is dependent only on j, not
on i). The criminal propensity development model requires more sophistication in
how attractiveness is calculated, as it is important to incorporate the attractive in-
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fluence of like-minded people at the setting (homophily). In order to do this it will
be necessary to make Wj into Wi j, dependent on attributes of both i and j, and in
particular this will be done through a function measuring how similar a person is to
other people who visit that setting.
As this is a model rather than reality, there are only a limited number of variables
ascribed to individuals that can be used to measure how similar a person is to others
visiting a setting: for instance the person’s age, religion, cognitive susceptibility,
and propensity for crime. These can be coded so that, for instance, those in age
bracket 14-18 have value “1”, 19-24 have value “2” etc. In the simplest instance it
will be assumed that all factors to have equal weighting when it comes to defining
similarity. The similarity between a person and a setting will then be calculated
as the difference between an individual’s personal characteristics and the mean av-
erage of these characteristics for people who have visited the setting. The overall
attractiveness Wj of setting j will then be a composite variable made up of both
setting j’s size and its similarity to person i. Wj in the retail model thus become Wi j
in the criminal propensity development model.
The variable that requires the most careful handling to make it transferable to the
criminality development model is Qi, originally described in the retail model as the
retail demand in location i. The equivalent for this model would be the proportion
of time that person i spends at a particular type of location — for instance a place
of work (such as a school, university, or office) or a place of leisure (such as a high
street, youth club or sports centre). The list at the start of this section comprising
estimates for how long people with certain demographic characteristics are likely
to spend in particular locations is a good place to start; these estimates allow the
value of Qi to be determined for each (simulated) person in the model given their
socio-demographic characteristics.
However, defining Qi is not quite that simple. In the original retail model the vari-
able Qi represents the general spending power of people from location i, and is
therefore dependent only on the originating location i, not on the receiving location
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j. But the assumptions at the start of this section relate to the different types of
setting that person i goes to, and hence it is necessary to make Qi dependent on the
type of location that j is.
We must therefore define the set K of setting types, comprising schools, universities,
offices, leisure centres, youth clubs, high streets, mosques, churches, and personal
residences (i.e. someone’s friend’s house).1 K is such that family {Jk}k∈K is a
partition of J, the set of all settings. In this way Qi from the retail model becomes
Qik in the criminality development model, for k ∈ K. The assumptions at the start
of this section can then be used to determine the specific values of Qik so that, for
instance, if person i is aged under 18 and location type k is a school, Qik = 3516×7 =
0.3125 (assuming people are awake for an average of 16 hours per day).
To summarise, the self- and social-selection elements of the IVEE model can be
represented as an activity field, which can be estimated using the function
fi jk = AikQikWαi j e
−βci j
where Qik represents the amount of time person i spends in settings of type k, Wi j
represents the attractiveness of setting j to person i, ci j represents the cost to person
i of going to setting j, α and β are model parameters, and Aik = 1∑l∈Jk Wαil e
−βcil is a
scaling factor that makes ∑ j∈Jk fi jk = Qik.
4.1.3 Measuring Cognitive Susceptibility
Section 2.2.1 explored what makes a person cognitively susceptible to developing
the propensity to commit acts of terrorism, and found that there are specific areas of
the brain that are either more likely to be activated or are less well developed in such
individuals. However, without conducting fMRI scans on the brains of a significant
sample of the population, it is difficult to use this definition to measure cognitive
susceptibility in the criminality development model. It is therefore preferable to
1Further elements could be added to K to refine this part of the model further, assuming that
accurate information could be obtained regarding the amount of time people spend at the additional
location types.
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measure the cognitive susceptibility of a person by means of a self-report measure
or a proxy.
As already discussed, Gottfredson and Hirschi and many other criminologists have
linked lack of self-control to increased criminal activity. There are various methods
that these researchers have used to measure self-control. Some consist of variations
of the Stroop task which tests executive function capacity (Stroop, 1935). Another
popular example is the Child Behavior Checklist (Achenbach, 1991), which has
been used in several criminological studies (Chapple, 2005; Hay and Forrest, 2006;
Meldrum et al., 2013). This comprises a questionnaire filled in by mothers or ado-
lescents, asking the respondents to rate certain statements such as “throws temper
tantrums or is hot-tempered” in terms of how often they are true. Grasmick et al.
(1993) have also developed a scale which includes some questions on self-control
that respondents are asked to rate, such as “I often act on the spur of the moment
without stopping to think”. The most popular methods have been used sufficiently
often to be known to have strong construct validity.
For measuring an individual’s vulnerability to moral change, there is one candi-
date which shows signs of being an appropriate proxy: a self-report measure called
Resistance to Peer Influence (RPI). This measure was developed by Steinberg and
Monahan (2007), and is calculated by presenting individuals with 10 pairs of state-
ments and asking them to choose the statement that describes them best (for ex-
ample, “Some people go along with their friends just to keep them happy” versus
“Other people refuse to go along with what their friends want to do, even though
they know it will make their friends unhappy”). This measure has been used in
several large studies that have observed its statistical significance as a predictor of
delinquent behaviour (Steinberg and Monahan, 2007; Monahan et al., 2009; Mel-
drum et al., 2013). It has also been shown to have a high level of construct validity
(Steinberg and Monahan, 2007).
The relevance of RPI to criminal propensity is supported by prior research into sus-
ceptibility to peer pressure, with Erickson et al. (2000) noting that a heightened
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susceptibility to peer pressure has most consistently been seen when the behaviour
is antisocial — that is, behaviours where morality would play a part in an individ-
ual’s decision making — making RPI a measure that logically may be linked to a
cognitive susceptibility to developing the propensity to commit crime. This link
has since been demonstrated by a team of psychologists who used the RPI measure
when analysing the results of fMRI scans conducted on a sample of 10 year old
children exposed to a visual stimulus (Grosbras et al., 2007). Their findings showed
that children with lower RPI scores experienced a higher response in three differ-
ent brain regions. Two of these three regions are the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
and the anterior cingulate cortex — precisely those that have been associated with
someone being more cognitive susceptible to changing their morality.
These findings suggest that RPI may be an appropriate proxy measure for an indi-
vidual’s cognitive susceptibility to moral change that can be used in the criminality
development model. The question of how to measure cognitive susceptibility there-
fore becomes one of how to measure RPI. As a self-report measure based on peo-
ple’s responses to “either-or” questions, RPI lacks a meaningful unit; while studies
using RPI (or similar measures) have shown that that there is a relationship between
RPI and the likelihood of delinquency, this relationship is not linear. For instance if
person A has twice the RPI of person B, this does not mean that person B is twice as
likely to commit criminal acts (given the same exposure to delinquent peers and sit-
uational stimulus). A similar argument can be made for self-control, which is also
often measured via a self-report questionnaire. In order for RPI and self-control
to be used in the computer simulation the relationship between these variables and
propensity for delinquency must be made quantifiable. Ways in which this has been
attempted will be examined in the next section.
An additional point to address is how to allocate realistic cognitive susceptibility
levels to the simulated people in the computer model, and whether it should be
static or change with time. In order to do this the distribution of RPI in the general
population needs to be determined, as does RPI’s relationship with age. As mea-
sures of self-control vary from study to study a similar analysis cannot be carried
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out for this variable; it is however assumed to be normally distributed (Wikstro¨m,
2009a).
In a study conducted by Meldrum et al., the authors found that the distribution
of susceptibility to peer influence is approximately normal in their sample of 908,
with skewness=0.34 and kurtosis=2.75 (2013, p. 117). While their measure of RPI
is slightly modified from the original measure developed by Steinberg and Monahan
(2007), the differences are small and unlikely to have generated significantly differ-
ent results from other RPI measures.2 It is therefore reasonable to assume that the
original measure of RPI as introduced by Steinberg and Monahan is also distributed
normally across the population.
Steinberg and Monahan’s original paper does provide information about the mean
and variance of the RPI measure. The data analysed in this paper come from four
studies that have taken cases from different parts of the USA and include both of-
fenders and non-offenders, giving a total of 3,676 cases. The overall mean RPI
across all cases is 3.07, with a standard deviation of 0.55 (Steinberg and Monahan,
2007, pp. 1534-5).
All analyses using the RPI measure agree that it varies with age over the period of
middle adolescence (ages 14 to 18). However Steinberg and Monahan’s analysis,
which uses data with an overall age range of 10 to 30, notes little change outside
this age bracket. Steinberg and Monahan applied several different models to their
four datasets, with the model that best fitted the longitudinal dataset having RPI
increasing linearly with age in the range 14 to 18, with the mean RPI of 2.78 at age
14 increasing by 0.09 every 6 months until age 18 (Steinberg and Monahan, 2007,
p. 1538).
The models showed that this linear trend in middle adolescence is the same for both
males and females, but that overall females have a higher RPI than males. This
finding is supported by prior research showing girls generally to be less susceptible
2The changes consist of a simplification of the questionnaire to a traditional 4-point scale worded
in the first person. See (Meldrum et al., 2013, p. 116) for details.
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to peer pressure than boys (Berndt, 1979; Greenberger, 1982; Steinberg and Sil-
verberg, 1986). Steinberg and Monahan’s model suggests that males have a mean
RPI of 2.68 at age 14 while females have a mean RPI of 2.88 at age 14, with RPI
increasing by 0.137 every 6 months for both genders (2007, p. 1539).
It must be noted that this model applies only to the longitudinal dataset analysed by
Steinberg and Monahan, which exclusively looks at serious offenders between the
ages of 14 and 21. It is therefore possible that the mean RPI for these individuals
is different from that of the general population. However, Steinberg and Monahan’s
analysis of the other three datasets (which mostly consist of non-offenders) shows
no statistically significant difference between the mean RPIs of the serious offenders
when compared with the wider population at each age.
It should also be noted that Steinberg and Monahan’s analysis uses data exclusively
from studies conducted in the USA. It is therefore possible that the difference in
culture between the UK and USA would prevent a meaningful transferral of these
results to the UK population. However, in addition to analysing the impact of gender
and age on RPI, Steinberg and Monahan also examined the effects of several cultural
factors, such as ethnicity and socio-economic status. They found only a very slight
variation in RPI due to these cultural factors. RPI’s linear relationship with age was
also found to be consistent with Dutch and French-Canadian studies, suggesting
that RPI is a measure largely independent of cultural factors.
For simplicity in the criminality development model, it is preferable to reverse the
scale to create a measure for susceptibility rather than resistance to peer influence,
and also to transform these values to z-scores so that the cognitive susceptibility
variable follows a standard normal distribution. A value of 3.8 is taken for the over-
all mean in this transformation, which assumes that the population has a uniform
distribution of ages between 14 and 60 and an even gender split. The differences in
mean according to the individual’s age and gender is shown in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Mean susceptibility to peer influence values
Gender Age Transformed Mean Susceptibility
Male 14 3.8−2.680.55 = 2.0364
Male 15 3.8−2.9540.55 = 1.5382
Male 16 3.8−3.2280.55 = 1.04
Male 17 3.8−3.5020.55 = 0.5418
Male 18+ 3.8−3.7760.55 = 0.0436
Female 14 3.8−2.880.55 = 1.6727
Female 15 3.8−3.1540.55 = 1.1745
Female 16 3.8−3.4280.55 = 0.6764
Female 17 3.8−3.7020.55 = 0.1782
Female 18+ 3.8−3.9760.55 =−0.32
4.1.4 Relating Cognitive Susceptibility, Exposure to Crimino-
genic Settings and Propensity
As highlighted in the previous sections, in order to simulate the effects that causal
factors have on an individual’s propensity for crime, each variable and the relation-
ships between them have to be made measurable. This is difficult to achieve, as
while self-control, RPI and peer delinquency have been shown to be strong predic-
tors for delinquent behaviour, statistical models linking them ignore the situational
factors that also contribute to an individual committing a crime. This limitation can-
not be eliminated entirely, but the use of a large sample can provide some mitigation,
as situational factors will be averaged out to a certain extent. This approximation is
clearly imperfect, but as the studies that have used RPI as a measure have related it
to actual instances of delinquency rather than by measuring propensity in the man-
ner suggested by Wikstro¨m, it is an approximation that must be made in order to
parameterise the computer model.
While several researchers have used RPI (or its converse, susceptibility to peer in-
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fluence), the focus of most studies has been on linking it to factors such as gender
and age (Steinberg and Monahan, 2007; Steinberg and Silverberg, 1986) or look-
ing at interaction effects with other variables (Monahan et al., 2009; Miller, 2010).
Only one study has explored the relationship between susceptibility to peer influ-
ence, self-control, peer delinquency, and the probability that someone will commit
a crime, which is Meldrum et al. (2013).
For Meldrum et al.’s study the dependent variable was a composite self-report delin-
quency measure3. Meldrum et al. found that the most suitable statistical model
linking susceptibility to peer influence, self-control, and peer delinquency to their
delinquency measure was a negative binomial regression model. In this model, the
number of different delinquent acts conducted by an individual of age 15 over a 12
month period is assumed to be a random variable Y such that the probability that a
person commits y delinquent acts in the next 12 months is:
P(Y = y) =
Γ(y+ 1α )
Γ(y+1)Γ( 1α )
(
1
1+αµ
) 1
α
(
αµ
1+αµ
)y
The values µ and α can be calculated from the data. Meldrum et al. produced
several models based on 908 data values, of which the most relevant is the one that
assesses the impact on delinquency of susceptibility to peer influence, self-control,
an interaction term (susceptibility × self-control), and peer delinquency. For each
person in the sample Meldrum et al. calculated values for these attributes using self-
report questionnaires (as discussed in the previous sections), then converted each of
these values to z-scores in order to produce the final regression model. For this
model the parameters were calculated as α = 0.1228 and
lnµ =−0.23+0.25x1−0.13x2+0.15x1x2+0.69x3
where x1 is the z-score for the susceptibility to peer influence (SPI) metric, x2 the
3The study uses 8 acts of delinquency in their measure; these act include threatening to beat
someone up, purposefully damaging property, and using marijuana. For each of these acts there is a
score of 0 if the individual has not done the act in the past 12 months, and a score of 1 if they have.
The delinquency measure is therefore always between 0 and 8 (Meldrum et al., 2013).
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z-score for self-control, and x3 the z-score for peer delinquency. All p-values are
less than 0.001.
Meldrum et al. do not refer specifically to criminal propensity; their model calcu-
lates the probability that someone will commit y acts of delinquency in a 12 month
period, not their propensity to do so. Therefore in order to use this model to find a
quantifiable relationship between susceptibility to peer influence, peer delinquency,
and criminal propensity, propensity must be defined in terms of Y . As there is no
information about the situational factors associated with each event, the most log-
ical choice is P(Y > 0), the probability that an individual commits any delinquent
acts at all in a 12 month period. P(Y > 0) must therefore be calculated to establish
how it changes with the predictor variables:
P(Y > 0) = 1−P(Y = 0)
= 1− Γ(0+
1
α )
Γ(0+1)Γ( 1α )
(
1
1+αµ
) 1
α
(
αµ
1+αµ
)0
= 1−
(
1
1+αµ
) 1
α
= 1−
(
1
1+0.1228e−0.23+0.25x1−0.13x2+0.15x1x2+0.69x3
)8.14
From this equation it is evident that the values held by any of the predictor variables
will have an impact on the size of the effect that changing any of the other predictor
variables has on P(Y > 0). As an example, Table 4.2 shows how P(Y > 0) changes
when x1 increases from 0 to 1 for different x2 and x3 values:
Table 4.2 shows that the relationship between susceptibility to peer influence, self-
control, peer delinquency, and the likelihood of delinquency in the next 12 months
is not simple, but it can be calculated. It can therefore be incorporated into the
computer simulation.
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Table 4.2: Example values for Meldrum et al.’s negative binomial model
Self-control Peer P(Y > 0) % change
Delinquency SPI=0 SPI=1
-1 -1 0.357 0.385 7.94
-1 0 0.576 0.611 6.01
-1 1 0.804 0.832 3.48
0 -1 0.322 0.391 21.37
0 0 0.531 0.618 16.20
0 1 0.765 0.837 9.47
1 -1 0.290 0.397 36.88
1 0 0.488 0.624 27.97
1 1 0.723 0.843 16.51
4.1.4.1 An Alternative Relationship
Although the negative binomial model was derived from empirical data, it is not the
only function that could be put forward as a possible explanation for how moral-
ity, self-control, criminogenic exposure and individual propensity for crime are
linked.
Section 4.1.1 explored the work carried out by Wikstro¨m on the effects of exposure
to criminogenic settings on crime using situational action theory. Wikstro¨m defines
crime propensity as being composed of a person’s level of morality and their ability
to exercise self-control. In his own research, he uses a measure for propensity that
is a simple sum of these two variables converted into z-scores, so
Propensity = Morality+Self-Control
where Morality and Self-Control are calculated by coding the responses to a ques-
tionnaire and then converting these totals to z-scores (Wikstro¨m, 2009a). So far
we have used susceptibility to peer influence as a proxy to represent morality; if
this proxy is kept, then Wikstro¨m’s equation suggests that we could simply put
pi(t) = x1−x2 into the model instead of the negative binomial equation (where pi(t)
represents the propensity of person i at time t). The sign for the self-control variable
is negative because it is assumed that higher self-control reduces crime propensity.
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However, such an equation does not provide any scope for including the influence
of exposure to criminogenic settings on how propensity for crime develops. How
can criminogenic influences be incorporated?
An answer comes from the work undertaken by Gino et al. (2011), which was dis-
cussed in Section 2.2.1. In this paper the authors explored the effects that reducing
an individual’s capacity to exercise self-control had on their moral behaviour, and
they discovered that when people are repeatedly exposed to criminalising moral
contexts, a person’s self-control reserves become depleted. Further to this, when a
person with a low capacity to exercise self-control is exposed to criminalising moral
contexts, this does affect their moral behaviour. Consequently, from Gino et al.’s re-
search it can be concluded that following repeated exposure to criminalising moral
contexts, an individual with a high capacity to exercise self-control will, eventually,
also see their moral behaviour altered.
These ideas can be combined to derive an alternative equation to the negative bino-
mial one, building upon the following premises:
• Self-control (x2) is immutable;
• Susceptibility to peer influence (x1) can be used as a proxy variable for an
individual’s base level of morality;
• When an individual is exposed to a criminogenic setting, their morality level
is altered from its base level;
• The extent to which an individual’s morality is affected by their criminogenic
exposure (x3) is determined by their level of self-control, where high levels of
self-control reduce the influence of criminogenic exposure on morality;
• An individual’s propensity for crime is then the sum of their self-control and
their current level of morality.
Bringing this together, one possible expression for person i’s morality at time t
could be:
mi(t) = x1+θx3e−γx2
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where x1 (susceptibility to peer influence) and x2 (self-control) are independent ran-
dom variables distributed N(0,1), and x3 is the z-score derived from the crimino-
genic exposure function (all as defined as in the negative binomial model), and θ
and γ are model parameters4. Then, as in Wikstro¨m (2009a), person i’s propensity
for crime at time t would be:
pi(t) = mi(t)− x2
This equation provides an alternative credible way to incorporate the relationship
between morality, self-control, criminogenic exposure and propensity for crime into
the computer simulation.
4.1.5 What environmental factors make a setting more or less
likely to become criminogenic?
Section 4.1.2 examined the factors that cause people to be more or less likely to visit
certain settings from the point of view of selection — that is, what makes someone
choose to go to one setting over another. This was approached via the assumption
that people are more likely to go to places that are closer to where they live, have a
larger catchment area, and that are visited by like-minded people.
The importance of the presence of like-minded people leads to questions about
emergence. Emergence is concerned with what causes a setting to be more likely
to draw criminally-minded people to it so that it becomes a home to criminalising
moral contexts. From the discussion about selection it is easy to see how crim-
inogenic hubs can perpetuate: if a setting has a higher than average number of
criminally-minded people who go there, more criminally-minded people will be at-
tracted to it. But what environmental factors cause this process to start in the first
place?
In Section 2.2.3 the hypothesis was put forward that a criminogenic moral context is
4Many other equations satisfying these premises could also be derived; this is simply one exam-
ple
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more likely to be found in a setting with low levels of collective efficacy. Collective
efficacy is a concept introduced by Sampson et al. (1997) in a paper in which the au-
thors argued that neighbourhoods in Chicago with higher collective efficacy would
be likely to experience less neighbourhood violence. The authors measured collec-
tive efficacy by means of a neighbourhood survey that looked at two aspects of a
neighbourhood: its levels of informal social control (such as whether local people
would intervene if someone were spray-painting graffiti on walls), and its levels of
social cohesion (for instance whether people trust their neighbours and consider the
community to be close). Using this definition they went on to show that low levels
of collective efficacy were correlated with higher levels of violence, which suggests
that low collective efficacy does indeed make a setting more criminogenic.
However it should not be supposed that the findings from a study conducted in
1990s Chicago can be directly transferred to the 21st century UK context. Thank-
fully, more recent UK-based data is available. The Peterborough Adolescent and
Young Adult Development Study (PADS+) is a longitudinal study that was set up
to study the criminal behaviour of adolescents in Peterborough, Cambridgeshire
(PADS+, 2015). One of the main focuses of the PADS+ project is in understanding
the effect that the environment has on the criminal propensities of young people,
including to what extent low collective efficacy in a setting affects the people in the
study (Wikstro¨m, 2011a). Importantly, this study examines the effects of settings
with low collective efficacy on crime propensity, not actual crime; this ensures that
the focus remains on the development of an individual’s morality, and not on the
“action process” which causes an individual to actually commit an act of crime at
any particular time.
Wikstro¨m (2011a) uses the same measure for collective efficacy as Sampson et al.
(1997), and finds conclusively that “the weaker the collective efficacy of a young
person’s family, school and neighbourhood environments, the more likely it is that
he or she will have a stronger crime propensity” (Wikstro¨m, 2011a, p. 113). As
with his previous research, for this study Wikstro¨m defines crime propensity as
comprising morality and self-control, and he notes that settings with low collective
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efficacy have a much stronger effect on morality than they do on self-control. This
supports the discussion in Section 2.2.1 concerning the psychology of morality and
self-control, in which it was concluded that self-control, as a largely genetic trait, is
more immutable than morality.
Wikstro¨m further notes that low collective efficacy does not fully capture the impor-
tance of peer delinquency on the development of an individual’s crime propensity,
and that when this is included in the model it is peer delinquency that has the greater
effect (though the effect of low collective efficacy is still significant) (2011a, p. 116).
This finding accords with earlier discussions about the importance of peers on the
development of a person’s criminal propensity, and will be captured in the criminal-
ity development model by ensuring that a setting’s criminogenity is determined by
the criminal propensities of the people who go there.
How then to incorporate the effects of low collective efficacy in the computer sim-
ulation? There are two possible mechanisms through which low collective effi-
cacy could cause a setting to become criminogenic: either through selection, where
criminally-minded people are attracted by low collective efficacy, or else by boost-
ing the effect that criminally-minded people have when they are present at a setting.
To date there has been no research conducted to distinguish between the two possi-
ble mechanisms, so both will be explored in the computer simulation.
4.1.6 How are environmental factors to be measured?
The importance of the environment in the IVEE model has been made clear in the
preceding sections, with many different environmental factors having influence at
different stages of the process. The computer simulation therefore cannot work
with simulated people alone — it must also be given a location in which to operate.
This can be done in two different ways. The first possibility is that, as with the
simulated people, the environment that is input into the model can be an entirely
fictitious one. The advantage of this is that it allows for all the environmental fac-
tors to be controlled, which will facilitate later analysis and make it easier to draw
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conclusions as to the impact of changing these environmental factors. However a
fictitious environment may lack realism and lead the model to generate implausible
results.
Alternatively, the computer simulation can be located in a real UK town. This
would add considerably to the simulation’s authenticity, but would require accurate
information about the chosen town to be collected for input into the simulation.
While this may be a simple task for some attributes and settings, such as identify-
ing the size and location of schools, it may be far more time consuming to collect
this information for others, such as identifying the size of every local employer,
and calculating the collective efficacy of every neighbourhood. Forcing the com-
puter simulation to be based on a real town also constrains the model and limits the
amount of manipulation of environmental parameters that can take place.
It should be recalled that the purpose of the computer simulation is to better un-
derstand the impact that changing different factors will have on the criminality de-
velopment process. The simulation does not therefore require the level of realism
that a predictive model would. It is therefore proposed that the computer simu-
lation should operate in a modified version of a UK town: real locations will be
used where they can be easily identified, but it will not be required for all attributes
associated with the locations to be recorded accurately. This allows the model to
operate in an environment that should provide the necessary level of realism for the
simulation to generate credible results, but without requiring an extensive period
of on-the-ground data collection that would not enhance the model’s overall value.
As this modified version of a real town is ultimately fictitious, all control of the
environmental factors remains with the modeller.
The town chosen to provide the basis for the environment to be used in the model
is Peterborough, a settlement with a population of approximately 115,000 that has
considerable social and ethnic diversity (Wikstro¨m et al., 2010). Peterborough is
a logical choice for the model’s environment as much of the UK-based research
that the model draws on was conducted as part of the Peterborough Adolescent and
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Young Adult Development Study (PADS+) project.
The following environmental factors have been identified in previous sections as
having a role to play in the process of criminal propensity development, and there-
fore will require inputting into the computer simulation for key settings in Peterbor-
ough:
• Type of setting
• Location of setting
• Size of setting
• Collective efficacy of setting
These first three attributes can be easily estimated for key locations in Peterborough
by conducting a web search. Collective efficacy is more subjective and requires the
use of a large survey. However as precise values are not necessary for the model to
serve its purpose, the collective efficacy values will not be estimated, and instead
will be controlled by the modeller.
4.2 Description of the Model
4.2.1 Overview
This section provides an overview of the criminality development model, and uses
an example from epidemiology to illustrate the modelling method and show how
the different levels in IVEE can be brought together.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the modelling technique chosen to represent the crim-
inality development process is an individual-level state-transition model (STM).
STMs are commonly used in epidemiology to describe the spread of infectious dis-
eases, with the simplest version being the basic SIR model (Keeling and Rohani,
2008). The SIR model represents the process of infection, where a person can be in
one of three states: “susceptible”, “infectious”, or “recovered”. The arrangement of
these states is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Basic SIR model
In this diagram, the circles represent states and the boxes represent transitions be-
tween the different states. Every transition has an equal number of inputs and out-
puts, so in the process of “infection” a susceptible person becomes exposed to an
infected person, and the output of that process is two infected people. The pro-
cess of “recovery” is simpler, just requiring one infectious person as input and one
recovered (and in this example immune) person as output.
The diagram in Figure 4.1 is called a Petri net. A Petri net is a graph which has
two categories of vertices: states and transitions. They can be used to describe
many different types of complex system, such as chemical reactions or predator-
prey relationships in an ecosystem (Baez and Biamonte, 2012, p. 9). They can be
deterministic, whereby anything going in to a transition comes out the other side,
or they can be stochastic, whereby each transition has a rate constant describing the
rate at which the input state transforms into the output state. As the criminal propen-
sity development model is to be a deterministic individual-level STM, it should thus
be possible to illustrate it as a Petri net.
In order to do this let us first consider a simplified version of IVEE, which ignores
the emergence of criminogenic settings and looks solely at a vulnerable person and
their exposure to criminogenic settings. When this is illustrated as a Petri net, it
would look like Figure 4.2. In this Petri net there is a transition called “Exposure”
that causes a Criminogenic Setting to have an effect on a Neutral Person and turn
them into a Criminally-Minded Person.
Similarly, the emergence transition can also be illustrated as its own Petri net. While
exposure is concerned with what effect a setting has on a person, emergence is about
what effect a person has on a setting. The emergence Petri net would therefore
see a Neutral Setting turn into a Criminogenic Setting, through the presence of a
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Figure 4.2: Simplified IVEE Petri net for exposure
Criminally-Minded Person. This is depicted in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Simplified IVEE Petri net for emergence
By combining the two, an initial basic Petri net describing the criminality devel-
opment process according to the IVEE model can be illustrated. This is shown in
Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4 is a way of illustrating the overall IVEE framework for criminal propen-
sity development in the form of a mathematical model. As previously discussed,
all models are simplifications of reality, however the basic Petri net on its own is
too simple to explain the entire criminality development process. In order to cre-
ate a simulation that mimics the process, it is necessary to look in more detail at
the emergence and exposure transitions and ensure that the way they are defined
reflects reality, by drawing on the data and statistical models discussed throughout
this chapter.
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Figure 4.4: Basic IVEE Petri net
4.2.2 The Emergence Transition
The emergence transition occurs when a setting forms a significant part of a
criminally-minded person’s activity field — that is for any setting j for which
fi jk(t) > τ1 for some time threshold τ1, where person i has a significant propen-
sity p for some criminal behaviour (so pi(t) > ε for some propensity threshold ε).
The time and propensity thresholds τ1 and ε could hold a variety of values; the im-
pact of changing these thresholds in terms of the behaviour of the model and the
real world implications will be explored in Chapter 5.
After the emergence transition the criminogenity of a setting j at time t is defined
to be:
c j(t) =
ω j
n
 ∑∀i s.t.
fi jk(t)>τ1
& pi(t)>ε
pi(t)

where pi(t) is the propensity of person i to some crime at time t, n is the number
of people i such that fi jk(t) > τ1, and ω j is the collective efficacy coefficient of
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the setting (where a high value for ω j indicates a setting with very little collective
efficacy). Thus after the emergence transition the criminogenity of the setting for
each type of criminal behaviour becomes the mean of the propensities of all people
spending a significant amount of time at that setting, multiplied by the collective
efficacy coefficient.
4.2.3 The Exposure Transition
The exposure transition occurs when person i spends a non-zero amount of time in
a criminogenic setting j. The exposure transition is defined to be the way the three
variables of cognitive susceptibility, criminogenic influence, and criminal propen-
sity (comprising morality and self-control) interact. There are a number of possible
candidates for this function, such as simple linear functions or probability functions
like the one derived from the negative binomial distribution discussed in Section
4.1.4. Chapter 5 will explore how using different functions for the exposure tran-
sition affects the way the model behaves, including the impact of incorporating
thresholds similar to τ1 and ε .
A complete description of the criminal propensity development model is at Ap-
pendix A.
4.3 Application to Radicalisation
So far this chapter has examined how the IVEE framework can be used to construct
a mathematical model and computer simulation describing how criminal propensity
develops. However recall that the research question this thesis aims to answer re-
quires a comparison between the process of criminal propensity development and
radicalisation. Constructing this model is therefore only half the answer: an equiv-
alent model must be constructed for radicalisation.
In Chapter 2 three potential differences were identified between radicalisation and
the development of a propensity for crime more generally. These differences were
in the severity of the crime that an individual has the propensity to commit, the level
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of morality required, and the rarity of radicalising moral contexts.
The first two of these factors are easy to incorporate, as they simply require a change
in how the output from the model should be interpreted. For instance, an individual
may be considered to have the propensity for some types of crime if, after the sim-
ulation has been run, they have mid-level morality and low levels of self-control.
However for an individual to count as radicalised, they would need to have a level
of morality sufficient for them to consider very severe crimes such as homicide or
significant property damage to be acceptable.
Incorporating the final aspect — the rarity of radicalising settings — will require
a change to the emergence transition to make it less likely that radicalising moral
contexts appear. There are a number of ways that this could be achieved, such as
increasing the thresholds ε and τ1. The specifics of all the alterations that would
need to be made to the model so that it represents the radicalisation process instead
of the criminality development process will be explored in Chapter 6.

Chapter 5
Testing the Model
The previous chapter proposed how a model describing the criminality development
process could be constructed using the IVEE theoretical framework and a computer
simulation built. However, the knowledge built up by social science researchers on
how criminality develops is still incomplete, and there are a great many elements of
the model that could be changed. In this chapter, the model will be tested by using
different values and functions in some of its component parts. The simulation will
then be run for these different versions of the model and the outputs compared in
order to understand the effects that changing each element of the model has on the
system as a whole.
There are several broad areas where changes could be made. Changes can be made
to the inputs: the environment and the people. How does altering the locations or
attributes of key settings affect the way the model behaves? How about a different
ethnic, religious or age mix of people?
Changes could be made to the selection mechanisms: how do the people and the
environment come together? How much weight should be given to the attractiveness
of settings to different people, and how much to the cost of getting there?
Changes can also be made to the emergence and exposure transitions themselves.
For emergence, one can introduce thresholds for how long an individual must spend
at a setting or what propensity they need to have to affect the setting. For exposure,
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one can change the function that measures each person’s level of exposure to crim-
inogenic settings, or even the whole function connecting this with their levels of
self-control and morality. What impact do these changes have on the model as a
whole?
This chapter will explore the impact that these alterations to the model have on
how propensity spreads and changes across the people in the model, to determine
how sensitive or stable the model is. This will enable the workings of the model
in its current form to be fully understood before it is then converted into a model
describing the radicalisation process, which will be explained in Chapter 6. But first,
a default version of the model will be defined and its behaviour analysed.
5.1 Default Version of the Model
5.1.1 Model Description
Due to the number of elements of the model that can potentially be altered, a default
setting for the model needs to be defined to allow comparisons to be made when
these settings are changed. The functions, inputs and parameters making up the
default version of the model are described below. A full description of the model is
also at Appendix A.
5.1.1.1 Activity Field Generation
Section 4.1.2.2 showed that an activity field for person i can be estimated using the
function
fi jk = AikQikWαi j e
−βci j
where k is the type of setting that j is, Qik represents the amount of time person i
spends in settings of type k, Wi j represents the attractiveness of setting j to person
i, ci j represents the cost to person i of going to setting j, Aik is a scaling factor,
and α and β are model parameters, which will be set to 1 in the default version of
the model. Note that the activity fields are recalculated every time-step, as some of
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these variables will change over time.
The variable Qik is defined using the assumptions stated in Section 4.1.2.2 regarding
how many hours people of certain socio-demographic characteristics are expected
to spend in certain locations each week. A look-up table showing the values for Qik
is at Appendix B.
The attractiveness factor, Wi j, is a composite variable that is a function of the size of
setting j (which we shall write as | j|) and j’s similarity to person i. The similarity
of person i to setting j was briefly discussed in Section 4.1.2.2, but here it requires
a complete definition.
Let us define a function Dxi j(t) to be the difference in attribute x between person
i and the mean value of that attribute among everyone visiting setting j. So for
example, suppose the attribute is religion (rel) and we code it as 0 for Christian and
1 for Muslim. Then
Dreli j(t) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣reli(t−1)− ∑∀i s. t.fi jk(t−1)>0
reli(t−1)
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
where n is the number of people such that fi jk(t−1)> 0. Similarly, for the attribute
propensity (p):
Dpi j(t) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣pi(t−1)− ∑∀i s. t.fi jk(t−1)>0
pi(t−1)
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
As propensity (as defined in the exposure transition below) and religion both hold
values in the interval [0,1], it follows that Drel,Dp∈ [0,1]. However other attributes
— self-control, susceptibility to peer influence, and age — take values in different
intervals, or are unbounded. This poses more of a problem when defining the Dx
function for these attributes, as we wish for all attributes to have an equal weighting
when they are combined in the similarity function. We therefore need to ensure that
Dx is defined so that for each attribute is maps to the same interval — for instance
[0,1]. How to determine what these functions should be?
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Self-control (sc) and susceptibility to peer influence (spi) are random variables dis-
tributed N(0,1), and can therefore hold any real value. For these attributes we
therefore require Dx to be a mapping Dx : R2 → [0,1] so that for all (a,b) ∈ R2,
when a = b this gives Dx = 0. The function should increase as |a−b| increases. A
starting point for finding an appropriate function can be taken from the Box-Muller
transformation, which tranforms two variables x1,x2 ∼U(0,1) into two variables
z1,z2 ∼ N(0,1). The inverse of the Box-Muller transformation is:
x1 = e−
(z21+z
2
2)
2 and x2 =
1
2pi
arctan
(
z2
z1
)
This provides us with two potential candidates for the function Dsc that would meet
the necessary criteria:
Dsci j(t) = 1− e−ζ |sci(t−1)−sc j(t−1)|, or
Dsci j(t) =
1
2pi
arctanζ
∣∣sci(t−1)− sc j(t−1)∣∣
where sci(t−1) is the self-control level of i at time t−1 and sc j(t−1) is the mean
average of sci for all i visiting setting j at time t − 1. The parameter ζ can hold
any positive value. Any of these options would be equally suitable from a logical
perspective, but as the second function is a trigonometric function it is more difficult
to implement in the computer simulation, as different versions of the arctan function
may output to different intervals. Therefore, to avoid ambiguity, the first function
will be used for Dsc (and similarly for Dspi), with a value of ζ = 1.
The final Dx function that needs to be defined is for age. The bounds of age depend
on how it is coded; for the default version of the model age shall be coded as in
Table 5.1, putting agei ∈ [0,5].
A suitable difference function for age would therefore be:
Dagei j(t) =
1
5
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣agei(t−1)− ∑∀i s. t.fi jk(t−1)>0
agei(t−1)
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
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Table 5.1: Age coding scheme
Age Code
Under 16 0
16-18 1
19-23 2
24-30 3
31-40 4
Over 40 5
The overall difference function for all five attributes is therefore:
Di j(t) =
1
5
(
η1Dreli j(t)+η2Dpi j(t)+η3Dsci j(t)+η4Dspii j(t)+η5Dagei j(t)
)
where the η values enable different weighting to be given to each attribute. For the
default version of the model these will all be set to 1, so that all attributes have the
same weight.
To turn this into a function determining similarity the scale should be reversed, so
that 0 implies minimal similarity and 1 is identity. Therefore the similarity function
is Si j(t) = 1−Di j(t). The attractiveness variable in the default version of the model
is then Wi j(t) = Si j(t)| j|.
The cost ci j of person i going to setting j is a simple measure of the distance as the
crow flies from person i’s home to the location of setting j.
The scaling factor is
Aik =
1
∑l∈Jk W
α
il e
−βcil
where the set Jk in the summation is the set comprising all settings of type k ∈ K
where, as previously stated, K is such that the family {Jk}k∈K is a partition of J.
This scaling factor ensures that ∑ j∈Jk fi jk = Qik.
Bringing all this together the equation for activity field generation in the default
model is:
fi jk(t) =
Qik(t)Si j(t)| j|e−ci j
∑l∈Jk Sil(t)|l|e−cil
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5.1.1.2 Emergence Transition
The emergence transition for the default version of the model is as defined in Section
4.2.2 with the values for τ1 and ε equal to zero. Therefore, following the emergence
transition, the criminogenity level of setting j at time t is:
c j(t) =
ω j
n
 ∑∀i s.t.
fi jk(t)>0
& pi(t)>0
pi(t)

5.1.1.3 Exposure Transition
The exposure transition for the default version of the model shall be as per the neg-
ative binomial model described in Section 4.1.4. So, after the exposure transition,
i’s propensity for criminal behaviour is:
pi(t) = 1−
(
1
1+0.1228e−0.23+0.25x1−0.13x2+0.15x1x2+0.69x3
)8.14
where x1 is i’s susceptibility to peer influence, x2 is i’s self-control, and x3 is a mea-
sure of the amount of exposure to criminogenic settings that person i has had. In the
original version of the negative binomial regression model as put forward by Mel-
drum et al. (2013) x3 is peer delinquency, which is a slightly different measure, but
for the default simulation x3 will be defined as the mean average of the criminogen-
ity of each setting visited by person i that time step. All the xi values are z-scores,
which is simple for x1 and x2 as they are randomly generated from a normal distri-
bution (as discussed in the following subsection), but x3 requires a transformation
before it can be used in the negative binomial equation. The value of µ for this
transformation is taken to be E(pi(t)) = 0.5314549, but due to the complexity of
the negative binomial function the variance cannot be calculated analytically. This
variance will instead be approximated using the sample variance from some trial
simulations, which was calculated to be approximately 0.04.
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5.1.1.4 Geographical Input
The geographical input to the model is a simplified version of the UK city of Peter-
borough. The settings in Peterborough that are included in the geographical input
are 11 schools, 2 higher education sites, the 8 largest local employers, 7 mosques,
the 8 largest churches, the 6 largest shopping centres (high streets), 5 leisure centres,
and 8 youth clubs. In addition, every person in the model has a home location (see
below). For the default version of the model all settings have a collective efficacy
coefficient equal to 1.
For a list of the names, locations and sizes of all settings input into the model see
Appendix C.
5.1.1.5 People Input
The default people input to the simulation consists of 100 people whose home lo-
cations are distributed evenly across the geographical area. There is an even split
across gender, religion (Christian, Muslim or none), and occupation (employed, un-
employed or studying). The ages of the people at the start of the simulation are
evenly divided between the ages of 14 and 30, with the only constraint being that
those aged 16 or below all have occupation “student”. Further details of the distribu-
tion of attributes across the simulated population are in Appendix C. Susceptibility
to peer influence (SPI) is generated randomly from a normal distribution with vari-
ance 1 and mean varying according to age and gender, as was illustrated in Table
4.1. Self-control is generated randomly (and independently of SPI) from a normal
distribution with mean 0 and variance 1. The starting propensity of all people is set
to be 0.5.
5.1.1.6 Time
One time-step in the simulation is defined to be one week. There are two parame-
ters which are functions of time alone: the first is a person’s susceptibility to peer
influence (SPI) level when they are aged between 14 and 18, and the second is the
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selection quotient Qik. For i between the ages of 14 and 18, i’s SPI reduces by
0.0095804 every time-step, in accordance with the findings of Steinberg and Mon-
ahan (2007) discussed in Section 4.1.3. The changes to Qik are step-changes which
come after i reaches the age of 18, when they attend universities instead of schools,
and after the age of 20 when they stop attending youth clubs. For more details see
Appendix B.
5.1.1.7 Simulation Language
The programming language used to code the model was C++. This language was
chosen because the structure of the model in terms of the states (people and settings)
and transitions (exposure and emergence) lent itself well to an object-oriented lan-
guage. C++ is a highly flexible language which has the added advantage of being
very efficient as it does not include graphical packages or visual elements which
would have been superfluous for this project (Stroustrup, 2007).
5.1.2 Model Behaviour
The default version of the simulation was run for 260 time-steps, representing a
period of five years. The change in the mean of the propensity for crime of all
people in the model over this time period is shown in Figure 5.1. This graph shows
that the average propensity for crime initially rises sharply over approximately 20
time-steps, before then reducing slowly at a steady rate until t = 208. Between
t = 208 and t = 239 propensity rises again very slightly, before finally becoming
static.
However, the mean may not be the best way to understand how propensity for crime
is changing, as there could be considerable variation in propensity across the 100
people in the model. The graph at Figure 5.2 shows how the propensity for crime
of each of the 100 people has changed over this period, with snap-shots at t=5, 10,
26, 52, then every 52 time-steps after that. These graphs show that although all peo-
ple in the simulation start with the same propensity for crime, once the simulation
begins their propensities differ.
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Figure 5.1: The mean average propensity for crime for all people over 260 time-steps.
Figure 5.2: Crime propensity for all people at different times in the simulation.
There are a number of possible reasons why people starting with the same propen-
sity for crime end up with different propensities by the end of the simulation. One
of these reasons may be the socio-demographic groups to which each person be-
longs, as people from different groups have different settings in their activity fields.
Graphs showing how the mean average of crime propensity changes for different
socio-demographic groups are in Figures 5.3a, 5.3b, 5.3c and 5.3d.
Figures 5.3a, 5.3b, and 5.3c show that the general pattern of change in propensity
for crime over time is similar within socio-demographic groups, although some do
have a higher mean propensity for crime than others. This difference is most striking
in Figure 5.3b which separates the population by gender, and is likely due to the fact
that females in the simulation are given a lower mean susceptibility to peer influence
than males. In Figure 5.3c, the graph for the “Student” group has a greater negative
gradient than the other groups, which is possibly due to the younger average age of
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(a) By religion (b) By gender
(c) By occupation (d) By age
Figure 5.3: Mean propensity for crime by religion, gender, occupation and age code over
260 time-steps
people in the simulation classified as students, as all people with starting age 14-
16 were designated students, and for these individuals their susceptibility to peer
influence reduces until the age of 18.
The graph depicting the change in propensity for crime according to age cohort,
Figure 5.3d, requires a more detailed explanation, as there are clear discontinuities
in the mean average crime propensity among nearly all age groups. This feature is
due to individuals changing age cohorts as they pass certain birthdays, with the dis-
continuities becoming more apparent when an age cohort has a very small number
of members. The general decline in propensity for crime within the younger age
cohorts in particular (except for the discontinuities) can be explained by the change
in susceptibility to peer influence that happens during adolescence. Interestingly,
this decline is also present in the older age cohorts (albeit to a lesser degree), where
no individual change in susceptibility to peer influence takes place. It can therefore
be surmised that the changes in the older age cohorts must be due to environmental
factors — that is, that as people age they go to less criminogenic settings.
It is also important to examine how propensity for crime changes with individual
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(a) By self-control (b) By SPI
Figure 5.4: Mean propensity for crime by self-control and susceptibility to peer influence
over 260 time-steps
psychological factors (self-control and susceptibility to peer influence) in order to
determine how influential these factors are when compared with socio-demographic
and environmental factors. These graphs are shown in Figures 5.4a and 5.4b. Fig-
ure 5.4a, depicting propensity for crime according to self-control, shows that while
those with the least self-control have the highest propensity for crime and those with
higher levels of self-control have generally lower levels, this rule is not entirely con-
sistent, and thus self-control must have a lesser impact on propensity for crime than
other factors. However Figure 5.4b, showing propensity for crime according to sus-
ceptibility to peer influence, does have the consistent pattern that individuals with
higher levels of susceptibility always have greater propensity for crime. As with the
age cohort graph, the discontinuities in this graph are caused by individuals chang-
ing category during the simulation as their susceptibility to peer influence changes
through adolescence. From these two graphs it can be supposed that susceptibil-
ity to peer influence has a greater impact on propensity for crime than self-control;
this is supported by the relative weights of these factors in the negative binomial
equation.
What then is the effect of geographical factors on propensity for crime? The map
at Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of propensities for crime according to each per-
son’s home location and the criminogenity of each of the settings in Peterborough.
There are no clear patterns visible in this map, suggesting that for this default ver-
sion of the model the role of geography in the development of crime propensity is
insignificant. However, the default version of the model as described in Section
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of propensity for crime across Peterborough. Darker colours indi-
cate a higher propensity for crime.
5.1.1 has no thresholds for how long an individual has to spend in a setting for it to
have an effect on them (or for them to have an effect on the setting). As the way
activity fields are generated makes everybody in the model go to the same public
places (such as high streets and leisure centres), even if only for a tiny fraction of
time, this lack of thresholds leads to everybody’s criminality levels affecting those
of everybody else, and thus makes geography redundant. It would be expected that
this map would show different results when the model is modified to include some
thresholds.
5.2 Model variations
5.2.1 Changing the Time-step
The first change to the default model tests the model’s general stability by changing
the size of the time-step. For the default version of the model the time-step is set to
be equal to one week, but if this time-step were changed the model should produce
the same results.
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In order to test this the model was modified so that one time-step represents one
day, by altering the rate at which a person’s susceptibility to peer influence changes
with time for individuals aged between 14 and 18. No other parts of the model were
changed, because no other model parameters are dependent on the size of the time-
step. (While the activity fields are calculated based on the number of hours a person
would be expected to spend in a certain location each week, this is then scaled so
that the value of fi jk is between 0 and 1, essentially representing the probability that
a person spends time in a particular location. It is thus independent of the length of
the time-step.)
Figure 5.6: Average propensity level of 100 people for the first 365 days of the simulation,
when the length of the time-step is one day and one week.
The model was run for 1825 time-steps, representing a period of 5 years, and the
outputs compared with those of the original version. It was found that, as expected,
the propensities of the people and the criminogenity levels of the settings were un-
changed at the end of the simulation regardless of the length of time-step used.
However, when the average propensity levels of all 100 people were compared over
time, it was found that there were some differences between the two models at the
start of the simulation (see Figure 5.6). In particular, there is a significant difference
between the average propensities produced by the models over the first 100 days
(100 time-steps for the “day” model, or 14 time-steps for the “week” model). How-
ever, when the average propensities for the first 14 time-steps of the “day” model
are analysed, these closely resemble the average propensities of the first 14 time-
steps of the “week” model. This suggests that the simulation takes approximately
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14 time-steps before it stabilises, and therefore that outputs produced in the first 14
time-steps should be disregarded.
5.2.2 Changes to the Activity Field generation
The default version of the model calculates each person’s activity field using the
equation
fi jk(t) = Aik(t)Qik(t)Wi j(t)αe−βci j
where α and β are equal to 1, and Wi j(t) = Si j(t)| j|= (1−Di j(t))| j| where Di j(t)
is the difference function defined in Section 5.1.1.
There are a multitude of changes that could be made to the way activity fields are
generated, from the values used in the Qik look-up table to the way the cost ci j
of person i going to setting j is defined. However examining every possible way
activity fields could be calculated would be both time-consuming and would fail
to produce any further insight into answering this thesis’ key research question.
Nevertheless, some experimentation with the way activity fields are defined needs
to be carried out in order to determine how sensitive the model is to changes in
activity fields.
The parts of the equation that shall be changed in order to generate different activity
fields are those that had no basis in prior research when they were defined in the de-
fault model: that is, the parameters α and β , and the way the attractiveness function
Wi j is defined. In the default model the parameters α and β both hold the value of
1; in order to establish the impact of changing these values, tests will be conducted
where the values of α and β are (separately) halved. This will have the effect of
halving our measure of the importance of (respectively) the attractiveness of a set-
ting and the cost of getting to a setting on the way activity fields are calculated. The
impact of changing the way attractiveness is defined will be done by swapping the
default definition of Wi j = Si j| j| for an alternative definition of Wi j = | j|Si j . Many
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alternative functions could be chosen for the way attractiveness is defined, and the
reason for this particular choice is to make it a function sufficiently different from
the default to be likely to have an impact on the activity fields, but that still has Wi j
positively correlated with both | j| and Si j.
The following tests will therefore be conducted to explore the impact of changing
these parameters on the activity fields:
Default Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5
α 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.5
β 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 1
Wi j Si j| j| Si j| j| Si j| j| | j|Si j | j|Si j | j|Si j
The simulation was run for these different model variants over 260 time-steps, and
the resulting activity fields compared in terms of how they each change over time
and the different places visited by a sample of 10 people covering a range of at-
tributes and geographical locations.
5.2.2.1 Results
Before comparing the different model versions, first the activity fields for the sample
of 10 people for the default version of the model were analysed to examine how
they changed over time. Four of the 10 people experienced no change to their
activity fields whatsoever; the remaining 6 experienced a combination of “hard-
wired” changes (by which we mean changes that are built in to the simulation, such
as moving from school to university at age 18, or no longer attending youth clubs
from age 20) and “organic” changes created by the simulation itself (such as who
the person’s best friend is). For the default version of the model these hard-wired
changes all occurred after a whole number of years (i.e. at t=52, 104, 156 or 208).
The length of time that people spent at locations such as religious centres, high
streets and leisure centres remained static throughout the simulation.
A similar analysis was conducted for the activity fields emerging from each of the
test simulations. For Tests 1 and 2, the amount of time spent in religious centres,
high streets and leisure centres (and youth clubs for under 20s) remained static, as
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it did for the default version of the model. However, for Tests 3, 4 and 5 (which use
a different version of the Wi j function) there were small changes to the amount of
time individuals spent in religious centres and high streets — although the amount
of time spent in leisure centres remained static, which can be attributed to each
being declared the same size in the settings input file.
For high streets, religious centres and youth clubs (where applicable), the proportion
of time spent in each location varied across the different models. An example of
this is shown in Figure 5.7, which illustrates how the proportion of time Person
65 spends in each mosque varies across the different models. This chart shows that
when α is reduced (in Tests 2 and 5) the amount of time spent at Faidlan-e-Madina is
lower but for Dar-es-Salaam is higher, while when β is reduced (in Tests 1 and 4) the
opposite is true. This result is logical when the attributes of these two mosques are
compared, as the Faidlan-e-Madina mosque is six times larger than Dar-es-Salaam,
but Dar-es-Salaam is considerably closer to Person 65’s home.
Figure 5.7: Differences in time spent at mosques for Person 65.
For workplaces and friends’ residences the activity field generation equation has
been engineered so that an individual will only spend time at a single location of
that type, rather than spreading their time between several of them. The location
of choice for each person is the one generating the highest value for fi jk(t) across
all settings of that type. Exploring the activity fields of the sample of 10 people
shows that which workplace or friend’s residence is chosen for each person varies
both through time within the same model and across different models. Table 5.3
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illustrates this by listing all the different workplaces and friends’ residences that
appear in each person’s activity fields at different times for different versions of the
model.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from Table 5.3: firstly that some people in
the model are more sensitive to change than others, both through time and across
different model versions. For example Person 9 is immutable both in terms of his
occupation and his choice of best friend across all times and all models; Person 87,
by contrast, has at least four different best friends in all models, and in some models
attends different schools as well.
The timings of the changes (not shown in the table) are mostly annual but not exclu-
sively so, and as with the other differences the timings vary across model versions.
The changes that are hard-wired into the model, such as moving from school to
university at age 18 or no longer going to youth clubs from age 20, always take
place annually at the predetermined time. But changes to a best friend or a work-
place may occur in three different ways: annually in conjunction with a hard-wired
change, annually when there is no other change, or at other times. By analysing the
frequency of these three different types of changes in the different model versions
we can assess which model variants produce more stability or more volatility to the
activity fields. These frequencies are shown in Table 5.2 for the timing of changes
to best friend.
Table 5.2 shows that the changes to best friend that take place annually in conjunc-
Table 5.2: Frequencies of different timings of changes to best friend
Model Timing of change Total
Variant Annual with Annual with Not annual
hard-wired no other change
Default 6 4 0 10
Test 1 5 5 1 11
Test 2 5 4 0 9
Test 3 5 6 8 19
Test 4 5 5 8 18
Test 5 5 5 5 15
Table 5.3: Workplaces and friends’ residences for 10 people over 260 time-steps
Default Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5
Pers 9 Friends Person 8 Person 8 Person 8 Person 8 Person 8 Person 8
Offices Produce World Produce World Produce World Produce World Produce World Produce World
Pers 12 Friends Person 6 Person 6 Person 6 Persons 3, 6 Persons 6 & 24 Person 6
Offices Indesit Company Indesit Company Indesit Company Indesit Company Indesit Company Indesit Company
British Sugar
Pers 21 Friends Persons 20 & 30 Person 30 Person 30 Persons 15 & 30 Persons 20 & 30 Persons 30 & 33
Offices British Sugar British Sugar British Sugar British Sugar British Sugar British Sugar
Pers 34 Friends Pers 35, 36 & 68 Pers 35, 36 & 68 Persons 35 & 43 Pers 35, 36, 37, 43 Pers 35, 36, 68, 69 Pers 28, 35 & 43
Schools T. Deacon Acad. T. Deacon Acad. Kings School Kings School T. Deacon Acad. Kings School
Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni
Pers 43 Friends Person 44 Person 44 Person 44 Person 44 Person 44 Person 44
Offices N/A (unemployed) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pers 56 Friends Persons 38 & 47 Persons 38 & 47 Persons 38 & 47 Persons 38 & 47 Persons 38 & 47 Persons 38 & 47
Schools Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni
Pers 65 Friends Persons 53 & 98 Persons 53 & 98 Pers 53, 56 & 74 Pers 41, 53, 56, 74 Pers 53, 56 & 98 Pers 53, 56 & 74
Schools Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni
Pers 78 Friends Person 66 Persons 77 & 89 Person 66 Persons 66 & 89 Pers 66, 77 & 99 Persons 66 & 77
Offices Interecruit Ltd Perkins Engines Interecruit Ltd Interecruit Ltd Perkins Engines Interecruit Ltd
Vital Recruitment Interecruit Ltd
Pers 87 Friends Pers 69, 74, 86, 98 74, 85, 86, 98 69, 74, 86, 98 69, 85, 86, 98 68, 70, 74, 86, 98 53, 69, 70, 74, 86
Schools T. Deacon Acad. T. Deacon Acad. T. Deacon Acad. T. Deacon Acad. T. Deacon Acad. T. Deacon Acad.
Peterborough Uni Voyager Acad. Peterborough Uni K. Stimpson Sch. K. Stimpson Sch. Voyager Acad.
Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni Peterborough Uni
Pers 90 Friends Persons 72 & 81 Persons 72 & 81 Persons 72 & 81 Persons 72 & 81 Persons 72 & 81 Persons 72 & 81
Offices Perkins Engines Perkins Engines Perkins Engines Perkins Engines Perkins Engines Perkins Engines
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tion with a hard-wired change are relatively stable across all the model versions.
However there are significantly more non-annual changes to best friend for Tests 3,
4, and 5; these are the models that use Wi j = | j|Si j as the attractiveness function. The
table also shows that for Tests 2 and 5 — the tests which give a greater weighting
to the cost of getting to a setting — there are relatively fewer of these non-annual
changes, making the activity fields more stable. These two observations together
suggest that way the attractiveness variable is defined and the weighting given to
it in the activity field generation equation have the most significant impact on the
volatility of a person’s activity field.
5.2.3 Changes to the Settings input
As with activity field generation, the settings that are input to the computer simula-
tion can be altered in a variety of different ways. These include adding or removing
settings, changing the attributes associated with the settings (such as their size, col-
lective efficacy coefficient or location), or even using an entirely different town as
the basis for the model. However as the purpose of testing the model is to better
understand the impact that different factors have on how it behaves, such a dras-
tic alteration as changing the town would not enable such conclusions to easily
be drawn. In order to understand the impact that changing the settings has on the
model, changes should be made one at a time and their impact measured after each
change by comparison with the default model.
There are two ways that the impact of changing the settings can be assessed: one
is through comparing each person’s activity field with that of the default model,
and the other is through comparing the levels of each person’s propensity for crime.
The latter method has the disadvantage that the link between settings and crime
propensity is indirect: changing the settings affects the activity field directly, which
then affects crime propensity levels via the exposure transition. Greater insight will
therefore be gained by comparing the activity fields of a sample of people, as was
done in Section 5.2.2.
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The tests for the impact of changing the settings will be conducted by altering the
attributes of one of the five leisure centres. Leisure centres were chosen for these
tests because all people have them in their activity fields, they are well spread out
across the geographical area (see Figure 5.8), and the default version of the model
has set all leisure centres to be the same size, which facilitates comparison when
this is changed.
Figure 5.8: Location of leisure centres and the people in the test sample.
There will be four tests, each of which makes a different change to the Bushfield
Leisure Centre, which is located in the south-west corner of Peterborough. These
tests are as follows:
• Collective Efficacy Test: doubles the collective efficacy coefficient to 2 for
this setting (keeping all other settings at 1);
• Size Test: doubles the setting size to 20,000 (keeping all other leisure centres
at 10,000);
• Move Test: moves the setting 1km south and 1km west (i.e. further away
from the centre of Peterborough and all the people in the sample);
• Removal Test: removing the setting entirely.
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5.2.3.1 Results
The Collective Efficacy Test resulted in no change at all to the activity fields of each
of the people in the sample. This might seem surprising, until it is recalled that
the collective efficacy coefficient is only used in the model as part of the emergence
transition, and is thus more likely to have an effect on the criminogenities of settings
and propensities for crime than it is on activity fields. This supposition is indeed
correct, as the graphs at Figure 5.9 show. It is particularly interesting to note from
Figure 5.9a that increasing the collective efficacy coefficient of just one leisure cen-
tre affects the criminogenities of all leisure centres (albeit by a far smaller amount).
Also noteworthy is the fact that while it might be logical for the change in collective
efficacy coefficient to have an indirect effect on activity fields through its impact on
criminogenities and propensities (which would then affect Wi j, the attractiveness
variable), this appears not to be the case.
(a) Criminogenities (b) Propensities
Figure 5.9: The effect of changing the collective efficacy factor for Bushfield Leisure Cen-
tre on the criminogenities of other leisure centres and the propensities for crime
of all people
In the Size Test, for each of the people in the sample the amount of time they
spent in the Bushfield Leisure Centre increased, as would be expected. The size
of this increase varied from person to person, from a factor of 38% for Person 21
to 99.9% for Person 90. Concurrently, the proportion of time spent at the other
leisure centres decreased for all people. The size of these decreases again varied
from person to person, but was approximately equal across all leisure centres for
each person (varying by less than 0.001% across leisure centres).
The Move Test saw the proportion of time people spent at the Bushfield Leisure
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Centre decrease for all people in the sample, and increase for all the other leisure
centres. The results for this test were very similar to that of the Size Test, in that
the precise factors by which the proportions changed varied from person to person,
but the overall pattern was the same. Time spent at the Bushfield Leisure Centre
reduced by between 62.1% for Person 9 and 75.6% for Person 56, and the amount
by which the time spent at other leisure centres increased varied between 0.02% for
Person 90 and 51.2% for Person 21. As with the size test, the percentage increase
in time spent at other leisure centres was approximately equal across the leisure
centres.
The Removal Test again follows the pattern of the size and move tests. The amount
of time spent at Bushfield Leisure Centre is reduced to zero in this test, and the
amount of time spent at all other leisure centres increased. As with the other tests,
the percentage increase in time spent at the other leisure centres is approximately
equal across leisure centres, but varies significantly from person to person (from
0.03% for Person 90 to 81.5% for Person 21). This variation is unsurprising when
the home locations of the people are taken into consideration: Person 90’s home is
a long distance from Bushfield Leisure Centre, so one would expect its closure to
have little impact; conversely, Person 21 is one of the closest people to Bushfield
Leisure Centre.
These results can be summarised in the graph at Figure 5.10, which shows how the
proportion of time spent at the different leisure centres varies for Person 21 (as a
typical example) under the different model variants.
5.2.4 Changes to the People input
There are a number of attributes associated with the people who are input into the
model that could be altered to test how they affect the development of each person’s
propensity for crime. These include socio-demographic attributes such as peoples’
ages, genders, religions, or occupation, and also individual factors such as their
geographical locations. Changing the number of people in the model could also
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Figure 5.10: Proportion of time spent at leisure centres for Person 21.
have an effect on the development of crime propensity. This section consists of
three tests on the impact of changing the people input: the first test explores the
effects of changing their socio-demographic attributes (age, gender, religion and
occupation), the second changes individual attributes (geographical location, self-
control and susceptibility to peer influence), and the third increases the number of
people in the model.
5.2.4.1 Test One: Socio-Demographic Factors
The default version of the model described in Section 5.1.1 uses a socially and
demographically heterogeneous group of people, with many different combinations
of gender, occupation, religion and age included. Test One compares the behaviour
of the default model using the original heterogeneous people input with that of
the default model using a far more homogeneous people input. The homogeneous
people input comprises the following:
• Number and Location: 100 people distributed across Peterborough (as in Sec-
tion 5.1.1 and Appendix C);
• Gender: All are male;
• Occupation: All are unemployed;
• Religion: All have no religion;
• Age: All are 21 years old at the start of the simulation;
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Figure 5.11: Propensities for crime after 260 time-steps for homogeneous and heteroge-
neous people inputs.
• Individual factors: Susceptibility to peer influence (SPI) and self-control are
as in Section 5.1.1.
• Initialisation: All have an initial propensity of zero at time t = 0.
The two simulations were run for 260 time-steps and the resulting propensities for
crime compared across all 100 people, as shown in Figure 5.11. The similarity
between the two graphs is striking, suggesting that — for the default version of
the model at least — the socio-demographic attributes of age, gender, religion and
occupation have little bearing on each individual’s propensity for crime. By pro-
cess of elimination, each individual’s propensity for crime must be more influenced
by individual factors such as SPI, self-control, or geography than it is by socio-
demographic factors. The propensity graph is slightly higher for the homogeneous
input, but this can be explained by the fact that all people in the homogeneous input
are male, and males have a slightly higher average SPI than females.
However it must be recalled that the default version of the model includes no thresh-
olds for the length of time a person must spend in a setting for either exposure or
emergence to happen. Therefore, because all people in the model spend a non-
zero amount of time in public locations such as high streets and leisure centres,
everybody’s propensity for crime ultimately influences everybody else’s. It is likely
that when these thresholds are changed (in Sections 5.2.5 and 5.2.6 below) that
socio-demographic factors may have more of an influence on each person’s crime
5.2. Model variations 157
propensity development.
5.2.4.2 Test Two: Individual Factors
Test Two examines the effects of changing the individual factors associated with
the people. There are three individual factors which could be altered: geographical
location, self-control, and susceptibility to peer influence. In order to draw conclu-
sions about the influence of each on the way the model behaves, these individual
factors will be altered one at a time and the behaviour of the model compared with
that of the default model.
The first stage of Test Two compares the default model using the homogeneous peo-
ple input described in Test One with the default model using a similarly homoge-
neous people input file but with their geographical home locations switched around.
For this latter version the pattern of individuals across the geographical area remains
the same, but the specific people (uniquely identifiable by their susceptibility to peer
influence and their self-control) are in different places. This change is achieved by
rotating the people in the input file by 45 places, so that people who were originally
on the edge of Peterborough are now in the centre (and vice versa).
After 260 time-steps the propensities of all people were plotted and compared with
those from the default model, and these two graphs were found to be almost iden-
tical. Changing the geographical location of the individuals has thus been shown
to have virtually no impact on propensities for the default version of the model.
However, as was the case with Test One, the lack of thresholds in the exposure and
emergence transitions of the default model is a possible reason for this, and this will
be explored further in Sections 5.2.5 and 5.2.6.
The second stage of Test Two involves altering the self-control levels of some of the
people in the model to see what impact this has on their propensities. Specifically,
a test was run where the self-control level of one random person was increased
by 1 (recall that self-control is a random variable distributed N(0,1)), and then a
second test was run where the self-control levels of four people were increased by
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1. Running the test in this way enabled conclusions to be drawn about to what extent
an individual’s self-control impacts on their own propensity and that of those around
them, and the relative effects of this when more people undergo the change.
When Person 50’s self-control was increased by 1 and all others kept the same, this
had the effect of lowering Person 50’s propensity at t=260 while all other people’s
propensity levels remained almost unchanged. When Persons 0, 25, 50 and 75 all
had their self-control increased by 1 the propensity levels at t=260 for Person’s 0,
50 and 75 were lower than for the default model, but perhaps surprisingly Person
25’s propensity actually increased slightly. This can however be explained by the
specific values of Person 25’s susceptibility to peer influence (SPI) and self-control,
as this person has an unusually high value for SPI (equal to 3.795) which when
combined with a higher level of self-control actually increases his propensity for
crime due to the interaction term in the negative binomial equation. This result is
consistent with Meldrum et al.’s original finding that “the effect of susceptibility to
peer influence on delinquency is stronger at higher values of self-control” (2013,
p. 121). The effect of changing the self-control levels of Persons 0, 25, 50 and 75
had a slight impact on other people in the model, some of whom saw a very small
reduction in their propensity levels at time t=260.
The third stage of Test Two consisted of the same test as the second stage but instead
applied to SPI. Person 50’s SPI level was reduced by 1, and in a separate test the
SPI levels of Persons 0, 25, 50 and 75 were all reduced by 1. When only Person
50’s SPI level was reduced by 1 their propensity at t=260 was lower, although by a
smaller margin than when their self-control was increased by 1. This may initially
seem surprising, as in the negative binomial equation greater weight is given to SPI
than self-control. However it illustrates that the impact of changing the values of
the individual factors depends on what the original values were: in the specific case
of Person 50, their self-control was changed from -1.207 to -0.207 while their SPI
was changed from 0.0575 to -0.9425; the former change had greater impact than the
latter for Person 50, but for different people this may not be the case. Indeed this
was borne out when the SPI levels of Persons 0, 25, 50 and 75 were all changed, as
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this resulted not only in Persons 0, 25 and 75’s propensities all reducing by more
than when their self-control was changed, but also the propensity levels for many
other people in the simulation were slightly reduced at t=260.
5.2.4.3 Test Three: Number of People
Test Three doubles the number of people input to the default model to examine
whether this affects the crime propensities of the original 100 people in any way.
The two versions of the people input used in this test are as follows:
• 100 people: the homogeneous people input as used in Test One;
• 200 people: Persons 1 to 100 are as above; Persons 101 to 200 are similarly
homogeneous (i.e. all male, aged 21, unemployed and with no religion), with
home locations between those of the first 100 people, and SPI and self-control
levels allocated randomly using the same distribution as the first 100 people.
Figure 5.12: Propensities for crime after 260 time-steps for 100 and 200 people.
The resulting propensities from the two people inputs after 260 time-steps are shown
in Figure 5.12. From this graph it is clear that the effect of adding people to the
model on the crime propensities of the original 100 people is minimal. However,
as with the previous tests, it is possible that when thresholds are introduced into the
exposure and emergence transitions this result may differ. This will be examined
next.
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5.2.5 Changes to the Emergence transition
In Section 4.2.2 the emergence transition was defined to be a function that takes as
its inputs each person’s propensity for crime, their activity field, and the collective
efficacy coefficient for each setting, and it outputs a value for that setting’s crimino-
genity. Specifically, the criminogenity of setting j at time t is defined to be:
c j(t) =
ω j
n
 ∑∀i s.t.
fi jk(t)>τ1
& pi(t)>ε
pi(t)

where pi(t) is the propensity of person i at time t, n is the number of people i such
that fi jk > τ1, and ω j is the collective efficacy coefficient for setting j.
This section analyses the impact on the model’s behaviour of changing the values
of τ1 and ε to introduce a time and propensity threshold to the emergence transi-
tion.
5.2.5.1 Changing the Time Threshold
In the default version of the model the time threshold τ1 is set to zero. Due to the
way activity fields are calculated this means that all high streets and leisure centres
have the same criminogenity level, because every person in the model spends a non-
zero amount of time at these locations. Similarly because all Christians, Muslims
and under 20s spend a non-zero amount of time at all churches, mosques and youth
clubs (respectively), these settings will also all have the same criminogenity levels
(although this will vary across the different setting types). Realistically, however,
one would expect that a person would need to spend a certain length of time in a
particular setting before their propensity for crime has an effect on the criminogenity
of the setting. It is therefore worth exploring how the model behaves when τ1 takes
a value greater than zero.
For this test three thresholds of 10 minutes, 30 minutes, and 1 hour were used to test
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the impact that changing the value of τ1 has on the way the model behaves. These
translate as τ1 = 0.0015, 0.0045 and 0.009 in the simulation, as τ1 is expressed as a
proportion of waking hours per week (112 hours). The impact of introducing these
thresholds was measured by comparing the crime propensities of all people in the
model and the criminogenity of all settings in the model after 260 time-steps with
those of the default model. The resulting graphs are at Figure 5.13.
(a) Propensities (b) Criminogenities
Figure 5.13: Crime propensities and criminogenity levels for a subset of settings when a
time threshold is introduced into the emergence transition
The key observation from Figure 5.13a is that the graphs all retain the same over-
all shape, although people’s crime propensities are much lower even for very small
non-zero values of τ1. Additionally the peaks in the graphs are more pronounced
for non-zero values of τ1, suggesting that there is more differentiation between peo-
ple’s crime propensities when a time threshold for emergence is introduced. Figure
5.13b (which only shows a subset of settings for ease of display) shows that for the
default version of the model there was very little difference between the crimino-
genity levels of settings, but for non-zero values of τ1 differences do appear. This
suggests that certain settings are more likely to become criminogenic hubs when a
time threshold is introduced.
5.2.5.2 Changing the Propensity Threshold
In a similar way to changing the time threshold, it is possible to introduce a thresh-
old for propensity. A propensity threshold in the emergence function means that an
individual is required to have a certain level of propensity for crime before this has
any impact on the criminogenity of the setting they are visiting.
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In order to test the effects on the model’s behaviour of such a change, the simulation
was run for 260 time-steps with the propensity threshold ε taking a variety of dif-
ferent values between 0 and 1, and the resulting graphs for crime propensities and
the criminogenities of settings compared. It was found that for ε < 0.5, changing
the propensity threshold had no effect at all on either propensities or criminogeni-
ties after 260 time-steps, however for ε ≥ 0.5 all settings have a criminogenity level
of zero. This surprising result can be explained by examining what the effect of
the propensity threshold is on the average criminogenity levels of all settings over
the first 26 time-steps, as shown in Figure 5.14. This graph shows clearly that for
the different values of ε below 0.5, while there is some differentiation between the
average criminogenity levels of the settings between time-steps 4 and 20, after that
all the graphs converge. Hence the propensity threshold has no effect on the final
propensities at time t = 260. The large jump in the first time step is due to the
criminogenity levels of all settings being initialised with the value of 0 while the
propensity levels are initialised with the value 0.5. This makes the criminogenity
levels of all settings the same for both t = 0 (when they are all 0) and t = 1, because
the criminogenity levels at t = 1 are influenced by the propensity levels at t = 0,
which are all above the threshold ε when ε < 0.5.
Figure 5.14: Average criminogenity level of all settings in the first 26 time-steps when
different propensity thresholds are applied to the emergence transition.
This also explains the change in the behaviour of the model when ε holds values
above 0.5: in this case, in the first time-step all the criminogenities of the settings
remain at 0, which has the effect of reducing the propensity levels of all the people
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Figure 5.15: Propensities for crime after 260 time-steps when different propensity thresh-
olds are applied to the emergence transition and the initial propensity levels
are set to 1.
in the simulation below the 0.5 propensity threshold in the next time-step, and con-
sequently the criminogenity levels never rise above 0 during the whole simulation.
If the initial propensity levels are instead set higher than 0.5 we would expect the
model to behave differently for ε ≥ 0.5. Indeed, when the simulation is run with all
people in the model having an initial propensity level of 1, increasing the value of ε
above 0.5 was found to have small but noticeable effects on both the criminogeni-
ties and the propensities, with the possibly surprising result that at time t = 260 the
versions of the model with the highest values of ε also had the highest propensities,
as shown in Figure 5.15.
From this test we can therefore conclude that when the value of ε is increased
above 0 it is essential that the initial propensities of the individuals in the model
are estimated as accurately as possible, as otherwise there is a risk that the initial
conditions will impair the model’s ability to replicate how propensity for crime
spreads.
5.2.5.3 Combined Threshold Changes
Further to changing the thresholds for τ1 and ε separately, it is worth examining
the effect of changing both simultaneously. Figure 5.16 shows the propensities and
criminogenities after 260 time-steps for versions of the model using τ1 = 0 and
ε = 0 (the default), τ1 = 10 minutes only, and τ1 = 10 minutes and ε = 0.2. From
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this it can be seen that for both propensities and criminogenities the graphs for
τ1 = 10 minutes & ε = 0.2 are almost the same as the graphs for τ1 = 10 minutes
only, but that the addition of the ε = 0.2 threshold slightly increases all propensities
and criminogenities.
(a) Propensities (b) Criminogenities
Figure 5.16: Crime propensities and criminogenity levels for a subset of settings when both
time and propensity thresholds are introduced into the emergence transition
A further comparison of the way the model behaves when these thresholds are ap-
plied is to examine how the mean average crime propensity changes through time
over the course of 260 time-steps. This graph is shown in Figure 5.17; of particu-
lar interest is the fact that the graphs for τ1 = 10 minutes & ε = 0.2 and τ1 = 10
minutes only are identical for the first 26 time-steps before diverging. This is be-
cause it is only after 26 time-steps that the propensity threshold of ε = 0.2 starts to
have an effect, for the simple reason that for the first 26 time-steps all individuals’
propensities levels are above the 0.2 threshold.
Figure 5.17: Average crime propensities over 260 time-steps when both time and propen-
sity thresholds are introduced into the emergence transition
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5.2.5.4 Integrating Threshold Changes with Settings Input Changes
Now that the effects of changing the emergence thresholds have been examined
when the model is run using the default inputs for people and settings, a further
test can be conducted to understand whether these thresholds change the effects of
altering the inputs.
In Section 5.2.3 the settings input was changed for the default version of the model,
and when this was done it was found that increasing the size of a setting increases
its prominence in a person’s activity field. But what is the effect of this change
on crime propensities when the thresholds of τ1 = 10 minutes and ε = 0.2 are in
place? To answer this question a test was conducted whereby the size of two of
the most criminogenic settings for the version of the model with these thresholds
was doubled (the workplace “Produce World Ltd” and the religious centre “Oundle
Road Church”). The direct result of this change is that these settings become more
attractive to people in general, and so all people are likely to spend more time at
these locations. However this may then have one of two impacts: it may cause
the people visiting the setting to gain more exposure to criminogenic influences
and hence increase their propensities, or it may reduce the criminogenity of these
settings because more neutral people are visiting them.
After running these model variants and comparing the criminogenity levels of the
settings and the propensities of the people after 260 time-steps it was found that the
second of these two scenarios is more likely: there was a small amount of varia-
tion in the criminogenities of the settings, and in particular the two settings whose
sizes had been doubled had a marginally lower criminogenity level than previously.
However the impact on propensity levels was minimal.
A second alteration to the settings input worth exploring is the impact of changing
the collective efficacy coefficients of certain settings. We saw in Section 5.2.3 that
changing the collective efficacy coefficient of a setting has minimal impact on ac-
tivity fields, but we would expect it to increase a setting’s criminogenity — which
in turn may then also increase people’s crime propensities.
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A test was conducted to explore this further. In this test, the collective efficacy co-
efficients were doubled for all mosques, and separately for all churches, and the re-
sulting criminogenities and propensities compared after 260 time-steps. The reason
for these particular settings to be chosen is that it enables a comparison to be made
between the propensity levels of Muslims and Christians in the model, which (if
a significant difference is observable) would then provide a strong indication that
changing the collective efficacy coefficients of settings does impact on the crime
propensities of people who visit the settings. The results of this test are shown in
Figure 5.18, where Figure 5.18a shows the resulting criminogenities of the mosques
and churches, and Figure 5.18b shows the overall crime propensities.
(a) Criminogenities (b) Propensities
Figure 5.18: Criminogenity levels of churches and mosques and crime propensities when
the collective efficacy coefficients of either mosques or churches is doubled.
Time and propensity thresholds for emergence are τ1 = 10 minutes & ε = 0.2
for all graphs.
From Figure 5.18a it can be seen that doubling the collective efficacy coefficient
does increase the criminogenity level of the settings in question, as expected, while
Figure 5.18b shows that the effect of this change on propensities is considerable, in
that the shape of the propensities graph (which in all other tests has been reasonably
stable) has been significantly altered. The impact of the tests on propensities is bet-
ter understood from Figure 5.19, which shows that the average propensity levels of
the Christians and the Muslims in the model has changed in line with the collective
efficacy coefficient changes at their respective religious centres.
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Figure 5.19: Average crime propensities for Christians and Muslims when the collective
efficacy coefficients of mosques or churches is doubled.
5.2.5.5 Integrating Threshold Changes with People Input Changes
The final alteration that can be made is to the people input file in conjunction with
the thresholds in the emergence transition. To investigate the effects of changing
the people input file when the thresholds of τ1 = 10 minutes and ε = 0.2 are in
place, three tests were carried out. These tests are parallels of the tests conducted in
Section 5.2.4: Test One compares the impact of using a homogeneous people input
as opposed to a socio-demographically diverse people input, Test Two changes the
individual attributes of each person, and Test Three doubles the number of people
in the model.
The simulation was run for 260 time-steps and the results compared. These are
summarised as follows:
• Test One: using a homogeneous people input file increased the criminogenity
levels of the settings considerably, to the extent that they exceeded the crim-
inogenity levels reached when no thresholds were in place (with the exception
of settings visited by nobody, such as workplaces and religious centres, which
naturally had a criminogenity level of zero). The effect on propensity levels
was similar, in that when a homogeneous input was used they became slightly
higher than the propensity levels reached for the default model version with
no thresholds in place; the final propensity and criminogenity levels are in
fact very similar to those obtained with the homogeneous people input and no
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thresholds that was carried out in Section 5.2.4. This effect can be explained
by the fact that when the people input is homogeneous the people divide their
time between a small number of different settings (because no workplaces, re-
ligious centres or youth clubs are visited), resulting in them spending longer
than the 10 minute time threshold in each setting, and therefore ensuring that
they influence every setting they visit. This keeps the criminogenity levels of
the setting sufficiently high to ensure that the people’s propensities never dip
below the 0.2 propensity threshold — resulting in those thresholds having no
effect.
• Test Two: altering the geographical locations of the people created some dif-
ferences in the criminogenity levels of the settings, but crime propensities
remained largely unchanged. This result held both for homogeneous and
socio-demographically diverse people input files. When the self-control and
SPI values for a small number of individuals were changed the propensities
altered in the same direction as when this test was applied to the version of
the model without thresholds.
• Test Three: doubling the number of people had minimal impact on both crime
propensities and criminogenity levels, for both homogeneous and socio-
demographically diverse people inputs.
5.2.5.6 Summary
In conclusion, increasing the time and propensity thresholds in the emergence func-
tion has been shown to have a considerable effect on the criminogenity levels of
settings overall, in that all settings have lower criminogenity levels and there is
more distinction between the criminogenity levels of different settings. When im-
plemented in conjunction with these thresholds, altering the collective efficacy coef-
ficients also increased the criminogenity levels of the settings, while increasing the
amount of time people spend at a setting (by, for example, increasing the setting’s
size) slightly decreased its criminogenity. Modifying the socio-demographic pro-
files of the people input also had a significant impact on criminogenity levels when
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the emergence thresholds were in place. Some of these changes also had a sig-
nificant impact on crime propensities: in particular, altering the collective efficacy
coefficients in conjunction with the emergence thresholds, and altering the socio-
demographic profiles of the people in the model. However for other changes, such
as altering the geographical locations of the people, the effects on the criminogen-
ity levels of settings did not translate into a significant change in propensity levels,
suggesting that propensities are relatively stable even when certain environmental
factors are changed.
5.2.6 Changes to the Exposure transition
The default version of the model as described in Section 5.1.1 uses for the exposure
function an equation taken from the negative binomial regression model derived by
Meldrum et al. (2013). According to this equation, after the exposure transition, i’s
propensity p for crime at time t becomes:
pi(t) = 1−
(
1
1+0.1228e−0.23+0.25x1(t)−0.13x2+0.15x1(t)x2+0.69x3(t)
)8.14
where x1 is i’s susceptibility to peer influence, x2 is i’s self-control (static over time),
and x3 is the amount of criminogenic exposure that person i has had (all converted
to z-scores).
This section considers the effect of making changes to the exposure transition in two
areas. The first is changing the way that criminogenic exposure (x3) is defined, in
order to incorporate a time threshold and to extend the amount of influence that each
criminogenic setting has on a person to more than one time-step. The second change
is more fundamental, and involves changing the entire function from the negative
binomial equation to the alternative equation derived from the work of Gino et al.
(2011) and Wikstro¨m (2009a) which was discussed in Section 4.1.4.1.
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5.2.6.1 Changing the Criminogenic Exposure
In the default version of the model, criminogenic exposure (Exp) is taken to be the
mean average of the criminogenity of each setting visited by person i that time-step.
In other words:
Expi(t) =
1
n
 ∑
∀ j s.t.
fi jk(t)>0
c j(t)

where n is the number of settings j such that fi jk(t)> 0.
In order to understand the impact of changing the way criminogenic exposure is
defined on the model’s behaviour, three tests will be undertaken. These three tests
are detailed below.
Test One: The first test introduces a simple time threshold τ2, similar to that used in
the emergence transition, so that the criminogenity of setting j only counts towards
the exposure gained by i if fi jk(t)> τ2. So:
Expi(t) =
1
n
 ∑
∀ j s.t.
fi jk(t)>τ2
c j(t)

This value is then converted to a z-score using the same values for the mean and
variance as in the default model.
Test Two: The second test modifies the criminogenic exposure definition so that
instead of it simply being the average criminogenity of all settings visited, the
criminogenities are weighted according to how long a person spends in each set-
ting. Although this is a theoretical test rather than one based on empirical research,
common-sense logic behind this definition is that a person would be more influ-
enced by the criminogenity of settings where they spend more time than settings
where they spend very little time.
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For Test Two criminogenic exposure is defined to be:
Expi(t) =∑
∀ j
fi jk(t).c j(t)
This value is then converted to a z-score using the same values for the mean and
variance as in the default model.1
Test Three: The third test incorporates an exponential decay in the criminogenic
exposure definition. The logic behind this is that the criminogenic influence of a
setting on a person may last longer than just one time-step (i.e. one week), but
that any influence would be expected to decrease with time if the person does not
continue to visit the setting.
For Test Three criminogenic exposure is defined to be:
Expi(t) = λExpi(t)+(1−λ )Expi(t−1)
which, when λ = 12 , is the same definition as for the default version of the model
but averaged with that of the previous time-step. This value is then converted to a z-
score using the same values for the mean and variance as in the default model.
5.2.6.2 Results
Test One: Incorporating a time threshold into the exposure function has little impact
on either crime propensities or the criminogenity levels of settings when applied
to the default version of the model. However, when applied to a version of the
model that has low thresholds in the emergence function (τ1 = 10 min and ε = 0.2),
incorporating a 10 minute time threshold in the exposure function has the effect of
reversing the effects of the emergence function thresholds, so the resulting crime
propensities and criminogenities return to the higher level that the default version
of the model produces. However in this case increasing τ2 further has very little
1The true values for the mean and variance of Test Two’s definition of Expi(t) cannot be calcu-
lated analytically. The sample mean and variance for Test Two’s Expi(t), calculated using randomly
generated values for x1, x2 and x3, were found to be similar to those for the default model.
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impact on either criminogenities or propensities.
Using a higher time threshold in the emergence function (τ1 = 1 hour) creates a
more interesting pattern. In this case, having no time threshold in the exposure
function (τ2 = 0) results in relatively low propensity and criminogenity levels. In-
creasing τ2 then leads to successively higher propensity and criminogenity levels,
until at τ2 = 1 hour the pattern of the graphs is very similar to that of the default
model. Graphs showing these effects for crime propensities is shown in Figure
5.20.
Figure 5.20: Effects of introducing a time threshold τ2 into the definition of criminogenic
exposure. These graphs show the value of each person’s propensity for crime
after 260 time-steps for a version of the model that uses τ1 = 1 hour and
ε = 0.2 in the emergence function.
Test Two: Comparing Test Two’s version of the model with the default version
suggests that changing the criminogenic exposure function in this way has very
little impact on either crime propensities or criminogenity levels. However when
this change is applied to the version of the model that has low thresholds in the
emergence function (τ1 = 10 min and ε = 0.2), Test Two’s criminogenic exposure
function reverses the effects of the thresholds and produces a very similar pattern
of outputs to those of the default model. This could be interpreted as the change
in how criminogenic exposure is defined removing the effects of the emergence
thresholds. An alternative interpretation is that while only a low threshold in the
emergence function is required to affect crime propensities and criminogenities
when the default definition of criminogenic exposure is used, Test Two’s version
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of criminogenic exposure requires higher thresholds in the emergence function be-
fore these thresholds have any impact. A further test to explore the effects on crime
propensity of increasing the emergence threshold τ1 when Test Two’s version of
the criminogenic exposure function is used yields the graphs shown in Figure 5.21.
These graphs show clearly that when the threshold τ1 is increased, people’s crime
propensities reduce gradually.
Figure 5.21: The value of each person’s propensity for crime after 260 time-steps for a
version of the model that uses weighted criminogenities in the criminogenic
exposure function, and varying values for the emergence threshold τ1. The
emergence propensity threshold remains ε = 0.2 throughout.
Test Three: Extending the length of time that each setting has an influence on the
people in the model via an exponential decay has very little impact on the outputs
of the model at time t=260. When the average crime propensities and crimino-
genities of settings are analysed over time, the version using the exponential decay
takes longer to reach its final values than the default version, but these final val-
ues remain the same. This result holds for versions of the model with and without
thresholds.
5.2.6.3 Changing the Entire Exposure Function
As the previous tests have shown, there is a considerable amount of stability in the
crime propensities generated by the negative binomial regression model used in the
default exposure function. However, as was discussed in Section 4.1.4.1, this equa-
tion is not the only credible means of linking the variables of morality, self-control,
criminogenic exposure and propensity. As using an alternative function may pro-
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duce very different results, it is worthwhile exploring the impact of replacing the
negative binomial function with another theoretically credible function, and testing
how the model behaves with this new function. We shall therefore run the model
using the alternative equation in the exposure transition that was first derived in
Section 4.1.4.1; that is, the equation derived from the work of Wikstro¨m (2009a)
and Gino et al. (2011), from which an equation was constructed putting person i’s
morality at time t as
mi(t) = x1+θx3e−γx2
and their propensity for crime as
pi(t) = mi(t)− x2
where x1 (susceptibility to peer influence) and x2 (self-control) are independent ran-
dom variables distributed N(0,1), x3 is the z-score derived from the criminogenic
exposure function as defined as in the default version of the model, and θ and γ are
model parameters.
5.2.6.4 Model Behaviour
Using this new exposure function, the simulation was re-run over 260 time-steps and
the outputs compared with the default version of the model. The first observation
is that, while for the default version of the model crime propensity is a probability
and is therefore bounded in the interval [0, 1], for the new version propensity is
unbounded and could hold any real value. To accommodate this the propensity
threshold ε in the emergence function has been removed entirely in order to allow
the propensity levels to float freely while this new version of the model is being
tested.
Before conducting the same series of tests as were done on the model that used
the negative binomial exposure function, the impact of changing new model pa-
rameters θ and γ was explored. In particular, the average propensity levels over
time and the propensity levels of all people in the model at time t = 260 were com-
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pared for different values of θ and γ , and it was observed that for some values of
θ and γ the average crime propensity converges over time, while for other values it
diverges.
One example of the variety of patterns produced is shown in Figure 5.22a. These
graphs show that when θ = 1, γ has to be less than approximately 0.19 to stop
the average propensity level spiralling towards infinity. The pattern of propensities
across all people at time t = 260 similarly shows that for higher values of γ the
propensities themselves are higher and also have a larger variance.
(a) Average propensities over time (b) Propensities at t = 260
Figure 5.22: Propensities for crime over time and at t = 260 using the new exposure func-
tion with θ = 1 and γ taking a number of different values.
In order to understand why the simulation converges in some circumstances but
not in others, the equations explaining the exposure and emergence transitions need
to be rewritten to enable the variable p to be defined as a function of time. This
requires a number of simplifications to be made, because the precise circumstances
under which the exposure or emergence functions will be called depend on the
activity fields. However, if one assumes that all people visit all settings (thereby
eliminating the influence of the activity fields), that susceptibility to peer influence
is constant, and that all people in the model have the same x1 and x2 values, a
person’s propensity for crime as a function of t can be written
p(t) = x1− x2+θe−γx2 p(t−1)
= (x1− x2)
t−1
∑
k=0
(
θe−γx2
)k
This is a geometric series. It follows that as t → ∞, the series will converge if
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and only if |θe−γx2| < 1. But x2 is a random variable distributed N(0,1) and can
take any real value, meaning that for different people inputs to the model, different
values of θ and γ will produce different results. Further, the assumptions made
that have allowed the influence of activity fields to be eliminated are not realistic
ones; in the real model if one person’s x2 value would allow propensity to converge
over time while someone else’s would cause it to diverge, in an actual simulation
the divergence property would spread throughout the model. We can conclude that
person i’s propensity will converge only if |θe−γx2| < 1 holds for every person in
the model.
Problems over convergence aside, the patterns produced by each of the graphs at
time t = 260 are similar in shape to each other and indeed they also mirror the
pattern produced by the negative binomial version of the model. This is better
illustrated in Figure 5.23, which compares the shape of the propensity graphs at
t=260 produced by the default negative binomial model with those produced by the
new model using two different θ and γ combinations. They are not identical, but
they do all agree on which people in the model have the higher and lower propensity
levels.
However, it is noteworthy that the equivalent graphs showing the criminogenities of
settings (shown in Figure 5.24), tell a very different story. These graphs show the
criminogenity levels of public settings (i.e. non-residential settings — the private
residences have criminogenity levels very similar to the propensity levels of their
inhabitants). From these graphs it can be seen that the settings that are the most
criminogenic in one version of the model are not the settings that are most crim-
inogenic in other versions of the model — and yet the three models give similar
relative propensity levels for all the individuals. This suggests that the emergence
of criminogenic settings does not have a large influence on the propensity levels of
individuals. However it should be recalled that all versions of the model used in this
comparison have no thresholds in the emergence function, and that the collective
efficacy for all settings is 1; when these values are changed, criminogenic settings
would be expected to have a far greater influence on people’s propensities.
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Figure 5.23: The value of each person’s propensity for crime after 260 time-steps for the
default negative binomial model and the new model using different values for
θ and γ . For ease of comparison propensities have been transformed to ensure
a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 for all model versions.
Figure 5.24: The criminogenity levels of the public settings after 260 time-steps for the
default negative binomial model and the new model using different values for
θ and γ , transformed the ensure a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.
Schools have been excluded because at t = 260 all individuals in the model
are above school-age.
5.2.6.5 Testing the Alternative Model
Once the basic behaviour of the new version of the model was understood for dif-
ferent θ and γ values, the same tests were applied to this model as were carried out
with the negative binomial version. Specifically, tests were undertaken to explore
the effects of altering the people input, settings input, the emergence function and
the criminogenic exposure function. These tests were applied to a version of the
model that has θ = 0.5 and γ = 0.5, which is a version for which the propensity
levels all converge.
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The tests that involved changing the composition of the people input to the model
saw the new version of the model behave in the same way as the negative binomial
version in almost all cases. These results are summarised as follows:
• Using a homogeneous people input file has very little impact on crime propen-
sities at t = 260.
• Altering the geographical locations of the people input in the model also has
very little impact on crime propensities.
• Altering the self-control and susceptibility to peer influence of a small num-
ber of people in the model altered the propensities of the people concerned,
although this had virtually no impact on any other people in the model. The
effect of increasing self-control by 1 or decreasing SPI by 1 was almost iden-
tical, and in both cases resulted in a reduction in the specific persons’ propen-
sities. (This differs from the result for the negative binomial version of the
model, where the impact of increasing self-control for Person 25 was to in-
crease his propensity, and the impact of changing self-control and SPI pro-
duced different results for all people.)
• When the number of people in the model is doubled, the crime propensities
for the original 100 people remain almost identical.
However, differences were observed in how the new version of the model behaves
when compared with the negative binomial version when time thresholds were ap-
plied to the emergence transition. When thresholds were applied to the negative
binomial version these did alter the crime propensities to some degree, but for the
new version of the model almost no change was perceptible. Changing the collec-
tive efficacy coefficients of the mosques and churches when a time threshold was in
place did have the expected effect on the propensity levels of Muslims and Chris-
tians, but all other propensities were almost unchanged.
Similarly, when changes were applied to the way criminogenic exposure was de-
fined, the new version of the model exhibited almost no change to the ultimate levels
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of crime propensities. This stability in crime propensities held for all changes made
to the criminogenic exposure function (i.e. introducing a time threshold, weighting
the criminogenities according to time spent in settings, and incorporating exponen-
tial decay).
In summary, changing the function in the exposure transition from a negative bino-
mial distribution to an alternative (but theoretically credible) function has demon-
strated that certain features of the model are very stable. In particular, altering the
characteristics of the people in the model has the expected impact for both model
versions in almost all cases, and similarly when the collective efficacy coefficients
for certain settings are changed. The basic pattern of crime propensities also re-
mains consistent when changes such as the introduction of time thresholds are in-
corporated into the emergence or exposure transitions, although the precise impact
of these thresholds does vary. However, from these tests it can be concluded that the
basic behaviour of the computer simulation is reasonably consistent overall when an
alternative theoretically credible function is used in the exposure transition.
5.2.7 Model Validation
Section 3.2.6 listed five stylised facts concerning criminality development that the
model should ideally be replicating. These stylised facts were as follows:
1. The agents in the model should be heterogeneous with regard to criminal
propensity;
2. The distribution of propensities across the population should be positively
skewed;
3. An individual’s propensity for crime can increase or decrease over time;
4. A steady state for the system overall should not be reached;
5. Average propensity for crime reduces with age.
We shall now establish whether the model (using either the negative binomial func-
tion or the alternative function) satisfies these criteria.
180 Chapter 5. Testing the Model
1. Heterogeneity of agents
From the graphs at Figures 5.2, 5.22b and 5.23 it is evident that the propensities of
the agents in the model are different for both versions of the model.
2. Distribution of propensities for crime
Histograms showing the distributions of crime propensities for the negative bino-
mial version of the model with τ1 = 10 minutes and ε = 0.2 and the alternative
version using two different values for θ and γ are displayed in Figure 5.25 (to facil-
itate comparison the propensities for the three sets of data have been standardised
so they have mean 0 and variance 1). From these it can be seen that the distributions
for all three versions of the model are similar, and that there is a slight positive skew.
We can therefore conclude that the model does reproduce this stylised fact.
Figure 5.25: Histogram showing the distribution of propensities for crime for the negative
binomial model with τ1 = 10 minutes and ε = 0.2 and the alternative version
with different θ and γ values at time t = 260 (standardised)
3. Change in propensity for crime
Figure 5.26 show the propensity for crime of a random 10 individuals in the model
throughout the 260 timesteps of the simulation, for three different versions of the
criminality development model (as before, the three versions of the model used
for the test are the negative binomial version with τ1 = 10 minutes and ε = 0.2, the
alternative version with θ = 1 and γ = 0.01, and the alternative version with θ = 0.5
and γ = 1.2).
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One striking thing about these three graphs is how different they are, but a trait that
all three of them share is that propensity for crime does indeed both increase and
decrease at different stages in the simulation. Therefore this stylised fact is fully
addressed by the model.
(a) Negative Binomial with τ1 = 10 minutes
and ε = 0.2 (b) Alternative with θ = 1 and γ = 0.01
(c) Alternative with θ = 0.5 and γ = 1.2
Figure 5.26: Propensity for crime of 10 individuals in the model over 260 time-steps
4. Lack of steady state
The graphs at Figure 5.26 also provide evidence as to whether the simulation out-
puts reflect the fourth stylised fact: that a steady state should not be reached because
propensity for crime can always change. The three graphs provide three very dif-
ferent answers to whether this stylised fact is met. Figure 5.26a, from the negative
binomial version of the distribution, suggests that there is stability in the model to-
wards the end of the simulation, but that individual fluctuations in propensity still
occur. Thus this graph shows that this version of the model does reflect this stylised
fact.
The second graph, Figure 5.26b shows that no steady state has been reached in this
model and that propensity is constantly changing; however, this is a version of the
model that does not converge and is therefore already to be regarded as unrealistic,
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despite it technically addressing this stylised fact.
The third graph, Figure 5.26c, shows the outcome of a simulation that does reach
a steady state. This simulation therefore does not address this stylised fact. How-
ever it should be recalled that the model as it is currently configured does not al-
low for changes in the environment, or for people to enter or leave the model. If
these additional features were incorporated the propensities may continue to change
throughout for all model versions.
In summary, this stylised fact can be addressed by the model in theory, but whether
it does — and whether the way it does is realistic — are highly dependent on the
function chosen in the exposure transition.
5. Average propensity for crime decreasing with age
A graph showing the average propensity for crime at the end of the simulation for
people of different ages for three versions of the model is shown in Figure 5.27. As
before, the three versions of the model used for the test are the negative binomial
version with τ1 = 10 minutes and ε = 0.2, and the alternative version with two
different values for θ and γ (all standardised). These graphs show that there is
not a clear correlation between age and criminal propensity; indeed for the three
sets of data the correlation coefficients against age are 0.157 (negative binomial
version), 0.448 (alternative version with γ = 0.01 and θ = 1), and 0.287 (alternative
version with γ = 1.2 and θ = 0.5) — all positive values, but in some cases only very
weakly positive. However as there are only 100 people in the simulation each age
bracket contains only 5 or 6 people; it is therefore unsurprising that these results
are quite noisy. It can be concluded that this stylised fact is partially met by the
simulation.
To summarise, of the five stylised facts that the model is required to address, all ver-
sions of the model fully satisfy the first three. The fourth stylised fact is reflected in
the negative binomial version of the model, but the alternative version either does
not reproduce this stylised fact or else it does so in an unrealistic way. The fifth
stylised fact is partially addressed by the model. In conclusion, some versions of
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Figure 5.27: Graphs showing the average propensity for crime against age at the end of the
simulation for the negative binomial model with τ1 = 10 minutes and ε = 0.2
and the alternative version with different θ and γ values (standardised)
the simulation model do fully reflect the traits of the phenomenon that they seek to
explain, but care must be taken when defining the parameters in the model — espe-
cially with regard to the function chosen in the exposure transition — to maximise
its validity.
5.3 Summary
This chapter began with a description of each of the functions and parameters that
make up the default version of the model, followed by examining how the default
model behaved in terms of the change in each person’s propensity for crime over
time, the variation in crime propensities across all the people in the model, and the
variation in the criminogenities of the settings. This section was followed by an
exploration of how the model behaved differently when compared with this default
version when alterations were made to each part of the model.
Changes were made to the way that activity fields were generated, the inputs to
the model (both people and settings), and the emergence and exposure transitions.
However not all possible changes that could have been made to the model have
been explored in this chapter. For instance, further changes could have been made
to the way activity fields are generated through changing the similarity function
Si j(t). Changes could also have been made to the people input during the model
(for instance to allow for people to change occupation or for new people to come
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into the model). But, although not completely comprehensive, the alterations that
were explored in this chapter were sufficient to enable a complete understanding of
how the different parts of the model interact with each other, and in particular under
what circumstances the model is stable and when it is more volatile.
Although some parts of the model were derived from empirical data, other parts of
the model were far more theoretical. Further empirical research, targeting specific
areas such as what attracts a person to one setting over another, would be required to
ensure that the criminality development model is correctly parameterised. However
even at this early (and highly theoretical) stage of model development it is clear
that the simulation is capable of producing results that are sufficiently consistent
that a model of this type could conceivably be of use to practitioners wishing to
understand which individual, social or environmental attributes make people most
at risk of developing a high propensity for crime.
In the next chapter this model will be adapted further in order to convert it into
a model that describes the process by which a person develops the propensity to
commit acts of terrorism — that is, radicalisation.
Chapter 6
A Model for Radicalisation
The model constructed and tested over the past two chapters has allowed us to bet-
ter understand which factors are most important in the criminal propensity devel-
opment process, and how stable the model is when changes are made to its inputs
and parameters. However the research question concerns not only the criminality
development process, but the difference between it and the radicalisation process.
For this we need models describing both processes. How then can the computer
simulation be modified in order to make it applicable to radicalisation instead of
general crime?
Three theoretical differences between criminal propensity development and radi-
calisation were suggested in Chapter 2: these were in the severity of the crimes
involved, the level of morality required for a person to have the propensity to act,
and the rarity of radicalising settings. Section 4.3 then briefly considered how these
could be incorporated in the model, by interpreting the model outputs in a differ-
ent way, and making alterations to the emergence transition that make radicalising
settings less likely to appear. In the first section of this chapter these changes will
be implemented and the subsequent behaviour of the model analysed, in order to
determine whether the changes produce credible results. A number of approaches
to finding suitable values for the model’s parameters in the absence of empirical
data are then pursued. Once such parameters are established, the chapter goes on to
use this model to explore how radicalisation could take off in an unstable, lawless
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environment. The radicalisation model is then validated, and then used in combina-
tion with the previous chapter’s criminality development model to provide an initial
answer to the research question.
The chapter ends with a brief exploration of how the radicalisation model could be
extended to include virtual settings.
6.1 Modifying the Criminal Propensity Development
Model
Chapter 5 examined the behaviour of many different versions of the criminal
propensity development model. Some versions were very similar to each other,
varying only in the size of a threshold, while others were very different, such as
when the negative binomial equation in the exposure function was replaced with an
alternative function. So which version should form the basis of the radicalisation
model?
From a theoretical perspective, any version of the model could be used as they are
all consistent with the theory and the IVEE framework. However the versions of the
model that use the alternative exposure function have a number of disadvantages.
The function used was devised purely from theory in order to provide an example
of what changes might be realistic, and is not based on any empirical data. Be-
cause of this it is not possible to interpret what the final propensity levels actually
represent, and therefore what it would mean for somebody to count as a “radical”.
Conversely, the negative binomial equation in the default version of the model was
taken directly from an empirical study and allows us to interpret the propensity val-
ues as representing probabilities that people will commit crime over the course of
the next year. This provides a far clearer basis on which to build, and so the negative
binomial version of the model will be used as the starting point for the radicalisation
model.
The first change necessary to make this model applicable to radicalisation is to in-
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crease the severity of the crimes for which an individual may have the propensity.
It was suggested in Section 4.3 that this could be done by putting in place a high
threshold whereby anyone with a propensity over this threshold would be consid-
ered a radical. However, a high threshold — say a threshold of 0.99 — simply
means that there is a probability of 0.99 that the person will commit any crime, and
does not say anything about their likelihood of committing severe crimes. In order
to focus the model on severe crimes, changes need to be made to the parameters
within the negative binomial function. To determine what these changes should be,
we need to return to the way the negative binomial function was derived.
As described in Section 4.1.4, a random variable Y is negatively binomially dis-
tributed if the probability that Y is equal to y is:
P(Y = y) =
Γ(y+ 1α )
Γ(y+1)Γ( 1α )
(
1
1+αµ
) 1
α
(
αµ
1+αµ
)y
where the mean of the distribution is µ , and α is the “heterogeneity parameter”
(Hilbe, 2011). In a negative binomial regression these parameters are estimated
from a set of data; for instance µ is estimated by
lnµ = β0+β1x1+β2x2+ . . .+βnxn
for n independent variables. In the criminality propensity development model these
parameters were taken from the work done by Meldrum et al. (2013), which gave
α = 0.1228 and
lnµ =−0.23+0.25x1−0.13x2+0.15x1x2+0.69x3
where x1 is susceptibility to peer influence, x2 is self-control, and x3 is peer delin-
quency. Propensity is then calculated as p= P(Y > 0) = 1−P(Y = 0). As all the xi
values are z-scores, this gives an expected value for an average person’s propensity
of
E(p) = 1−
(
1
1+0.1228e−0.23
)8.14
= 0.5314
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This can be interpreted as the probability that an average person with average expo-
sure does commit a crime at some point over a 12 month period.
As no empirical studies have been carried out replicating the results produced by
Meldrum et al. (2013) for terrorism, there is no data on which to draw to adapt this
equation into one more applicable to radicalisation. However, some common-sense
logical changes can be made. Firstly, as we are defining a radicalised person as
someone with the propensity to commit severe crimes that are very rare in UK so-
ciety, the expected value for an average person’s propensity for such crimes needs
to be far, far lower than 0.531. Moffitt et al. (1989) observed that the rate of con-
viction for a violent offence in young adult males is between 3% and 6%; when
spread across the whole population this number becomes lower still, and then even
lower again if one considers the probability that the violent offence is committed in
a particular 12 month period. A more realistic value then would perhaps be 0.001
for such rare events. Assuming the value for the heterogeneity parameter α remains
unchanged, this would suggest β0 =−6.91, as
E(p) = 1−
(
1
1+0.1228e−6.91
)8.14
= 0.001
Secondly, the role of morality is more important in a person’s propensity for terrorist
actions than the role of self-control, because terrorism requires more premeditation.
This is already incorporated into the negative binomial function in the criminality
development model to a certain extent, because β2 =−0.13 is smaller in magnitude
than β1 = 0.25. However for the radicalisation model the influence of self-control
should be reduced further: an initial attempt at suitable values could be to have
β2 = − 0.10 while keeping β1 = 0.25. The remaining parameters will remain
unchanged, as without data on which to base the model, no other changes can be
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justified.1 This gives an equation for the exposure transition of
pi(t) = 1−
(
1
1+0.1228e−6.91+0.25x1(t)−0.1x2+0.15x1(t)x2+0.69x3(t)
)8.14
where pi(t) is the propensity of person i at time t. One observation that can im-
mediately be made about this equation is that the magnitude of β0 =−6.91 is con-
siderably larger than the other βi values, meaning that x1, x2 and x3 would need to
be large for them to have much effect at increasing the propensity of i significantly
above 0.001. However while the equation may look unusual from a mathemati-
cal perspective, this is precisely the effect that we are trying to achieve, as we are
seeking to replicate the rarity of radicalisation in society.
Aside from the negative binomial regression, the emergence function needs to be
altered in order to make the emergence of radicalising settings a rarer occurrence
than the emergence of criminogenic settings. As with the changes made to the
emergence function in Chapter 5, there are three changes that could be made: setting
a time threshold τ1, setting a propensity threshold ε , and changing the impact of the
collective efficacy factor.
Taking this last suggestion first, the literature for both development processes con-
sider collective efficacy to be important, so it should certainly remain as part of
the emergence function. In the criminality development model the collective effi-
cacy coefficient is multiplied by the average propensity of people visiting a setting
in the emergence function, so that a setting with twice the collective efficacy of
another becomes twice as criminogenic (with all other factors being equal). This
works in the criminality development model because propensities for crime are ap-
proximately normally distributed and having a relatively high propensity is not a
rare occurrence, so it is primarily the collective efficacy coefficient that determines
which settings are the more criminogenic. But in the radicalisation model it will be
unusual for anyone to have a high enough propensity to cause a radicalising setting
1The mean and sample variance used to transform criminogenic exposure into a z-score have also
been changed to take into account the new values of βi.
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to emerge at all. It should therefore be the presence of radicalised people in the
setting, not the collective efficacy coefficient, that makes a setting radicalising. The
impact of a high collective efficacy coefficient on the extent to which the setting
emerges as a radicalising setting should therefore be reduced; it should still have
an effect, but that effect should be less than it is for the criminality development
model.
How about the impact of a low collective efficacy coefficient? If we take the default
collective efficacy coefficient of a setting to be one, settings with a value of ω j < 1
will be settings with high levels of informal social control and high levels of social
cohesion. These settings are less likely to become criminogenic, but if a radicalised
person were present we would still expect them to have an influence on others at
the setting, although that influence might well be lower than in other settings. An
example might be a highly radicalised pupil at a school: the school itself might have
high levels of collective efficacy making the radicalised pupil unlikely to actively
recruit fellow pupils while at school, but they could still build relationships with
their fellow pupils with the intent of recruiting them in a different setting.
In order to reduce the impact of collective efficacy in the radicalisation model’s
emergence function we need to replace multiplying the average propensity of the
people visiting the setting by ω j with multiplying it by some function f (ω j). That
function should keep f (1) = 1, but for ω j > 1 we need f (ω j)< ω j and for ω j < 1
we need f (ω j)>ω j. A simple linear function of f (ω j) = aω j+b for a∈ (0,1) and
b= 1−a would work, as would the non-linear option of f (ω j) =ωφj for φ ∈ (0,1).
As the collective efficacy coefficients used in the model are not based on actual
data, it is not possible at this stage to know which function would be more suitable;
for this first version of the radicalisation model the function f (ω j) = ω
φ
j will be
used.
An additional way to integrate the role of collective efficacy in the model is to make
it part of the propensity threshold in the emergence function, so that a lower propen-
sity is required to make a radicalising setting emerge if it has a higher collective
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efficacy coefficient (recall that the scales are reversed, so a setting with low col-
lective efficacy has a high collective efficacy coefficient). The “standard” propen-
sity threshold that would apply to settings with a collective efficacy coefficient of 1
need not be very high, as propensity in the radicalisation model refers to very severe
crimes only. For instance if a person has only a 10% chance of committing a very
severe crime in the next 12 months, that may make them sufficiently radicalised
to have a radicalising influence on others. For this first attempt at parameterising
the radicalisation model we shall therefore set ε = 0.1, and make the propensity
threshold for a setting j equal to ε/ω j.
As for the time threshold, case studies including those described by Sageman (2004)
and Pantucci (2010) have described the locations of key radicalising settings for a
number of individuals’ radicalisation experiences. For instance, Abu Qatada al-
Filistini was active at a youth club in north London which became a rallying point
for London-based Algerian Islamists, while Abu Hamza al-Masri — the “hook-
handed sheikh” — drew “angry young men” around him at the Finsbury Park
mosque (Pantucci, 2010). These locations are visited by people for a reasonable
length of time — they do not become radicalising over the course of just 10 minutes
of attendance per week. However, a radicalised person does not need to spend the
majority of their waking hours there either to be highly influential. With this in
mind, we shall set the time threshold τ1 to be 1 hour per week.
Finally, a threshold needs to be set which defines someone as being “radicalised” or
“not radicalised” based on whether their propensity is higher or lower. This is very
subjective, as we are dealing with probabilities rather than certainties. However
the heterogeneity parameter α in the negative binomial distribution acts as a useful
guide, as 1α is the number of “failures” expected before one “success”, where in
this case a “success” means committing a severe crime. This suggests that a person
has (for our value of α) approximately 1α =
1
0.1228 = 8.14 opportunities to carry
out a severe crime where they do not do so, before they finally do. A propensity
of α = 0.1228 therefore seems a good starting point to define what it means to be
“radicalised” in the absence of empirical data.
192 Chapter 6. A Model for Radicalisation
Our first attempt at a radicalisation model will therefore use the same inputs and
activity field generation as the default criminality development model, but with the
following functions used for the transitions:
Exposure: After the exposure transition the propensity p of person i to commit an
act of terrorism is:
pi(t) = 1−
(
1
1+0.1228e−6.91+0.25x1−0.1x2+0.15x1x2+0.69x3
)8.14
Emergence: After the emergence transition the radicalisation level r of setting j
is:
r j(t) =
ωφj
n
 ∑∀i s.t.
fi jk(t)>τ1
& pi(t)>ε/ω j
pi(t)

for φ < 1, τ1 = 1 hour and ε = 0.1.
It is recognised that these parameter values are not derived from empirical data, and
that the radicalisation model is a theoretical one that may not replicate reality to a
great degree. However as the decisions on which parameters to change and in what
way they should be changed are based on logical conclusions drawn from analysing
the literature it is hoped that this model will be more reminiscent of radicalisation
than the version that describes the development of criminal propensity. All that
remains therefore is to run the model and examine how it behaves, and from this we
can draw conclusions as to its realism.
6.1.1 Radicalisation Model Behaviour
When the simulation is run for 260 time-steps using the default people and settings,
the number of radicals is zero. Increasing the number of people in the model up
to 500 still produces zero radicals, and indeed the highest propensity reached by
anyone in the model over the whole simulation is 0.0075, which is significantly
lower than the threshold defining what it means to be radicalised.
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This result is to be expected, because radicalisation in the UK is — thankfully —
a very rare phenomenon, and the people being input to the simulation are “normal”
people who one would only expect to become radicalised if they are heavily exposed
to a radicalising setting. But with only “normal” people in the model, no radicalising
settings appear.
One way to establish how likely it is that a radicalising setting or a radicalising
person appears in the model might be to run the simulation multiple times until a
radical appears, and then to calculate how likely an occurrence this is based on the
number of simulations run. However, a far simpler way is to look at what values for
x1, x2 and x3 would produce a radicalised person.
Let us define X1, X2 and X3 to be independent, identically distributed random vari-
ables distributed N(0,1), representing levels of SPI, self-control and exposure to
radicalising moral contexts respectively. Then using the definition of radical as be-
ing someone with a propensity over 0.1228, we can calculate what values X1, X2
and X3 would need to hold:
p = 1−
(
1
1+0.1228e−6.91+0.25X1−0.1X2+0.15X1X2+0.69X3
)8.14
≥ 0.1228
By rearranging this equation we have:
−6.91+0.25X1−0.1X2+0.15X1X2+0.69X3 ≥−2.0243479
From this it is possible to establish what X1 and X2 values would be required for
somebody to become a radical without any exposure to radicalising moral contexts
(i.e. X3 = 0), and thus how likely it is that someone with these X1 and X2 values
appears in the model.
When X3 = 0, for a person to be a radical they require X1 and X2 values such
that
0.25X1−0.1X2+0.15X1X2 ≥ 4.886.
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As X1 and X2 are both random variables from a standard normal distribution,
0.25X1− 0.13X2 is also a normally distributed random variable, with mean µ =
0.15 and variance σ2 = 0.0725. However X1X2 has a “product-normal” distri-
bution, which has characteristic function φX1X2(t) = (1+ t2)−1/2 (Oberhettinger,
1973). From this we can calculate the characteristic function of random vari-
able Y = 0.25X1 − 0.1X2 + 0.15X1X2, but calculating P(Y ≥ 4.886) from this
characteristic function is not possible analytically. However this is not neces-
sary for the present study, which merely seeks to find out the approximate or-
der of magnitude of P(Y ≥ 4.886). This can be achieved well enough simply
by calculating P(0.25X1 − 0.1X2 ≥ 4.886), as for such an extreme value as
4.886 the contribution of the interaction term 0.15X1X2 will be very small since
there will be very few occasions where 0.25X1− 0.1X2 + 0.15X1X2 ≥ 4.886 while
0.25X1 − 0.1X2 < 4.886.
The probability that 0.25X1−0.1X2 ≥ 4.886 is equal to:
P(0.25X1−0.1X2 ≥ 4.886) = P
(
Z ≥ 4.886−0.15√
0.0725
)
= P(Z ≥ 17.59)
≈ 1.469×10−69
This is a value which, even across a world population of 7 billion people, would
never be expected to happen.
However, one does not expect there to be zero exposure to radicalising settings for
a radicalised person to appear, making such unlikely values for X1 and X2 unneces-
sary. Perhaps a more sensible approach therefore is to ask what level of exposure
to radicalising settings is required to turn someone in the most extreme 1% of X1
and X2 values into a radical? This is a far more important question for testing the
realism of the model, as a person in the top 1% for both X1 and X2 would appear on
average one time in 10,000, meaning there are approximately 6,400 such individu-
als in the UK. As the number of UK citizens sufficiently radicalised to join terrorist
group Daesh in Syria is estimated to be in the hundreds (Neumann, 2015), this is a
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reasonable figure with which to work.
Individuals in the top 1% for both X1 and X2 will have X1 ≥ 2.326 and
X2 ≤ − 2.326. Putting these values into the equation above gives
−6.91+0.25(2.326)−0.1(−2.326)−0.15(2.326)(−2.326)+0.69x3 ≥−2.0243
giving X3 ≥ 7.08. This again is extremely rare, appearing with a probability of
7.2×10−13.
At this point it can be concluded that in adapting the model so that it describes
radicalisation instead of normal crime, the parameters in version one of the rad-
icalisation model have been pushed so much to the extreme as to make radicali-
sation virtually impossible, which we know not to be true. This suggests that the
parameters need to be adjusted further in order to make the radicalisation model
realistic.
6.1.2 An alternative approach to parameterisation
The previous attempt to choose realistic parameters for the radicalisation model
proved to be unsuccessful, as the probability of radicalisation happening to anyone
at all was far too low. An alternative approach to parameterising the model therefore
needs to be found.
The way that it was established that the radicalisation model was unrealistic pro-
vides a good starting point, as we can ensure that a realistic number of people
with X1 and X2 values in the top percentile become radicalised. For instance, let
us suppose that of these 6,400 most cognitively susceptible people in UK soci-
ety, if they become exposed to a setting in the top 5% of radicalising settings they
themselves become radicalised. As X3 follows a standard normal distribution, this
means that we would require X3 ≥ 2.5758 to make somebody with X1 ≥ 2.3263 and
X2 ≤−2.3263 become radicalised. This provides a boundary condition of:
β0+β1(2.3263)+β2(−2.3263)+β12(2.3263)(−2.3263)+β3(2.5758)≥−2.0243479
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We can then specify other logical conditions to ensure that the values chosen for
β0, β1, β2 and β3 produce a model with realistic results. For example, β1 and β3
should both be greater than 0, because as susceptibility to peer influence and expo-
sure to radicalising settings increase, we would expect an individual’s propensity to
commit terrorist attacks also to increase. Similarly, β12 should also be greater than 0
because Meldrum et al.’s finding that the effect of susceptibility to peer influence on
delinquency is stronger at higher values of self-control is likely to be applicable to
radicalisation as well as to criminality. However, β2 should be less than 0, because
self-control on its own is negatively correlated with the propensity to commit severe
crimes. In addition, as it has already been concluded that the influence of morality is
greater in the radicalisation process than the influence of self-control, there should
also be |β2|< |β1| and |β12|< |β1|. Finally, there needs to be a condition for β0: as
the logic behind the original choice of β0 = −6.91 still stands, this parameter will
remain unchanged.
These conditions are not overly restrictive, and there still remains a great deal of
flexibility in the choice of parameters. Ultimately it is only through the collection
and analysis of empirical data concerning the relationship between susceptibility to
peer influence, self-control, exposure to radicalising settings and actual radicalisa-
tion that one can hope to estimate these parameters with any degree of accuracy, but
for this theoretical model these steps of logic provide enough of a guide to enable
the radicalisation simulation to be parameterised and compared with the model de-
scribing the development of criminality. For this second attempt at parameterising
the radicalisation model the values chosen were β0 =−6.91, β1 = 0.9, β2 =−0.45
β12 = 0.05 and β3 = 0.8, which gives
β0+β1(2.3263)+β2(−2.3263)+β12(2.3263)(−2.3263)+β3(2.5758) =−1.979
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6.1.2.1 Behaviour of Radicalisation Model Version Two
As with the previous version of the radicalisation model, when the simulation was
run for 260 time-steps with the default people and settings inputs, nobody in the
model became radicalised and no radicalising settings emerged. This was the case
when 100 and 500 people were input into the model. The maximum propensity
achieved by anyone in the model over the whole simulation was 0.0456 (achieved by
Person 472 at time t = 1), which is below the radicalisation threshold of 0.1228, but
not so far below it as to suggest that radicalisation would be an impossibility. These
results are entirely consistent with what one would expect from the simulation, as
radicalisation in UK society is a very rare occurrence.
In order to test whether this version of the radicalisation model is producing results
that are more realistic than the first version we need to create a situation where
a radical appears and see how (and whether) radicalisation spreads, which can be
achieved by planting a person with sufficiently extreme values for SPI and self-
control into the model. This was done by increasing the SPI of Person 472 by 1,
which makes their propensity at time t = 1 greater than 0.1 and forces the process
of the emergence of radicalising settings to begin.
When this simulation was run for 260 time-steps, all 500 people in the simulation
had a propensity of 1 by time t = 3. This is clearly highly unrealistic. On closer
examination of what is occurring during the first three time-steps, at time t = 2 nine
settings have a radicalisation level of 0.103, which then has the effect of making 471
of the 500 people officially “radical” (i.e. they have propensity greater than 0.1228).
In the next time-step total radicalisation has spread to everybody. This suggests that
the value for β3 is far too high, as a relatively small number of slightly radicalising
settings has had an overwhelming impact.
The explanation for the model behaving in this way is that when criminogenic ex-
posure is converted into a z-score to give a value for x3 the value used for the
variance is very low (the sample variance calculated after some trial simulations
is s2 = 0.000006), which results in disproportionately high values for x3 for anyone
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who has visited a setting with even a low radicalisation level. This is an inevitable
by-product of the rarity of radicalised people and radicalising settings, which makes
the distribution of propensities among the population highly positively skewed but
with a very low variance. This problem can be fixed in two ways: either the variance
used to convert criminogenic exposure into a z-score is increased, or β3 is reduced.
As increasing the variance is not statistically justifiable, it is preferable to reduce
β3. The question is, by how much?
In order to answer this question, the simulation was run with a number of lower
values for β3 in order to establish the effect of changing this parameter, and in par-
ticular what values of β3 produce a model where one highly cognitively susceptible
person does not cause all people in the model to become radicalised.
6.1.2.2 The Effect of Changing β3
The radicalisation model was run for 260 time-steps using the default settings input
and the 500 person input with Person 472 modified to force the emergence process
to start. Values for β3 were varied from β3 = 0.8 (the value used in version 2) down
to β3 = 0.
Comparing the propensity levels of all people in the model and the number of rad-
icals that appear for these different values of β3 revealed that for values of β3 of
0.0354 and above the average propensity level after 260 time-steps is greater than
0.99, and all 500 people become radicals. At the other end of the spectrum, for val-
ues of β3 below 0.027 no people in the model are radicalised after 260 time-steps,
and the average propensity level stabilises at approximately 0.0019.
When β3 holds a value between these two bounds, the model behaves in rather more
interesting ways, as can be seen from Figure 6.1. This graph shows the average
propensity for severe crimes over all 260 time-steps for some β3 values in this range,
and from it we can see that the average propensity varies greatly over time between
the different model versions, but ultimately stabilises around 0.02.
The number of radicals generated by the simulation after 260 time-steps for values
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Figure 6.1: Average propensity for terrorism for the radicalisation model with different β3
values when the simulation is run for 260 time-steps and seeded with one highly
susceptible person.
of β3 in this range also varies, as shown in Table 6.1. Of particular note from this
table is the dramatic increase in the number of radicals present at the end of the
simulation when the value of β3 is increased only a very small amount above 0.035.
This tells us that the amount of weight given to the x3(t) (exposure to radicalising
settings) variable should not rise above this value, as when β3 > 0.035 radicalisation
is pervasive and the model becomes highly unrealistic.
Table 6.1: Number of radicals generated by the simulation at t = 260
β3 Number of radicals
≤ 0.0265 0
0.027-0.031 6
0.032 10
0.033 13
0.034 12
0.0345 26
0.035 42
0.352 417
≥ 0.354 500
6.1.3 Changing Environmental Factors
In Section 6.1 it was argued that the collective efficacy coefficient ω j of each setting
should be incorporated into the emergence transition in two ways: firstly by mul-
tiplying some function f (ω j) with the average propensities of all people visiting
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the setting, and secondly as part of the emergence propensity threshold. It was de-
cided that the function f (ω j) = ω
φ
j for φ ∈ (0.1) would be a theoretically suitable
function to use in the absence of primary data. This section explores the effects of
choosing different values for φ and ω j on the behaviour of the model.
The parameter φ has so far been left undefined (other than stipulating that it should
be less than 1) because the model has only been run with the default settings input
where all settings have a collective efficacy coefficient of 1. However, a further
test of whether the radicalisation model is producing credible results would be to
increase the collective efficacy coefficients of the settings and analyse whether the
model produces more radicals, and if so how many more radicals. Translating this
to the real world, increasing the collective efficacy coefficients of all the settings
in the model would indicate a breakdown of local organisational structures and a
lack of social control and cohesion, which one would expect to make radicalisation
a more likely occurrence, although still relatively rare while collective efficacy lev-
els remain moderate. However if the collective efficacy coefficients became large
enough they would represent such a breakdown of social structures (for instance as
might be found in a place affected by war) that radicalisation might be seen sig-
nificantly more frequently, as has sadly been observed in recent years in war-torn
Syria.
In order to observe how the model assesses radicalisation might spread in more
socially disorganised environments, a credible value for φ must be chosen. To de-
termine such a value the model was run for 260 time-steps with the default 500
people input (i.e. without the planted highly susceptible individual) and a settings
input where all settings have ω j = 2, and with a variety of values for φ to explore
the impact of changing this parameter. A value of β3 = 0.028 was used, as the pre-
vious section has shown that when all settings have collective efficacy equal to 1
this value for β3 generated a credible result in terms of the number of people who
become radicalised when one highly cognitively susceptible person forms part of
the input.
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(a) Propensities for Terrorism (b) Setting Radicalisation Levels
Figure 6.2: Average propensity for terrorism and average setting radicalisation levels for
the model over 260 time-steps with different φ values with the collective effi-
cacy of all settings equal to 2.
Figure 6.2 shows the results of this test. From the graphs in Figure 6.2a it can be
seen that the line showing the average propensity when all settings have collective
efficacy equal to 1 is lower than all the other lines, and thus that in all cases a col-
lective efficacy coefficient of 2 results in higher propensities for terrorism overall.
Figure 6.2b shows the same result is true for the radicalisation levels of the set-
tings. However, in both cases the difference between the line for ω j = 1 and those
for ω j = 2 with φ between 0 and 0.4 is very small indeed after approximately 120
time-steps. A value of φ of 0.5 or 0.6 might therefore be more realistic, given that
the literature discussed in Section 4.1.5 suggests that collective efficacy is a highly
influential factor in determining whether people visiting a setting are likely to de-
velop an increased propensity for crime (including terrorism).
An alternative way to compare these results is to count the number of radicals pro-
duced by the simulation after 260 time-steps, which is shown in Table 6.2. This
table also suggests that φ needs to hold a value of at least 0.5 before the effects of
doubling the collective efficacy coefficients for all settings actually has an impact on
whether people become radicalised. It is therefore proposed that a value of φ = 0.5
will be used in the model.
6.1.3.1 The Effect of Extreme Environments
One similarity between the radicalisation model and the criminality development
model is that they are both describing the process of the breakdown of moral re-
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Table 6.2: Number of radicals at t = 260 for different φ values.
Test Number of radicals
All settings with ω j = 1 0
ω j = 2, φ = 0 0
ω j = 2, φ = 0.2 0
ω j = 2, φ = 0.3 0
ω j = 2, φ = 0.4 0
ω j = 2, φ = 0.5 4
ω j = 2, φ = 0.6 5
ω j = 2, φ = 0.7 5
ω j = 2, φ = 0.8 500
straint. However because the threshold for what it means to be a radical is much
higher than the threshold for having sufficient propensity to carry out petty crime, it
is difficult to see the subtleties of the process in the radicalisation model. Radicali-
sation is very rare in UK society, and the individuals in the model who do become
radicalised are highly cognitively susceptible to it, making the influence of environ-
mental factors relatively minor. However what if the model’s geographical input
was altered so that it represented an environment where weak levels of morality
were pervasive? Would radicalisation here spread in the same way as criminality,
with individuals who are far less cognitively susceptible being affected?
This can be tested by altering the value of ω j. If ω j holds high values for all settings
in the model, this would represent a lawless society that has experienced a complete
breakdown in collective efficacy, such as might be seen in an unstable war-torn
country such as Syria. Testing the behaviour of the radicalisation model when ω j
holds higher values would therefore tell us how radicalisation might spread in such
an environment.
Figure 6.3 shows the results of running the simulation over 260 time-steps when all
settings have high values for ω j. From these graphs it is clear that as ω j increases
the average radicalisation levels of the settings increase as well at the start of the
simulation, with a similar pattern also visible for the average propensities. How-
ever, for all but the very highest values of ω , after approximately 40 time-steps the
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propensities and radicalisation levels start to decrease again until the averages be-
come almost indistinguishable from each other. This result is also visible when we
examine the number of radicals that the simulation produces at time t = 260 for the
different values of ω , shown in Table 6.3. For ω ≤ 8 there is very little change in
the number of radicals, but when ω rises above this value radicalisation becomes an
epidemic.
(a) Propensities for Terrorism (b) Setting Radicalisation Levels
Figure 6.3: Average propensity for terrorism and setting radicalisation levels for the model
over 260 time-steps with high values for the collective efficacy coefficients of
all settings.
Table 6.3: Number of radicals at t = 260 for different ω values.
Test Number of radicals
All settings with ω j = 1 0
ω j = 2 4
ω j = 3 4
ω j = 4 2
ω j = 5 2
ω j = 6 2
ω j = 7 2
ω j = 8 2
ω j = 9 7
ω j = 10 500
Are these results realistic? Collective efficacy as it has been included in the model
is a theoretical parameter, so the real world impact of changing it to the extent that
we have done here cannot be determined. Several studies have used an empirically
derived measure of collective efficacy in their research, such as Sampson (2004)
and Wikstro¨m and Treiber (2009) — but, as has already been mentioned in Section
4.1.5, no research has yet been conducted into what precisely is the mechanism
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through which low collective efficacy causes a setting to become more criminogenic
or more radicalising. This remains a question to be answered, and it is one that can
only be answered using traditional social science methods. Once this question has
been answered, the realism of the results produced by the radicalisation model when
run in an extreme environment can be better assessed.
6.2 The Final Model
6.2.1 Transitions in the Radicalisation Model
We are now in a position to put forward a complete model simulating the radicali-
sation process. This model is a modified version of the original model for criminal
propensity development, and it produces credible results in terms of the number
of people likely to become radicalised in different situations. For this model the
following functions are used for the transitions:
Exposure: After the exposure transition the propensity p of person i for terrorist
activity at time t is:
pi(t) = 1−
(
1
1+0.1228e−6.91+0.9x1(t)−0.45x2+0.05x1(t)x2+0.028x3(t)
)8.14
where the xis are realisations of random variables X1, X2 and X3 with distribution
N(0,1), which represent person i’s susceptibility to peer influence, self-control, and
exposure to radicalising settings respectively.
Emergence: After the emergence transition the radicalisation level r of setting j at
time t is:
r j(t) =
ω0.5j
n
 ∑∀i s.t.
fi jk(t)>τ1
& pi(t)>ε/ω j
pi(t)

for τ1 = 1 hour and ε = 0.1.
As this is a theoretical model that has not been parameterised using empirical data
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there remains uncertainty around what values the parameters should hold, however
this version of the model satisfies the following criteria:
• With the default people and settings inputs nobody becomes radicalised;
• When an unusually cognitively susceptible person is introduced to the model,
a small number of other people become radicalised;
• When the collective efficacy coefficients of the settings are doubled a small
number of people become radicalised.
The complete description of the full radicalisation model is at Appendix A.
6.2.2 Model Validation
As with the criminality development model constructed in Chapter 5, the radical-
isation model will be validated against a list of stylised facts. The stylised facts
suggested in Section 3.2.6 were as follows:
1. The agents in the model should be heterogeneous with regard to radicalism;
2. The distribution of propensities for terrorism across the population should be
much more positively skewed than the distribution of propensities for crime;
3. An individual’s propensity for terrorism can increase or decrease over time;
4. A steady state for the system overall should not be reached;
5. Radicalising moral contexts (i.e. settings) should be far rarer than crimino-
genic moral contexts.
The model inputs for the validation comprise 500 individuals with one highly cog-
nitively susceptible individual, and all settings have ω j = 1.
1. Heterogeneity of agents
Figure 6.4 shows the propensities for terrorism of the 500 individuals in the model
at the end of the simulation. From this graph it is clear that the agents have different
propensities for terrorism, so this stylised fact is replicated.
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Figure 6.4: Graph showing the propensities for terrorism for the radicalisation model with
one highly susceptible individual at time t = 260 (standardised)
2. Distribution of propensities for terrorism
A histogram showing the distribution of propensities for terrorism compared with
the distribution of propensities for crime from different versions of the criminality
development model is at Figure 6.5. The propensities for all four model versions
have been standardised so that they have mean 0 and variance 1 in order to facilitate
comparison between the models. A sample of 100 individuals from the radicalisa-
tion model was used to construct the histogram in order to compare the distribution
of propensities with the criminality development model (which was run with 100
individuals).
Figure 6.5: Histogram showing the distribution of propensities for crime compared with
the distribution of propensities for terrorism at time t = 260 (standardised)
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From this histogram it can be seen that there is much less variability in propensities
for terrorism than there is in propensities for crime, with nearly all individuals in
the model having lower than average propensity for terrorism. There are a small
number of individuals with extremely high propensity for terrorism, while no such
individuals exist for any of the criminality development model versions. There is
a positive skew for all datasets, although it is not noticeably more positive for the
radicalisation model than it is for the criminality development models. However
the number of individuals with standardised propensity less than 0 is significantly
greater for the radicalisation model: 394 out of 500 individuals (78.8%) for the
radicalisation model, versus between 54% and 60% for the different criminality
development model versions. It can therefore be concluded that this stylised fact is
satisfied by the model.
3. Change in propensity for terrorism
The graph at Figure 6.6 shows the propensity for terrorism over time of a random
10 individuals in the model. From this graph it is clear that the propensities of all
individuals in the model can both increase and decrease.
Figure 6.6: Propensity for terrorism over time of 10 people in the model
4. Lack of steady state
Figure 6.6 also shows that for the radicalisation model no steady state has been
reached, and that individual propensities continue to change at the end of the simu-
lation.
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5. Rarity of radicalising settings
Table 6.4 shows the number of settings with zero versus non-zero radicalisation
level at the end of the simulation, compared with the number of settings with zero
or non-zero criminogenity level at the end of the negative binomial version of the
criminality development simulation. (The versions of the criminality development
model using the alternative function in the exposure transition give unbounded val-
ues for criminogenity, meaning that the concept of “zero criminogenity” cannot be
defined and thus these versions of the model cannot be used in this comparison.)
Residences were excluded from this analysis, as the radicalisation model has 500
residences versus the criminality development model only having 100.
Table 6.4: Number of settings with the given radicalisation or criminogenity levels at the
end of the simulation
Radicalisation or Radicalisation Negative Binomial
Criminogenity level Model Criminality Model
0 42 24
0 < x≤ 0.1 0 13
0.1 < x≤ 0.2 5 16
0.2 < x≤ 0.3 3 0
0.3 < x≤ 0.4 2 2
0.4 < x≤ 0.5 0 0
0.5 < x≤ 0.6 3 0
Total 55 55
The table shows that for the radicalisation model 42 out of the 55 non-residential
settings have zero radicalising influence, while only 24 of the 55 settings have zero
criminogenic influence in the criminality development model. The radicalisation
model therefore does satisfy the stylised fact. However, it should also be noted that
there are very few settings that have greater than 0.2 criminogenic influence (only
2 out of 55), while 8 of the 55 settings have greater than 0.2 radicalising influence.
This suggests that where radicalising settings do exist they tend to be highly radi-
calising, while criminogenic settings tend to be only weakly criminogenic. Further
research would be needed to determine whether this finding is true in the real world,
but if not then it suggests that both models need further refinement.
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Overall the radicalisation model has been found to satisfy all five of the stylised
facts, although stylised facts 2 and 5 in particular raise additional questions as to
what precise phenomena the model should be aiming to replicate.
6.3 Answering the Research Question
It is now possible to return to the main research question to be answered in this the-
sis, which was first introduced in Section 2.4.3: are the radicalisation and criminal
propensity development processes indistinguishable? Over the past three chapters
two separate computer simulations based on the IVEE framework have been devel-
oped: one to mimic how people develop the propensity to commit crime in general,
and one focussing on radicalisation. By comparing the mechanisms in the two sim-
ulations and the results they produce we can explore how similar or different these
two processes actually are.
For the criminality development process the model created used two different types
of state — people and settings — and two transitions that link the states together
which either cause a change in a person’s propensity for crime or a setting’s crim-
inogenity. For the radicalisation process the model developed followed the same
basic structure as the criminality development model. It used the same method to
generate the activity fields, fi jk, as no fundamental differences between radicalisa-
tion and criminality development were identified in the literature with regard to how
selection mechanisms contribute to the overall process. The differences lie in the
specific parameters used in the transitions.
For the criminality development model the two transitions emergence and exposure,
can be written as the following equations:
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Emergence (criminality development):
c j(t) =
ω j
n
 ∑∀i s.t.
fi jk(t)>τ1
& pi(t)>ε
pi(t)

Exposure (criminality development):
pi(t) = 1−
(
1
1+0.1228e−0.23+0.25x1(t)−0.13x2+0.15x1(t)x2+0.69x3(t)
)8.14
where changing the values of τ1 and ε or the method of calculating x3 alters the
final values of the propensities, but it does not affect who ultimately ends up with
relatively high or low propensities (i.e. the basic shape of the propensity graph at
t = 260).
For the radicalisation model these equations became:
Emergence (radicalisation):
r j(t) =
(ω j)0.5
n
 ∑∀i s.t.fi jk(t)>1 hour
& pi(t)>0.1/ω j
pi(t)

Exposure (radicalisation):
pi(t) = 1−
(
1
1+0.1228e−6.91+0.9x1(t)−0.45x2+0.05x1(t)x2+0.028x3(t)
)8.14
While the descriptions of the model have both similarities and differences, the real
test of how similar these processes are comes from comparing the behaviour of the
two models. It is of course expected that radicalisation is a far rarer occurrence
than it is for someone to development a strong propensity for crime; but how do the
6.3. Answering the Research Question 211
two processes compare when the radicalisation model is applied to a chaotic, war-
torn environment? Is there a tipping point after which radicalisation as a process
essentially behaves the same as criminality propensity development?
In order to explore this further a comparison was conducted between the propen-
sities at t = 260 for the criminality development model with τ1 = 10 minutes and
ε = 0.2, and the radicalisation model. The same 500 person input files were used for
both models, and the same setting inputs with the exception that for the criminality
development model all settings have ω j = 1 while for the radicalisation model all
settings have ω j = 9. The propensity levels for all 500 people at time t = 260 are
shown in Figure 6.7.
Figure 6.7: Propensities for the radicalisation model run in an extreme environment (ω j =
9) and the criminal propensity development model in a standard environment
(ω j = 1) at time t = 260
The first observation to be made from comparing the graphs is how different in
shape they are. The two datasets actually have a very similar variance (σ2 = 0.0096
for the criminality development model and σ2 = 0.0078 for the radicalisation
model), but this similarity hides the stark difference that for the radicalisation model
the majority of people have a very low propensity for terrorism while just a few are
extreme outliers, whereas propensity is far more evenly distributed for the crim-
inality development model. This is illustrated better by the histograms in Figure
6.8, which show clearly that the propensities in the criminality development model
are approximately normally distributed, while for the radicalisation model they are
heavily skewed.
A second observation of interest from the graphs in Figure 6.7 is that those indi-
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Figure 6.8: Histogram showing the distribution of propensities for crime or terrorism for
the two models at time t = 260
viduals with the highest propensities for terrorism in the radicalisation model are
not the same individuals who have the highest propensity for crime in the crimi-
nality development model; indeed the correlation between the two datasets is only
0.222. To explain why this might be it is worth examining the individual attributes
(SPI and self-control) of the individuals with the highest propensity levels at time
t = 260 in more detail to understand how much influence these attributes actually
have. This analysis reveals that those with the highest propensities for terrorism
are more likely to have very high levels of SPI and low levels of self-control, while
those with a higher propensity for crime are more likely to have high levels of SPI
and also higher than average levels of self-control (it is worth noting here that in
general self-control is weakly negatively correlated with propensity for both mod-
els). These differences go some way towards explaining why it is that the individ-
uals with the highest propensities are not the same for both models. An additional
difference between the two models comes from comparing the criminogenity levels
and radicalisation levels of the settings at time t = 260; as with the propensities,
there is a low correlation between the two (only 0.182).
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6.3.1 Summary
To summarise, comparing the outputs of the criminal propensity development
model with the radicalisation model running in a socially unstable environment has
revealed that:
• The two models produce different distributions of propensities across the pop-
ulation, with the distribution for the criminal propensity development model
being approximately normal and that for the radicalisation model being highly
positively skewed;
• The individuals with a high propensity for normal crime are not the same
people as those who would become radicalised in an unstable environment;
• The settings with the highest radicalising influence are not the same as the
most criminogenic settings.
Therefore, from the analysis undertaken on the respective models representing the
criminality development and radicalisation processes, it can be concluded that even
when the radicalisation is taking place in a war-torn, highly socially disorganised
environment, the two processes are not at all alike. However the mechanisms con-
necting the components in each process are the same: the differences arise purely
as a result of the parameters chosen.
6.4 Extension to Include Virtual Settings
The importance of “virtual settings” in how people gain exposure to radicalising
moral contexts is one that has not yet been considered in this thesis, but should not
be ignored: modern terrorist organisations such as Daesh have shown themselves
to have a sophisticated knowledge of how the internet can be used to reach out to
potential recruits, with promotional videos of their atrocities uploaded to YouTube
and advertised via supportive Twitter users (Irshaid, 2014). Therefore if the models
are ever to be of potential use to practitioners in future they need to be sufficiently
flexible to allow for online radicalisation to happen. This short section explores how
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virtual settings could be incorporated into the models, but stops short of doing so in
practice as it is not of direct relevance to the primary research question.
The literature on how influential the internet is as part of the radicalisation pro-
cess is sparse, as most studies examining the internet’s role have focussed on the
“supply” side of what terrorist material is available to view online, rather than the
“demand” side of what effect such material has on those who come into contact with
it (Edwards and Gribbon, 2013, p. 41). However some research has been carried out
concerning the role of the internet in 15 individual cases of radicalisation as part of
a RAND study (Von Behr et al., 2013). The cases showed considerable variation
according to each individual’s age and role in their respective terrorist organisa-
tions: for instance, an older recruiter interviewed for the study needed face-to-face
meetings to sell his ideas during the 1990s, but in the 21st century he could used the
internet for the same purpose and so reach a wider audience. The younger intervie-
wees used a wider range of online tools, such as BitTorrent for sharing information,
and social media sites for fostering a sense of community. On this last point, pre-
vious research had also noted that the internet provides a means by which disparate
people with extreme views can find each other, allowing them to encourage each
other without their views being challenged — essentially acting as an echo-chamber
(Post, 2005, p. 10).
The ways in which terrorist recruiters use the internet for radicalisation must be
put into context with internet use more generally, as this itself varies enormously
across the population. Kozinets (2009) has studied general online culture, and he
has observed that people become integrated into online communities via a gradual
process. This process begins with a person browsing — that is, merely reading
about the subject from a passive perspective. They then progress to being “lurkers”,
where they will observe the interactions of others in the online community but not
participate themselves. After some time they may then decide to take part in discus-
sions themselves, starting out as “newbies” before eventually becoming “insiders”.
However the process of online integration is not a conveyor belt, and the people who
get to the end of the process and become “insiders” are very much in the minority.
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Indeed, studies including Berger and Strathearn’s research into online extremism
have found evidence to support the “90-9-1 rule”, which suggests that 90% of users
of online discussion groups are passive, 9% are somewhat engaged, and 1% drive
most of the discussion (2013).
So what does all this tell us about the radicalisation process online? The cases
considered in the RAND study provide further support for the IVEE framework as a
means of synthesising what we know about radicalisation, as the individual journeys
undertaken by each of the cases can still be interpreted in terms of IVEE. As with
physical settings, people can either happen across radicalising websites accidentally
or look for them deliberately, and the likelihood of them doing either depends on
self- and social selective factors. And, as with physical settings, when somebody
does become exposed to a radicalising narrative on a website, whether it has an
effect on their morality depends on their personal cognitive susceptibility: indeed
one of the RAND study’s cases observed that the echo-chamber effect depends on
the individual consumer in question, what they are seeking, and how far along the
radicalisation journey they are (Edwards and Gribbon, 2013, p. 45).
As online radicalisation is compatible with IVEE it follows that it can be integrated
into the model; the question is how best to do so. In the original version of the
model the attributes of the physical settings are their location, size, collective effi-
cacy, and radicalisation level — the latter being a dependent variable and the others
being constant over time for each setting. For virtual settings there are no locations,
and therefore no cost for a person to visit them — anyone with an internet-enabled
device can visit any webpage with ease (with certain exceptions, such as those re-
quiring membership or those forming part of the dark net). Also a webpage does
not have a “size” as such, although some webpages attract many more visitors than
others. The size variable can therefore be re-interpreted for virtual settings to make
it represent a website’s overall popularity. Collective efficacy can similarly be made
applicable to online settings by re-defining it so that it takes into consideration the
level of moderation attached to websites where people can post comments or update
their status.
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So far these attributes of settings do not pose a problem and can easily be re-
configured for virtual settings. However it is with the dependent variable — rad-
icalisation level — where we find a difficulty. In the original model a setting’s
radicalisation level is calculated by taking into consideration the propensities of all
the people who visit that setting. For a virtual setting there could be millions of
visitors from anywhere in the world, meaning that for the radicalisation level of
virtual settings to be calculated the simulation would have to cover the entire of the
world’s online population, and thus the whole simulation would have to cover the
whole world. This is clearly infeasible. A similar problem arises when considering
how many virtual settings should be incorporated into the model, as the size of the
internet runs to several billion webpages.
An alternative approach would be rather than modelling each website separately,
instead to merge virtual settings together into grouped entities according to their
radicalisation level. The size of each entity would represent the overall popularity
of all websites of that radicalisation level, so that if a website becomes more extreme
this would be modelled by a change in the size of the relevant entities rather than
a change in their radicalisation levels. This means that for virtual settings in the
model the dependent variable would be size, and radicalisation level would be an
independent constant.
The next question concerns time. A person can only be in one physical location at a
time, and they are always located somewhere, so the total amount of time they spend
at physical settings in the model has to sum to their total waking hours. However the
total amount of time spent online varies from person to person, as does the length of
time they spend visiting webpages of differing levels of radicalising influence. This
does not pose a problem for the model from a theoretical perspective however, as
the total amount of time spent online could be modelled as an individual attribute
of each person. Research into the amount of time that people from different socio-
demographic groups spend online and the types of sites visited has been carried out
by Oxford Internet Surveys (2015) for a number of years, and this could be used to
parameterise this part of the model.
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Additionally, a new exposure transition would need to be devised in order to deter-
mine the level of influence that a webpage has on the individual viewing it. This
would likely be similar to the negative binomial function used for physical settings,
but with some added complexity regarding how the x3 (exposure to radicalising
narratives) parameter is calculated in order to integrate the 90-9-1 rule.
Extending the simulation to include virtual settings is thus entirely feasible, but
would require certain questions to be answered first in order to ensure that the model
could be correctly parameterised. These questions include how popular are websites
of differing levels of extremism, how much of a radicalised person’s time online is
spent looking at extremist websites, and what is the relationship between an individ-
ual’s cognitive susceptibility, the amount of time they spend on extremist websites,
and their propensity for terrorism.

Chapter 7
Using the Models For
Interventions
The past three chapters have sought to develop models describing the criminal de-
velopment and radicalisation processes, test their credibility and stability, and fi-
nally put the models to use by generating an initial answer to the primary research
question. This chapter seeks to further explore the potential utility of the models
by investigating how interventions can be incorporated into the simulations. This
will provide further insight into the research question, as it is possible that while the
two development processes have been shown to be different, an intervention that is
known to be effective against criminality development may also be effective against
radicalisation, and vice versa. Equally it is also possible that an intervention that is
effective against one process actually proves to be ineffective or counter-productive
when used against the other.
Before exploring this question using the models, let us first consider the similarities
and differences between the interventions most often used in the fields of counter-
radicalisation and crime prevention from a real world perspective.
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7.1 Counter-Radicalisation
7.1.1 Overview of UK Counter-Radicalisation Policy
In the UK counter-radicalisation falls under the remit of the Prevent strand of the
government’s wider counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. The Prevent strategy’s
aim is “to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism”, which it at-
tempts to achieve by meeting three objectives:
• Challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it;
• Protecting vulnerable people; and
• Supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation
(HMG, 2011).
There are a number of vehicles that have been put in place by the government to
facilitate the achievement of these objectives. Legislation is one such vehicle, with
the 2000 Terrorism Act allowing the Home Secretary to proscribe any organisation
believed to be involved in terrorism (HMG, 2013). There is also the Channel pro-
gramme, to which people identified as being vulnerable to radicalisation are steered.
The Channel programme works alongside Prevent and describes itself as “a multi-
agency approach to protect people at risk from radicalisation” (HMG, 2012, p. 4).
Channel support can consist of a range of interventions, from engaging people in
constructive leisure activities, to one-on-one mentoring (HMG, 2012, p. 21).
Prevent is not a “silver bullet”; those involved with its implementation, especially
in the early days, admit to making mistakes and that delivery of the strategy was
a process of trial and error (Chaudhury and Fenwick, 2011, p. 48). There were no
benchmarks, templates, or best practices to follow. While counter-terrorism poli-
cies had been introduced previously in order to combat the threat of terrorism from
separatist Northern Irish groups, these were generally restricted to target harden-
ing measures. Counter-radicalisation policies were limited to those restricting press
coverage of political groups with terrorist links such as Sinn Fein. The purpose of
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this was to limit the amount of publicity they received, publicity having famously
been described by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as the “oxygen” of
terrorism (Lewis, 2005, p. 7). This restriction has long been rescinded, and while
some have argued that it did damage Sinn Fein’s reputation by denying it an aura
of legitimacy (Wilkinson, 2006, p. 350), such a ban would be ineffective in today’s
internet age, and could even be counter-productive by forcing those in pursuit of
information about the groups towards the terrorists’ own propaganda.
The Prevent strategy was written in 2006 but was revised in 2011 following a re-
view. The new version intended to address a number of controversial issues raised
about Prevent in its original form, in particular that its allocation of regional fund-
ing according to the number of Muslim inhabitants made Muslim communities feel
stigmatised (Richards, 2011; Kundnani, 2009). The strategy was also more gener-
ally criticised for impinging on civil liberties, and the government faced accusations
that they were using Prevent as a means of spying on innocent people (Kundnani,
2009; Vidino and Brandon, 2012).
In an effort to address these issues the new version of Prevent encompasses violent
extremism more generally rather than focusing on Islamism. Funding is now allo-
cated to regions according to risk (as informed by intelligence) rather than purely
demographics, making the new strategy more targeted (Vidino and Brandon, 2012,
p. 18). It also looks more towards preventing extremist ideas rather than specifically
preventing violence, the government’s argument being that “some terrorist ideolo-
gies draw on and make use of extremist ideas which are espoused and circulated
by apparently non-violent organisations” and “preventing radicalisation must mean
challenging extremist ideas that are conducive to terrorism” (Choudhury, 2012,
p. 25).
However despite these changes the Prevent strategy remains controversial among
certain communities. As already discussed, the radicalisation process is not a simple
conveyor-belt whereby people start by holding extremist views before migrating
towards violent action, and the new strategy’s focus on extremist ideas could take
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resources away from more effective interventions. The new strategy has also not
solved the problem that when funding is allocated to a specific community that
community feels stigmatised.
The controversies surrounding Prevent funding can have other unintended conse-
quences. Some organisations have misrepresented themselves in grant applications
to make their activities seem connected to Prevent when they are not, while some
areas have exaggerated the level of jihadi activity in their communities to increase
their likelihood of funding (Chaudhury and Fenwick, 2011, p. 57). Funding has also
been a source of resentment between communities, for instance the Sikh Commu-
nity Action Network complained in 2009 that Prevent was “a dedicated £80 million
fund for the Muslim sector” while other religions were forgotten (Vidino and Bran-
don, 2012, p. 16). This increase in inter-community tensions may provide fuel for
those trying to incite hatred.
Although the Prevent strategy faces criticism, the 2011 review does demonstrate a
desire on the part of the government to learn from their previous mistakes and to
make Prevent more effective as it matures. There is evidently still a need for more
research into the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation measures in order to refine
Prevent further.
7.1.2 Methods for De- and Counter-radicalisation
Counter-radicalisation is often used as a catch-all term, encompassing any project
or intervention that aims to prevent people becoming terrorists. It covers de-
radicalisation (turning an existing radical away from militancy), disengagement
(where an existing radical simply ceases their involvement but may still hold ex-
tremist views), and preventing people becoming radicalised in the first place. It
is therefore unsurprising that the literature shows an enormous variety of projects
and interventions have been suggested for counter-radicalisation, from “soft” ap-
proaches such as encouraging debate in schools and communities (Korteweg, 2010;
HMG, 2010), and encouraging social cohesion through youth groups (Innes, 2006;
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Bhui et al., 2012), through to much harder approaches such as expelling radical
preachers (O’Duffy, 2008; Korteweg, 2010), targeting “gatekeepers” (individuals
who provide links to terrorist networks) for arrest (Taarnby, 2005), and bringing in
longer or harsher prison sentences for terrorism offensives as a deterrent (Miller,
2013). These projects all share an aim of preventing people committing acts of
terrorism, but they do so in a variety of different ways.
Examples of specific projects demonstrate the range of ways that organisations hope
to stop people becoming radicalised. Simple methods such as promoting a counter-
narrative include the theatre production “From one extreme to the other” that toured
schools across the North West of the UK, reaching over 50,000 children from de-
prived areas, and the DVD-based lesson programme “Getting on together” that pro-
vides a robust critique of Islamic extremism (Vidino and Brandon, 2012, p. 13).
Simple counter-narratives such as these serve two purposes: they seek to strengthen
an individual’s ability to make good moral decisions, and they discourage the indi-
vidual from choosing to put themselves in a setting where they may be exposed to
radical ideas. To relate this to the IVEE framework, counter-narratives seek to af-
fect both an individual’s cognitive susceptibility and self-selection. Groups putting
out counter-narratives include government organisations such as the Home Office’s
Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), and charities such as
Radical Middle Way, and the Strategy to Reach Empower and Educate Teenagers
(STREET) (Briggs and Feve, 2013, pp. 42, 54).
This last group, STREET, engages in wider projects in addition to simply putting
out counter-narratives. As one of the non-governmental organisations that partici-
pate in the Channel scheme, they offer individualised support, such as theological
guidance and mentoring, and provision of welfare support (Barclay, 2011). In one
case of an individual who had served time in prison for offences under the Terrorism
Act, STREET’s package of measures included career planning and access to new
social networks to help him break ties with his old extremist associates (Barclay,
2011, p. 10). STREET’s support can therefore also affect the social selection part
of the IVEE process, by steering people away from radicalising settings who might
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otherwise have been swept along through their involvement in violent gangs or other
forms of criminality. The key to STREET’s success has been put down to both their
theological knowledge and their cultural knowledge of the South London youths
with whom they engage, which make their staff both credible and influential.
However not all projects initiated under the auspices of Prevent have been so
successful. One high-profile example was a public debate in Tower Hamlets in
2007/2008 run by the Cordoba Foundation, who had received £38,000 in Prevent
funding. The debate pitched Muslim Brotherhood speakers against pro-jihad speak-
ers from Hizb-ut Tahrir. The pro-jihadists won the debate, resulting in 78% of the
audience voting that “political participation had failed Muslims” (Vidino and Bran-
don, 2012, p. 16).
While this incident was clearly an unintended own goal, many other Prevent-funded
projects have had less obvious but similarly negative consequences. Communities
in receipt of Prevent funding are considered “suspect”, and this can lead people
in these communities to refuse to engage with Prevent (Kundnani, 2009, p. 25),
resulting in those on the path to radicalisation not being given help to break out of
the process. A lack of buy-in from communities also means that those who have
already been radicalised may not be brought to the attention of the authorities. And
even worse, if the communities feel alienated this could contribute to the process of
radicalisation itself, by increasing the exposure people in that community have to
any radicalising elements within it (Spalek et al., 2008, p. 17).
Overall, Prevent’s credibility has suffered from the lack of assessment done on the
impact of the projects that it is funding, both positive and negative. A Prevent-
funded project that is not having a net positive effect is at best a waste of public
money and at worst a contributor to the tensions that fuel violence and terrorism in
the first place. That said, the 2011 Prevent strategy does include a section on eval-
uation, and it highlights that “performance monitoring and evaluation have been a
weakness of the Prevent strategy. We cannot afford for that to continue.” (HMG,
2011, p. 102). The strategy goes on to say that the government will carry out per-
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formance assessments and measure the impact of projects using such metrics as
“the number of individuals no longer assessed as being vulnerable” (HMG, 2011,
p. 102). However these performance assessments are unlikely to be published, mak-
ing it difficult to know how well Prevent really is being evaluated. Apart from
official government performance assessments the number of rigorous evaluations
of counter-terrorism measures is woefully low, but those that have been done re-
veal that some interventions have had negative or displacement effects rather than
positive effects (Enders and Sandler, 1993; Lum et al., 2006). Lum et al. recom-
mend that more evaluations need to be carried out, looking at both the outcome
effectiveness of interventions, and the social, political, economic and psychological
effects.
If they can be demonstrated to have the potential to be effective, computer simula-
tions such as those developed in this thesis may provide an additional tool that can
be used to assist with evaluations in the future.
7.2 Measures to Prevent Criminality Development
Unlike radicalisation, there is no single government policy in place to prevent peo-
ple from developing the propensity to commit crimes in general. And in seeking
to prevent crime, many interventions are devised to target the “action” part of the
process rather than the “development” part, meaning that they seek to alter situa-
tional factors through such means as target hardening, increasing surveillance, and
reducing the temptation to break the law (Clarke, 1997). Ekblom (2005) gives an
overview of measures that can be used to prevent crime by disrupting the “conjunc-
tion of criminal opportunity” and splits them into 11 categories which he places on a
spectrum, with offender-oriented measures at one end and situational interventions
at the other.
The development of an individual’s propensity for crime is very much offender-
oriented, making interventions at this end of the spectrum likely to have a signif-
icant impact on the process. However, interventions that are designed to be more
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situational in nature may also have an effect on criminality development. Examples
come from across the whole of Ekblom’s spectrum: for instance his third cate-
gory consists of interventions that seek to tackle an individual’s readiness to offend,
including the control of stressors and motivators such as tackling unemployment.
Unemployed individuals have more free time in which they may become exposed
to criminogenic settings, and so providing a person with employment may reduce
the likelihood that they develop the propensity to commit crime.
Similarly, Ekblom’s fifth category of interventions affect an individual’s decision to
commit an offence, and therefore consists of measures targeting the “action” level
of the causes of crime. This category includes deterrence measures such as im-
prisonment; imprisonment operates at the situational level by removing individuals
with the propensity to commit crime from society for the period of their custodial
sentence, making them unable to commit further crimes in that time. But it also
affects the development of crime propensity more widely, as individuals who are
incarcerated are less able to influence the morality of those on the outside.
Another example is at the situational end of the spectrum, from Ekblom’s tenth cat-
egory which consists of measures used by on-the-ground crime preventers, such as
extra surveillance around likely targets. Increasing surveillance can also operate at
the developmental level by making a person less likely to go to criminogenic set-
tings, which will in turn prevent them becoming exposed to criminogenic influences
and reduce the likelihood that their morality changes as a consequence.
However, as with counter-radicalisation schemes, crime prevention measures can
have an array of unintended consequences. For situational crime prevention in par-
ticular one negative consequence can be displacement, which is where an offender
will simply commit their intended crimes in a different location (Tilley, 2005, p. 5).
Offender-oriented measures can also have their disadvantages, for instance if they
target a group of people based on risk factors and in doing so they engineer associ-
ation between fellow likely offenders. Certain measures such as “Stop and Search”
also have ethical downsides similar to those affecting the Prevent programme, such
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as targeting “false positives” — people who have risk factors associated with crim-
inality, but who do not themselves have a strong propensity for crime (Ekblom,
2005; Tilley, 2005).
In order to weigh up the pros and cons of implementing a particular crime preven-
tion measure, a method called SARA has been developed and is commonly used
to aid policy makers and practitioners (Karn, 2013, p. 20). The method consists
of four stages: Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment, and it ensures that
organisational and local community concerns surrounding the implementation of
a particular initiative are included in the decision making process, and that initia-
tives undergo a thorough evaluation. The method has however been criticised for
overly simplifying a complex process that rarely follows a linear path (Bullock and
Tilley, 2009). The use of computer simulations to trial these measures prior to im-
plementation may therefore provide an additional tool that can be used alongside
SARA.
7.3 Mechanisms
This section takes four examples of interventions that focus on preventing crime
and four that focus on preventing radicalisation, and considers in what way they af-
fect the causal mechanisms in the process of propensity development. These eight
interventions will then be incorporated into the computer simulations for crime
propensity development and for radicalisation to enable their impacts to be sim-
ulated.
But first, it must be highlighted that — as with the simulations themselves — the
way interventions will be incorporated into the models is theoretical. The imple-
mentation of actual interventions requires a substantial amount of project man-
agement and constant evaluation as to whether a programme is being delivered as
intended and is having the hoped-for outcomes (Herman et al., 1987; Owen and
Rogers, 1999). For the purpose of this thesis the interventions to be incorporated
into the simulations will be assumed to have been implemented correctly and to be
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having the intended direct consequences. Based on this assumption the simulations
will then be able to identify any indirect consequences.
The four interventions seeking to prevent criminality that will be incorporated into
the model are:
• Early childhood interventions;
• Imprisonment;
• Overt surveillance;
• Reducing unemployment.
The four counter-radicalisation measures to be incorporated into the model
are:
• General promotion of a counter-narrative;
• Targeted counter-narrative;
• Encouraging social cohesion through youth groups;
• Channel intervention on high-risk individual.
The aim of an early childhood intervention is to enhance the health and well-being
of children aged from birth to five years, particularly for children born to fami-
lies with significant risk factors such as being from disadvantaged communities or
born to teenage mothers (Homel, 2005). Much research has been carried out into
the efficacy of these measures, with several studies producing significant results:
one example is the Elmira Project which ran in New York for two years, and in-
volved home visits to 400 first-time young, single and/or low socio-economic status
mothers. A follow-up after 15 years found that the children of the mothers visited
had less than half as many arrests as the children of control mothers, and they also
smoked and drank less and had fewer sexual partners (Olds et al., 1998). Other
studies in different locations have seen similar successes, though some have noted
that success is restricted to certain participant groups (for instance, the Elmira study
saw positive outcomes only in high risk mothers), and others have highlighted the
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importance of commencing the intervention before the age of five (Homel, 2005).
This suggests that the mechanism targeted by this intervention is the capacity of
the children to exercise self-control — an attribute which, as discussed in Section
2.2.1, develops very early in life and may become impaired due to early exposure
to toxins. This intervention will therefore be incorporated into the simulations by
increasing the self-control of a group of individuals by a small amount before the
time-loop starts.
The mechanism targeted by imprisonment was touched upon in the previous section
but deserves further explanation. Imprisonment serves a number of purposes: it acts
as a deterrent to those who already have the propensity for crime, it reduces crime
directly by removing those with a propensity to offend from the streets and pre-
venting them committing further offences while they remain in prison, it provides
rehabilitation to the offender in the hopes that they will be less likely to reoffend in
future, and it acts as a punishment in order to give victims a sense that justice has
been done. The first and last of these have no impact on the mechanisms in the crim-
inality development model, but the second and third do. By removing an individual
with high propensity for crime from society for a time, they are less able to influence
others, and the settings that they frequented before their incarceration will become
less criminogenic as a result of their absence. And the rehabilitation provided by
prison should (one hopes) reduce the propensity of an individual to commit crime in
future. Imprisonment can therefore be incorporated into the simulations by adding
an additional “Prison” setting, to which people can get sent for a certain number of
time-steps if their propensity to commit crime becomes too high. While in prison,
they will be exempt from the effects of the exposure transition, and the Prison itself
will be exempt from the emergence transition; instead, the individual’s propensity
is decreased by a small amount each time-step.1
1This is obviously a simplification of the prison experience. A far larger version of the model
could be built that includes several prisons and has a large prison population, enabling exposure
and emergence to happen within prisons, and with the effects of prison rehabilitation programmes
being far more nuanced. The way prisons are incorporated into the model in this thesis is meant for
illustration purposes only, to provide an example of what the models can be made to do.
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Overt surveillance acts partly as a deterrent and partly as an element of the criminal
justice system. In its deterrence role, overt surveillance reduces the likelihood that
an individual with the propensity to offend will go to a setting with the intention of
doing so; in its latter role it increases the likelihood that an offender will be caught
and then convicted. In both cases surveillance acts on an individual who already
has the propensity to offend and therefore does not directly affect the criminality
development process. However, the element of the process that overt surveillance
does have an effect on is the collective efficacy of a setting, as a setting with a heavy
police presence or that is obviously overlooked by CCTV cameras is unlikely to be
thought of as a safe haven by offenders. This will therefore be incorporated into the
simulation by decreasing the collective efficacy coefficients of a number of settings
in the model.
Finally on the crime prevention front, the economic measure of reducing unemploy-
ment. This is not a specific crime prevention intervention per se, but it allows the
flexibility of the model to be demonstrated, by providing a means of exploring the
potential consequences of changing economic circumstances on crime. The imple-
mentation of this measure simply involves changing the proportion of employed
and unemployed people input to the model.
The four counter-radicalisation measures have a different focus in terms of mech-
anisms. An example of the general promotion of a counter-narrative would be
the material put out by the Home Office’s Research, Information and Communi-
cations Unit (RICU) and charities such as Radical Middle Way (Briggs and Feve,
2013). These organisations distribute audio-visual messaging both on and off-line,
and seek to reach as many vulnerable communities as possible. The aims of the
counter-narratives are to strengthen individuals’ knowledge of Islam (for narratives
seeking to counter Islamist extremism) and their ability to think critically, so that
they are less likely to become influenced by a radicalising narrative should they be-
come exposed to one. Counter-narratives also seek to discourage their audiences
from becoming exposed to radicalising influences in the first place. They therefore
affect two mechanisms in the radicalisation process: they strengthen an individ-
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ual’s resistance to the influence of their peers, and they reduce the likelihood that
individuals will choose to go to radicalising settings.
Organisations such as Radical Middle Way also deploy targeted counter-narratives
by engaging in outreach with specific at-risk communities. The causal mechanisms
that such programmes aim to disrupt are the same as for more general counter-
narratives, but they would be intended to have a greater impact on a smaller number
of people. The effects of the two different methods of promoting counter-narratives
can therefore be compared using the models, by altering the extent to which an
intervention reduces individuals’ SPI and the attractiveness of radicalising settings,
and the number of people affected by the interventions.
There are also a number of charities that encourage social cohesion through youth
groups. One such example is the Active Change Foundation, based in Waltham
Forest in East London. This charity carries out outreach and promotes counter-
narratives, but it also has its own youth club bringing together local young people
from an array of different ethnic groups. The youth club runs activities such as
outward bound adventure training, careers advice, and bringing in invited speak-
ers (Qadir, 2013; Active Change Foundation, 2015). Interventions such as these
target several mechanisms: they affect self-selection by encouraging young people
to spend their free time in a setting with high collective efficacy rather than in un-
monitored locations, and in doing so they reduce the likelihood of exposure to a
radicalising narrative. They also seek to strengthen the participants’ resistance to
peer influence. This intervention can be replicated in the model by declaring one of
the youth clubs to be a more attractive setting than the others, and giving it a lower
collective efficacy coefficient. Individuals who spend enough time at that youth
club will also have their SPI lowered by a small amount.
The final counter-radicalisation measure is a Channel intervention on a high-risk
individual. As discussed in Section 7.1, a Channel intervention can consist of a
range of measures which vary from individual to individual, and can include such
activities as encouraging people to participate in constructive pursuits, providing
232 Chapter 7. Using the Models For Interventions
educational or careers support, or one-on-one mentoring and cognitive behavioural
therapy (HMG, 2012). For the purposes of this illustration the Channel intervention
that will be programmed into the model will be deemed to consist of one-on-one
mentoring with psychological support that is intended to significantly reduce the
individual’s SPI and the likelihood that they will go to radicalising settings in the
future. The Channel intervention takes place over a set number of time-steps when
an individual’s propensity to commit terrorism gets sufficiently high.
The next section will examine the outputs from the criminality development and
radicalisation models when these interventions are incorporated.
7.4 Model Behaviour
7.4.1 Relative Effectiveness of Crime Prevention Measures
As with the testing of the computer simulations that was carried out in previous
sections, the outputs coming from the versions of the model that include interven-
tions must be compared with some default version. The default settings for the
criminality development model were chosen to be the following:
• People input: 500 people spread evenly across the geographical area, with
self-control and SPI normally distributed as previously, and with socio-
demographic attributes evenly distributed. (This gives an unemployment rate
of 33%.)
• Settings input: The usual settings input based on Peterborough are used,
with the following distributions of collective efficacy coefficients: offices
have ω j = 0.6, schools have ω j = 0.8, and all other locations have ω j = 1.
• Emergence transition: Thresholds of ε = 0.2 and τ1 = 10 minutes were
used.
• Exposure transition: The negative binomial version of the exposure transi-
tion was used, with no time threshold and no exponential decay.
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Table 7.1: Crime prevention measures
Intervention Changes to the default
(1) Early childhood (a) Universal: Increase all individual’s self-control
by 0.2
(b) Targeted: Increase the self-control of the cohort
aged 16 at time t = 0 by 0.4
(2) Imprisonment Add a “Prison” to the settings input. Individuals
with propensity above 0.6 have a 50% chance of
going to prison for 26 time-steps. While in prison
their propensity reduces by 0.05 each time-step.
(3) Surveillance (a) Universal: all settings except private residences
have ω j = 0.8 (offices remain at ω j = 0.6)
(b) Targeted: all settings in South West Peterbor-
ough except private residences have ω j = 0.7
(offices remain at ω j = 0.6)
(4) Economic (a) Alter the occupation status of the people input
so that unemployment is at 10%
(b) Alter the occupation status of the people input
so that unemployment is at 5%
The interventions described in the previous section were then incorporated by al-
tering specific parts of the default model. One strength of the models lies in their
ability allow different implementations of interventions to be tested and their (sim-
ulated) outcomes compared; this can be demonstrated by incorporating some in-
terventions in two different ways in the models — for example surveillance being
spread thinly across the whole of the geographical area, or concentrated in one spe-
cific area. The changes made to the default for each intervention tested are detailed
in Table 7.1.
The models were run for 260 time-steps and the following outputs analysed:
• the mean propensity at t = 260,
• the maximum propensity at t = 260,
• and the number of people with propensity higher than 0.6 at t = 260.
Table 7.2 shows these outputs for the different interventions, and enables compar-
isons to be made between each intervention when implemented separately, and
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Table 7.2: Results of crime prevention interventions
Intervention Mean p Max p People with
at t = 260 at t = 260 p > 0.6
at t = 260
No intervention 0.286 0.668 3
(1a) Early child- 0.279 0.688 5
hood: universal
(1b) Early child- 0.274 0.709 3
hood: targeted
(2) Imprisonment 0.283 0.592 0
(3a) Surveillance: 0.221 0.551 0
universal
(3b) Surveillance: 0.246 0.600 0
targeted
(4a) Economic: 0.281 0.662 3
10% unemployed
(4b) Economic: 0.281 0.662 3
5% unemployed
Combined 0.218 0.577 0
when all four interventions are implemented together (the “combined” interven-
tion2).
These results are not intended to actually represent the relative impacts of imple-
menting these policies, as the parameters used in the model are purely hypothet-
ical and not based on any empirical data. However they do demonstrate the uses
to which the models could potentially be put, and in particular that certain poli-
cies could have complex consequences such as (for example) successfully bringing
down the mean propensity for crime across an area but not reducing the propensities
of the most criminal. The results also illustrate how the models could be used to
compare the impact of implementing a policy in a number of different ways, or in
combination with other policies.
2The combined intervention is the universal early childhood intervention, imprisonment, univer-
sal surveillance, and 5% unemployment.
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7.4.2 Relative Effectiveness of Radicalisation Prevention Mea-
sures
In the same way as with the criminality development model, the counter-
radicalisation measures explored in the previous section can be incorporated into
the computer simulation and the results compared with the default. For these tests
the default version of the radicalisation model is as follows:
• People input: 500 people spread evenly across the geographical area, with
self-control and SPI normally distributed as previously, and with socio-
demographic attributes evenly distributed. One individual has been made
particularly cognitively vulnerable with very high SPI and low self-control.
• Settings input: Identical to the criminality development model above.
• Emergence transition: Thresholds of ε = 0.1 and τ1 = 1 hour were used,
with the collective efficacy coefficients raised to the power of φ = 0.5.
• Exposure transition: The negative binomial exposure transition was used,
with β0 =−6.91, β1 = 0.9, β2 =−0.45, β12 = 0.05, and β3 = 0.028.
As with the interventions to prevent the development of criminality, the counter-
radicalisation measures discussed in the previous section can be incorporated into
the simulation in a number of different guises. The specific changes made to the
default radicalisation model to recreate these counter-radicalisation initiatives are
shown in Table 7.3. The simulations were then run for 260 time-steps and the
following outputs analysed:
• the mean propensity at t = 260,
• the maximum propensity at t = 260,
• and the number of people who are radicalised (i.e. with propensity higher
than 0.1228) at t = 260.
These results are shown in Table 7.4 for each intervention implemented separately
and the combination of all together.
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Table 7.3: Counter-radicalisation measures (numbering is continued from the criminality
prevention measures to facilitate later analysis)
Intervention Changes to the default
(5) Counter-narrative For settings with radicalisation level > 0.8,
- universal multiply the attractiveness factor W by 0.75.
All people have SPI reduced by 0.1.
(6) Counter-narrative At time t = 100, children at Nene Park Academy
- targeted event have their SPI reduced by 0.5. For these people
only from t = 100 onwards, for settings with
radicalisation level > 0.6 multiply the
attractiveness factor W by 0.6.
(7) Youth group PARCA Drop-In youth club is given a collective
efficacy coefficient of 0.6, and for this setting W
is multiplied by 1.2 for all people. Individuals
spending more than 2 hours at PARCA Drop-In
have their SPI reduced by 0.001 each time-step.
(8) Channel For individuals with propensity > 0.8, for 26 time-
intervention steps their SPI reduces by 0.001 each time-step.
During this period for settings with radicalisation
level > 0.6, W is multiplied by 0.75.
As before, the results in Table 7.4 are not intended to be accurate or to provide
policy guidance; they are meant as an illustration as to what use the models could
be put if they were correctly parameterised following a period of data collection.
For example if accurate results for the two different counter-narrative interventions
could be produced these simulation outputs could be used to provide an indication
as to how large a targeted intervention might have to be to have a significant impact
on disrupting radicalisation. A second example would be to demonstrate how much
more effective interventions might be if they are implemented in co-ordination with
other interventions.
7.4.3 Effects of Crime Interventions on Radicalisation, and Vice
Versa
The models also allow for experiments to be carried out exploring the impact that
interventions designed to prevent crime might have on radicalisation, and vice versa.
7.5. Summary 237
Table 7.4: Results of counter-radicalisation interventions
Intervention Mean p Max p No.
at t = 260 at t = 260 radicalised
at t = 260
No intervention 0.0169 0.9491 6
(5) Counter-narrative 0.0121 0.8724 5
— universal
(6) Counter-narrative 0.0136 0.9048 5
— targeted
(7) Youth group 0.0153 0.9290 6
(8) Channel 0.0130 0.8184 5
intervention
Combination 0.0016 0.0318 0
For example Table 7.5 shows the results when crime prevention interventions (1) to
(4) are implemented in the radicalisation model. Equivalent results when counter-
radicalisation measures (5) to (8) are applied to the criminality development model
are shown in Table 7.6.
As with before, it must be emphasised that no useable policy conclusions can be
drawn from these theoretical models. However it is encouraging to observe that
the models suggest the overall most effective intervention on all three counts for
the radicalisation model is the counter-radicalisation combination. Similarly for
the criminality development model the crime prevention combination is the most
successful intervention overall. This provides some sense that the results produced
by the models are credible despite them being highly theoretical, and that with
sufficient data they could be refined into tools that might serve a useful practical
purpose.
7.5 Summary
This chapter started with an overview of the UK Government policy on counter-
radicalisation and explored a number of specific interventions, followed by a simi-
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Table 7.5: Impact of crime prevention interventions on radicalisation
Intervention Mean p Max p No.
at t = 260 at t = 260 radicalised
at t = 260
(1a) Early child- 0.0156 0.9417 6
hood: universal
(1b) Early child- 0.0165 0.9460 6
hood: targeted
(2) Imprisonment 0.0067 0.3824 2
(3a) Surveillance: 0.0159 0.9420 7
universal
(3b) Surveillance: 0.0110 0.7823 5
targeted
(4a) Economic: 0.0137 0.9155 6
10% unemployed
(4b) Economic: 0.0156 0.9575 7
5% unemployed
Combination 0.0105 0.8417 4
lar analysis of interventions used to prevent the development of criminal propensity.
Ways to incorporate these interventions into the computer simulations were then
considered, before the simulations were run with the interventions incorporated, to
investigate whether they had any effect on preventing criminality or radicalisation
among the simulated people. A comparison of the effectiveness of different inter-
ventions was then undertaken using the models.
The final chapter will examine the impact of these findings, and those from the
previous chapters, and consider further applications for the research.
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Table 7.6: Impact of counter-radicalisation interventions on criminality
Intervention Mean p Max p People with
at t = 260 at t = 260 p > 0.6
at t = 260
(5) Counter-narrative 0.274 0.642 2
— universal
(6) Counter-narrative 0.286 0.669 3
— targeted
(7) Youth group 0.280 0.629 3
(8) Channel 0.284 0.657 3
intervention
Combination 0.269 0.601 1

Chapter 8
Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter reviews the research detailed in the previous chapters, in particular
considering whether the research question has been answered successfully, whether
the research design was fit for purpose, and what the limitations of the research are.
Applications for the research and alternative fields to which it could be applied are
also considered.
8.1 The Research Question
The primary research question presented at the end of Chapter 2 which this thesis
intended to answer was: are the radicalisation process and the process by which peo-
ple develop the propensity to commit crime indistinguishable? This was answered
by collating the findings of a number of different pieces of empirical research that
had been conducted on different aspects of the criminality development process,
using this to build a model replicating the process, identifying areas where radical-
isation is different from criminality development, adapting the criminality develop-
ment model into a model describing radicalisation, and finally running simulations
of both processes to explore their similarities and differences.
An initial attempt to answer the research question came at the end of Chapter 6,
where the two models were compared both in terms of their descriptions and in
terms of the outputs from the simulations. However radicalisation is a far more
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rare occurrence in normal UK society than the process by which people develop the
propensity to commit crime, meaning that unless the simulation is run with very
large numbers of people (which would take a very long time, thereby causing the
model to become unworkable) it was not likely that the process of radicalisation
would ever happen, making it impossible to draw a comparison. In order to make
the comparison the environment for the radicalisation model was changed so that it
replicated a location lacking any social cohesion, as it is locations such as these (for
example in conflict zones) where radicalisation is more likely to occur.
When the radicalisation simulation was run on such an environment it was found
that the people who became radicalised were not the same as the people who devel-
oped the highest propensity for normal crime in the criminality development model.
It was also found that the distribution of propensities for crime and radicalisation
at the end of the simulation was very different, with the distribution of propensities
for normal crime being approximately normally distributed and the distribution of
propensities for terrorism being highly skewed. While it is difficult to obtain accu-
rate empirical data on the numbers of people in society who have the propensity for
crime or who have become radicalised, this result is consistent with what has been
observed in the real world, as terrorism when it occurs is very rare, but many of
those with the propensity to carry it out would have almost no limit as to what they
might be prepared to do. This result is also consistent with that observed in the real
world as regards who commits terrorist offences, as while some convicted terrorists
have histories of ciminal activity, many do not.
In Chapter 7 interventions were explored and incorporated into the simulations. It
was found that interventions specifically aimed at countering radicalisation were
more effective against the radicalisation process than interventions targeted at re-
ducing more general criminality, and vice versa. This lent further support to the
argument already suggested by the models in Chapter 6 that, despite both processes
being well described by the IVEE framework, there are fundamental differences
between them, and interventions should be targeted accordingly.
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In summary, through using simulation modelling of the two processes we have suc-
cessfully answered the research question. The two processes follow the same theo-
retical framework, but there are differences in the relative importance of some causal
factors within that framework, and this leads to differences in the behaviour of the
processes which is sufficiently significant that interventions are more effective when
they are deliberately designed to target one or other of the processes.
8.2 Key Findings
Aside from answering the research question, the simulation models developed in
this thesis have also produced a number of interesting results which are worth high-
lighting.
The first of these is that while the interventions implemented in Chapter 7 showed
that counter-radicalisation interventions were more effective at reducing radicalisa-
tion than at reducing people’s propensities to commit crime (and vice versa), they
also showed that in some cases there was a diffusion of benefits effect, as many of
the interventions tested had a positive impact on both criminal and terrorist propen-
sity — although some did not. It must be reiterated once again that these models
are too theoretical to provide guidance on the impact of interventions, but it is clear
that if the models were correctly calibrated and the interventions more realistically
implemented, that these simulations would be capable of demonstrating whether a
diffusion of benefits effect existed. They can also be used to test the effects of dif-
ferent implementations or “dosages” of an intervention, as some interventions were
modelled both as “universal” (affecting all agents weakly) or “targeted” (affecting a
sub-section of the population more strongly). The models are also flexible enough
to use a variety of different metrics for measuring the effects of interventions.
A second finding worth noting is that the propensities of the individuals in the crim-
inality development model remained quite stable relative to each other, even when
substantial changes were made to the exposure transition. The impact of introduc-
ing thresholds in the transitions was also significant in reducing the propensities
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of the individuals, and also in causing the criminogenity levels of the settings to
vary — thus making each individual’s activity field and their level of exposure to
criminalising moral contexts more important in determining their propensity. This
highlights the importance of ensuring that future models are correctly calibrated,
and suggests that further research on the length of time people need to spend in
criminogenic settings in order to be influenced by them is needed.
The third key finding worth highlighting is that the radicalisation model was capable
of producing very interesting patterns of propensities. In particular, when experi-
ments were conducted to examine the effect of changing the value of parameter β3,
the resulting graphs at Figure 6.1 showed examples where an initially large amount
of radicalisation diminished over time. While not explicitly one of the stylised facts
against which the model was validated, the capacity of the model to produce di-
minishing levels of radicalisation in a population is important, as such situations do
occur in the real world.
The final finding of particular interest is the differences between the distributions
of propensity for crime and propensity for terrorism across the population produced
by the two models when answering the research question in Section 6.3. The two
different models were able to produce realistic and very different distributions of
propensity: the distribution for the criminality development model was close to
normal, and the distribution for the radicalisation model was more skewed, and had
a far smaller mean and variance (with a couple of outliers representing radicals).
Also of note was the fact that the individuals with the highest propensity for crime
were not the same as those with the highest propensity for terrorism. This shows
that if there were sufficient data to calibrate the models correctly, the models hold a
great deal of promise in being capable of producing realistic results.
8.3 Suitability of Modelling as a Technique
We have seen that the research question was successfully answered using the in-
tended methodology, but the question still remains as to whether the decision to
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use modelling as the main tool in this research project was the right one. Here we
consider the way the models were developed, analysed, and validated in the course
of the project, and review whether these techniques were effective.
8.3.1 Model Development
The methodology used to answer the research question relied heavily on the as-
sumption that developing models replicating the criminality development and rad-
icalisation processes was feasible, and in particular that the models would be of a
low enough level of abstraction to allow the differences between the two processes
to be identified.
The first stage of model development used empirical research previously conducted
by social science researchers which was synthesised using the IVEE framework.
The IVEE framework was then re-structured in the form of a Petri net in order
to describe it in a procedural way, thereby allowing the model to be coded as a
computer simulation. Up to this point, the criminality development and radicalisa-
tion processes appeared identical, as both could be modelled using the same IVEE
framework and Petri net.
The distinguishing features of the two separate processes only became apparent
when the models were parameterised. For the criminality development model this
was carried out using data collected from previous empirical studies. For the radi-
calisation model there was insufficient data available for the parameters to be esti-
mated accurately, however common-sense logical assumptions regarding the preva-
lence of radicalisation in society dictated that certain parameters needed to be al-
tered from the values they held in the criminality development model. Suitable
values for the parameters in the radicalisation model were then established via a
trial-and-error approach, using the outputs from the simulation as a guide to ensure
that radicalisation happened with a realistic frequency. While this method would be
inadequate for constructing models intended to predict the spread of radicalisation,
for models that merely seek to identify the similarities and differences between two
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processes this approach was sufficient.
This flexible approach to model development came about as a consequence of the
nature of the research question combined with the lack of data surrounding the
radicalisation process. This demonstrates that even where information is severely
lacking, developing models can still be a useful exercise and provide insight into
complex areas of social science. Not only that, but without developing the models
to the extent that specific values for the parameters were needed, the differences
between the two processes would not have been clarified. Additionally, the models
developed in this thesis point the direction that further sociological research could
take, and open up the possibility that such models could have operational utility in
the future. Overall therefore it is concluded that the model development part of the
research design was adequately suited to answering the research question.
8.3.2 Model Analysis
Following the development of the models the research design also involved a con-
siderable amount of model analysis. This analysis took several different forms and
served a number of purposes.
The first stage of analysing the models consisted of stress-testing the criminality
development model, by altering the inputs and the values of the parameters to as-
certain the effect that this had on the model’s outputs. The outputs used for these
comparisons varied according to the parameter or input being altered; for instance
where changes were made to how activity fields were calculated the outputs of in-
terest were the activity fields themselves, while for changes made to the parameters
in the emergence or exposure transitions the outputs of interest were the propensi-
ties of the people in the model at the end of the simulation and the criminogenity
levels of the settings. The analysis conducted at this stage mostly consisted of a
visual comparison of the output graphs, as only a general overview of the impact of
changing the inputs and parameters was required.
The second stage concerned the analysis of the radicalisation model. As discussed
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above, realistic parameters for the radicalisation model needed to be ascertained
based on the way the model behaved. In order to do this, the model outputs were
analysed in a very similar way to the analysis done for the criminality development
model, with the specific outputs of interest being the number of people radicalised
at the end of the simulation and people’s propensities for terrorism. This analysis
took the form of a visual comparison of output graphs showing how average propen-
sity changes over time, and a quantitative comparison of the number of people radi-
calised for different parameter values. While for the criminality development model
the purpose of the analysis was to check how robust the model was, for the radicali-
sation model the analysis informed what the definition of the model should actually
be.
The purpose of the third stage of analysis was to answer the research question. This
stage of analysis consisted of a comparison of both the outputs and descriptions of
the two models. The analysis of the descriptions was a direct comparison of the
values held by the parameters and any other changes made to the transitions. The
differences between the outputs of the models were then analysed by comparing the
distribution of propensities using a histogram, and by comparing each individual’s
propensities at the end of both simulations. This analysis allowed conclusions to be
drawn regarding the similarities of the two processes.
A final stage of analysis was another comparison of the behaviours of the two pro-
cesses, but this time using alternative versions of the models where a number of
interventions had been incorporated. For this analysis the metrics used were the
mean average propensity level of all people in the model, the maximum propensity
of all people in the model, and the number of people in the model with a propensity
higher than a certain level. This range of metrics allowed the differences between
the impact of interventions to be observed in cases where one intervention reduces
the propensity of all people by a small amount while another reduces the propensity
of only the most criminally-minded or radical by a large amount.
The analysis methods used in this research were not complicated and there was no
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requirement for any statistical hypothesis testing. The reason for this is that the
models were not intended to have a high degree of accuracy, and so there was no
need for any quantitative goodness-of-fit tests. Additionally the models developed
are deterministic models, so when a parameter is altered and the outputs change it
can immediately be concluded that the change occurred as a direct result of altering
that parameter. The usual null hypothesis in a statistical test — that changing a
parameter has no effect — would therefore always be rejected if any difference
(no matter how small) were observed. Thus a simple comparison was sufficient.
It is concluded that the methods used to analyse the models were appropriate and
effective at answering the research question.
8.3.3 Model Validation
The method used to validate the models was to compare the outputs from the sim-
ulations with a list of “stylised facts”, to see whether these were reproduced by the
models. A list of five stylised facts was compiled separately for the criminality de-
velopment model and the radicalisation model; these stylised facts were relatively
broad and concerned basic features of criminality and radicalisation in the real word
that the models needed to be able to replicate, such as the capacity for propensity to
go down as well as up, and for individual agents to all have different propensities.
The model outputs were largely found to replicate these phenomena (with some
caveats), and thus it was concluded that the models were sufficiently validated and
realistic to be used to answer the research question.
As has been discussed extensively at several points in this thesis, in an ideal world
there would be sufficient data available to both calibrate the models accurately and
then to validate them using statistical methods. However in the absence of such data,
alternative methods must be explored and the question asked as to whether these
methods are adequate. In the case of the models in this thesis, it was acknowledged
from the start that they would be theoretical models whose primary purpose was to
further understanding of the criminality development and radicalisation processes
and the differences between them, rather than being operational models to be used
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for prediction. The level of validation required for the models to be able to fulfil
their purpose was therefore low. However validation was still a very necessary
part of the overall research process; with no validation process at all, the models
could have produced highly unrealistic results and their use could have resulted in
conclusions that might have been very misleading. As it is, the validation process
followed in this thesis showed that the outputs for both models were largely realistic
in terms of the levels of individual propensities, distribution of propensities across
the populations, and the state of the systems overall. The stylised facts for the two
systems were very similar, but sufficiently different from each other for distinctions
to be made between them — and indeed the outputs from the two models were
shown to be different from each other in the way required by the stylised facts.
However the method of validation by stylised facts is not perfect. Its greatest failing
is that it is highly dependent on the list of stylised facts used, and unless a list has
previously been agreed upon by multiple experts in the field it is highly subjective: I
may consider a phenomenon to be a fundamental characteristic of criminal propen-
sity, but your opinion may differ. The question therefore remains as to whether the
list of stylised facts used in this thesis is rigorous enough and has sufficiently gran-
ularity for the models to have been adequately validated. However here again we
return to the problem that not much data exists in the field of research into criminal
and terrorist propensities, making it difficult to generate stylised facts; ultimately
further traditional social scientific research is needed for such stylised facts to be
generated, and thus for more rigorous model validation to be possible.
8.4 Assumptions and Limitations of the Research
Modelling by its very nature involves simplifying reality, and therefore a number of
assumptions had to be made throughout this thesis about the real world systems that
were being modelled. The first and most fundamental of these was to use the IVEE
framework as the basis of the computer simulations. A key piece of further research
would therefore be to create a computer simulation of propensity development with
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a different theoretical framework underlying the models, and then to see if similar
results were achieved. This would also enable the sufficiency of IVEE when com-
pared with other possible theoretical frameworks to be tested, by comparing the
number of stylised facts that simulations based on the different frameworks were
able to replicate. The assumption was also made throughout that well-established
theories in criminological research such as routine activity theory, rational choice
theory and situational action theory are correct.
Within the IVEE framework several further assumptions were made in order to
make it possible to create a computer simulation of the process. The first of these
concerned the way the factors associated with cognitive susceptibility were mea-
sured and modelled. The negative binomial equation used in the exposure transition
of the model was taken directly from an empirical study into how self-control, sus-
ceptibility to peer influence, and peer delinquency affect the probability that an
individual will commit an act of delinquency over the subsequent 12 month period.
An assumption therefore had to be made that susceptibility to peer influence could
be treated as a proxy for an individual’s morality, and peer delinquency as a proxy
for exposure to criminogenic influences. The former assumption was supported by
additional academic studies, but the latter was not, meaning that it is possible that
the assumed parity between peer delinquency and exposure to criminogenic influ-
ences may not actually hold. Additionally, the equation in the exposure transition
came from a single study; further studies would need to be done to replicate the
results before this equation can be used with a high degree of confidence.
A further assumption within the IVEE framework was to use the retail model devel-
oped by Harris and Wilson (1978) as the basis for modelling individuals’ activity
fields. One obvious difference between the flow of money that was being modelled
by Harris and Wilson and the flow of people in the modelling of activity fields is
that retail activity is discretionary, whereas going to school or to a workplace is
obligatory. This was managed in the model by categorising the settings and using
different rules for workplaces and educational establishments, however the validity
of the assumption has not been proven and alternative methods for modelling how
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people move around may generate better results. An alternative, for example, might
be to use research conducted by Gonza´lez et al. (2008) among others into how peo-
ple move around space, and to use this to create activity spaces for individuals in a
similar way to that done in some environmental criminological models.
A final unknown in terms of the modelling process is the degree to which the geo-
graphical setting is important in the generation of a plausible set of emerging fea-
tures. This forms a key tenet in IVEE, as the exposure to and emergence of radi-
calising settings is something which happens in a particular environment. In order
to replicate this the model was located in a representation of an average UK city.
However the actual importance of geography in the model remains an unanswered
question; if the model were located in a completely different environment, or per-
haps a much simpler, theoretical environment, would the models have produced the
same results and been able to answer the research question?
Aside from the limitations associated with the assumptions made during the mod-
elling process, the research is also subject to a number of additional limitations,
the most significant of which has been the lack of data available with which to pa-
rameterise and validate the models. This lack of data was particularly stark for the
radicalisation model, but even for the criminality development model there was in-
sufficient data to allow the emergence of radicalising settings or people’s activity
fields to be modelled with much accuracy. While it is assessed that the amount of
data available was sufficient for the purposes of answering the research question, the
secondary aim of the project — to construct models that could potentially predict
the spread of criminality or radicalisation and be of practical use to practitioners —
was completely infeasible.
This project was also limited by a lack of computer processing capacity. In particu-
lar this affected the analysis of the behaviour of the radicalisation model. Radical-
isation is rare, so in order for it to emerge organically in the computer simulation
there would need to be over 100,000 people input to the model, and this was signifi-
cantly greater than the computer was able to process. For this reason a short-cut was
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taken, which was to force one of the 500 people to be highly cognitively susceptible
to ensure that the radicalisation process started, and an assumption was made that
the results from the 500 people model could be scaled up to larger population sizes.
However it is possible that this assumption is incorrect, and that the model would
behave differently for larger numbers of people.
Finally, an additional limitation lies in the lack of sophistication of some aspects of
the model, which may have been modelled too simply. The aspects in question tally
with the parts of the process for which there is not much data — namely the genera-
tion of activity fields and the emergence of criminogenic or radicalising settings. For
example, the collective efficacy coefficient has been modelled as a single number,
but it may be better modelled as a vector with different dimensions representing,
say, the level of community cohesion or the amount of surveillance. This would
allow each dimension to have a different impact on the emergence of criminogenic
or radicalising settings, and would make it possible to model interventions such as
increased surveillance more realistically. However, with so little known about the
mechanisms by which such settings emerge, a lower level of abstraction was not
possible. Likewise individual preferences for finding some settings more attractive
than others were modelled very simply via the similarity function; this could easily
be made into a more sophisticated model of rational choice, for example through
using a “preference function” such as that devised by Gintis and Helbing (2015).
But without further information about which factors really are important, a more
sophisticated function could not be used.
These limitations could however all be overcome in the future after further soci-
ological research on the criminality development and radicalisation processes has
been carried out, and by using a more powerful computer processor.
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8.5 Applications for the Research
8.5.1 Operationalising the Models
As has been said many times throughout this thesis, the models that have been
developed are largely theoretical and should not be used for prediction or to provide
policy guidance in their current state. However there is scope for them to be used
this way in the future if sufficient empirical data is available for the models to be
parameterised and the results validated. If this were done, there are a number of
uses to which the models could be put. These include:
• Identifying which settings or wider geographical areas have the most crim-
inogenic / radicalising influence, in order to help practitioners target their
interventions on particular areas.
• Identifying the socio-demographic characteristics of those most likely to de-
velop the propensity for crime or terrorism, again to help target interventions.
• Testing which interventions or combinations of interventions are likely to be
most effective and whether any have unintended negative consequences.
• Exploring the idea of a “tipping point”: what would have to change for radi-
calisation or criminality to become pervasive and what indicators might sug-
gest that the tipping point was being approached?
• Scenario generation, such as:
– Changing the socio-demographic make up of an area over time to see
how this alters the effectiveness of interventions;
– Giving one setting a very high collective efficacy coefficient then testing
what measures can be used to deter people from going there and what
overall impact such measures would have;
– Exploring the impact of a small number of individuals with a very high
propensity for crime or terrorism on those around them.
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Although these applications would only be possible with more realistically param-
eterised versions of the models, there is one additional application for the models in
their current form, and that is to use them as a guide to social scientists in the fields
of criminology and counter-radicalisation as to where the key knowledge gaps in
their fields are, in the hopes that this will direct their future research. In particu-
lar, there are clear knowledge gaps in both processes as regards selection mecha-
nisms — that is, what factors lead a person to go to one setting over another, and
how important those factors are. There are also gaps concerning the mechanism by
which collective efficacy makes a setting more or less criminogenic or radicalising.
Finally, for the radicalisation process a knowledge gap exists concerning the pre-
cise relationship between cognitive factors (self-control and morality), exposure to
radicalising influences, and the extent to which a person’s propensity for terrorism
changes. For each of these areas the basic theory of what the causal mechanisms are
has been developed, but the relationships have never been quantified — and until
they are, these models will not be accurate enough to put into operational use.
8.5.2 Alternative Fields
Aside from the social processes that these models were intended to replicate, the
basic structure of the models could also be applicable to a number of alternative
fields. While the IVEE theoretical framework underpinning the models was devel-
oped with radicalisation in mind, it is essentially simply a way to synthesise three
different levels — individual, ecological and systemic — underlying a complex so-
cial process, and thus could be transferrable to other processes that operate on these
three levels. And any process to which the IVEE framework can be applied could
be modelled in a similar way to the criminality development and radicalisation pro-
cesses in this thesis.
The more obvious candidates for alternative fields to which the models in this thesis
might be applicable are other processes describing human behaviour. An example
not too dissimilar to the original criminality development model is the spread of
users of illegal drugs. This is clearly the outcome of a process working at the indi-
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vidual, ecological and systemic levels, as the individual’s own cognitive decision-
making attributes affect whether they decide to take drugs, in addition to the preva-
lence of drugs and drug users at the settings the person visits on a day-to-day basis.
A very similar argument can be made for the process by which an individual decides
to start or stop smoking, showing that the models could be modified to assist prac-
titioners in the field of public health in addition to security and crime. Consumer
behaviour is another process which operates at multiple levels and is one where
the settings that a person visits affect the decisions they make, making market re-
search another alternative field to which the models could be applied. For these
latter processes there is no requirement for an individual’s morality to change, and
further research would have to be carried out to determine what functions would be
most suitable for the exposure and emergence transitions within the models, but the
basic structure of the Petri net would be identical to that used for the criminality
development and radicalisation models.
With some subtle changes to this basic Petri net structure the models could be made
applicable to a range of other subjects. For instance, instead of the two states rep-
resenting people and settings, they could represent investors and publicly traded
companies to create a model replicating the stock market. The amount of exposure
an investor has to certain companies would affect their decisions over where next
to invest, making the exposure transition still applicable, while where they choose
to invest would influence certain attributes of the companies (such as share price),
making the emergence transition applicable. While clearly a simplification (as of
course all models are), further complexity could easily be added by increasing the
number of different states and transitions in the model.
8.6 Conclusion
This research project has revolved around the use of mathematical modelling as a
tool to answer hard questions in social science. The areas chosen to be the focus of
this research — criminality and radicalisation — were deliberately chosen because
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they are difficult areas in which to carry out conventional social science research.
Measuring someone’s propensity to commit crime or terrorism is difficult to do
accurately, and on a large scale is extremely resource-intensive, making empirical
data hard to come by. It was for this reason that it was hoped that modelling might be
able to make a positive contribution to the field, although as the models themselves
also rely on the availability of data their utility is unfortunately limited.
Now was the right time for a research project like this to take place. The IVEE
framework provided the foundation on which the models could be built, and with-
out it there would have been no starting point. Further, without previous studies
quantifying the relationships between psychological attributes, exposure to external
criminogenic influences and the probability of future criminal activity there would
have been insufficient data for even the most simple parameterisation to happen.
Clearly further data would lead to better models, but the minimum requirement for
data was satisfied, and this project has demonstrated that even these simple theoret-
ical models can serve a purpose. As a result of this research we have learned that
the process by which people develop the propensity to commit crime is different
from the process of radicalisation, and that interventions should be targeted accord-
ingly. Further, we have identified key knowledge gaps in the field and hope that
this will direct further social science research. Finally, the models developed are
an important first step towards creating operational simulations that would allow
policy-makers and practitioners to test the impact of interventions before they are
implemented. The basic structure of the work is done: it simply remains for the
blanks to be filled in.
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Appendix A
Full Model Description
A.1 Criminal Propensity Development Model
A.1.1 Overview
The model is an individual-level state transition model comprising four states and
two transitions. The four states are:
• Neutral person
• Neutral setting
• Criminally-minded person
• Criminogenic setting
The model can also be described as an agent-based model, as these four states group
naturally into two types of agent: a “Person” agent and a “Setting” agent, each
of which have a number of different attributes that are explained in more detail
below.
The two transitions are:
• Exposure: this has a neutral person and a criminogenic setting as inputs, and
a criminally-minded person and criminogenic setting as outputs.
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• Emergence: this has a criminally-minded person and a neutral setting as in-
puts, and a criminally-minded person and a criminogenic setting as outputs.
The arrangements of the states and transitions can be depicted as a Petri Net, as in
Figure A.1.
Figure A.1: IVEE Petri net for criminality development
A.1.2 The Person Agent
In the descriptions that follow, i refers to a person, j refers to a setting, and k refers
to a setting type.
The Person agent has the following attributes:
• Propensity, pi: this is a real number whose bounds depend on the function
used in the exposure transition; for the negative binomial version of the model
pi lies between 0 and 1. The higher the number, the greater the person’s
propensity for criminal behaviours. Propensity changes after the exposure
transition is called.
• Susceptibility to Peer Influence (SPI), x1. This is an unbounded real number.
A.1. Criminal Propensity Development Model 281
The higher the number, the more susceptible the person is to criminogenic
influences. SPI reduces between the ages of 14 and 18, but is otherwise static.
It is used to calculate propensity, and also as part of the similarity function Si j
(which models homophily, so settings are more attractive if the people who
go there are similar).
• Self-Control, x2: this is constant for each person, and can take any real value.
The higher the number, the more self-control the person has. It is used to
calculate propensity and as part of the similarity function Si j.
• Activity Field, fi jk: this is a table consisting of the percentage of time the per-
son is expected to spend in each setting every week. The way it is calculated
is explained below.
• Pattern of Life, Qik: this is a vector comprising values for each type of setting,
and is determined by a person’s age, religion, and occupation. It is used when
generating the person’s activity field, and is explained in more detail below.
• Home Location: these are (x,y) co-ordinates for where the person lives, and
is constant for each person. This is used to calculate ci j, the distance between
the person’s home and the settings, which is used to generate the person’s
activity field.
• Age: used in the calculation of the pattern of life Qik, the similarity function
Si j, and for reducing the value of i’s SPI while i is between the ages of 14 and
18.
• Religion: used when calculating pattern of life Qik and the similarity function
Si j. It is one of Christian, Muslim, or None.
• Occupation: used when calculating pattern of life Qik. It is one of Employed,
Student, or Unemployed.
A.1.3 The Setting Agent
The Setting agent has the following attributes:
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• Name
• Criminogenity Level, c j: this is a number whose bounds are linked to the
exposure transition; for the negative binomial version of the model it is always
greater than or equal to zero. The higher the number, the more criminogenic
the setting is. Criminogenity changes after the emergence transition is called.
• Size, | j|: this is an integer representing the size of a setting, either in terms of
the number of people to visit the setting, or in terms of area1. It is used when
calculating the attractiveness of a setting to a person (described below).
• Collective Efficacy Coefficient, ω j: this is a positive number. The higher the
number, the lower the collective efficacy of a setting. The collective efficacy
coefficient is static for each setting.
• Location: these are (x,y) co-ordinates for the geographical location of the
setting. It is used in conjunction with the person’s home location when gen-
erating activity fields.
• Type, k: this categorises settings as workplaces, religious centres, social cen-
tres and residences. It is used when calculating a person’s pattern of life. The
setting types are as follows:
– Workplaces: Office, University, School
– Religious Centres: Church, Mosque
– Social Centres: High Street, Youth Club, Leisure Centre
– Residences: Own, Friend
A.1.4 Activity Field Generation
The person agent’s activity field is a table showing the percentage of time person i
spends in setting j of type k for each timestep t, as follows:
1The way a setting’s size is measured must be consistent for settings of the same type.
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Setting type a a ... k
Setting 1 2 ... j
Time spent (%) fi1a(t) fi2a(t) ... fi jk(t)
We define
fi jk(t) = Aik(t)Qik(t)Wi j(t)αe−βci j
where
Aik(t) =
1
∑l∈Jk Wil(t)αe−βcil
is the scaling factor; the set Jk in the summation is the set comprising all settings of
type k ∈ K where K is such that the family {Jk}k∈K is a partition of J. This scaling
factor ensures that ∑ j∈Jk fi jk(t) = Qik(t).
Qik(t) is the person’s pattern of life, dependent on their selection quotient (see be-
low).
ci j is the distance as the crow flies between person i’s home and setting j.
Wi j(t) is the attractiveness of setting j to person i, and is a function of the setting’s
size | j| and the similarity function Si j(t).
The similarity function Si j(t) is a measure of how similar person i is to the other
people who visit setting j. It is defined as Si j(t) = 1−Di j(t), where Di j(t) is the
difference function:
Di j(t) =
1
5
(
η1Dreli j(t)+η2Dpi j(t)+η3Dsci j(t)+η4Dspii j(t)+η5Dagei j(t)
)
where the η values enable different weighting to be given to each attribute. For the
default version of the model these are set to 1, so that all attributes have the same
weight.
The difference functions for the five attributes are defined as:
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Religion:
Dreli j(t) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣reli(t−1)− ∑∀i s. t.fi jk(t−1)>0
reli(t−1)
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
where a Christian is coded 0 and a Muslim is coded 1, and n is the number of people
such that fi jk(t−1)> 0 (i.e. the number of people visiting setting j in the previous
timestep).
Propensity:
Dpi j(t) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣pi(t−1)− ∑∀i s. t.fi jk(t−1)>0
pi(t−1)
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
with n defined as before.
Self-Control:
Dsci j(t) = 1− e−|sci−sc j(t−1)|
where sci is the self-control level of i and sc j(t− 1) is the mean average of sci for
all i visiting setting j at time t−1.
Susceptibility to Peer Influence:
Dspii j(t) = 1− e−|spii(t−1)−spi j(t−1)|
where spii(t−1) is the SPI of i at time t−1 and spi j(t−1) is the mean average of
spii for all i visiting setting j at time t−1.
Age:
Dagei j(t) =
1
5
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣agei(t−1)− ∑∀i s. t.fi jk(t−1)>0
agei(t−1)
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
where age is coded as in Table A.1.
α and β are parameters of the model.
There are two exceptions when generating activity fields:
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Table A.1: Age coding scheme
Age Code
Under 16 0
16-18 1
19-23 2
24-30 3
31-40 4
Over 40 5
• Workplaces: only the most likely workplace is included in the activity field.
This is defined as the workplace that generates the largest value of fi jk(t)
using the equation above. All other workplaces are set to zero, so a person
has only one workplace during each time-step.
• Friend’s residences: person i’s “best friend” is calculated as the person whose
activity field most closely resembles that of i. A person will spend a propor-
tion of their time at their best friend’s house, but no other private residences
during each time-step.
A.1.5 Pattern of Life Generation
The person agent has a function that defines their pattern of life. This uses attributes
of person i such as age, religion and occupation to determine the types of setting
that i is more or less likely to visit. It is determined via a look-up table which is
at Appendix B. The values in the look-up table are calculated using the following
rules:
• Person i is awake for 112 hours per week;
• If person i attends school they do so for 35 hours per week;
• If person i attends university or a workplace they do so for 40 hours per week;
• If person i has a religion they attend their place of worship for 2 hours per
week;
• For person i under the age of 20, i’s remaining waking hours are equally split
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between their home, a friend’s house, high streets, leisure centres, and youth
clubs;
• For person i over the age of 20, i’s remaining waking hours are equally split
between their home, friend’s house, high street, and leisure centre.
A.1.6 The Transitions
A.1.6.1 Emergence
The emergence transition occurs when a setting forms a significant part of a
criminally-minded person’s activity field — that is, for any setting j for which
fi jk(t)> τ1 for some time threshold τ1, where person i has a significant propensity
p for some criminal behaviour (so pi(t)> ε for some propensity threshold ε).
After the emergence transition the criminogenity of a setting j at time t is defined
to be:
c j(t) =
ω j
n
 ∑∀i s.t.
fi jk(t)>τ1
& pi(t)>ε
pi(t)

where pi(t) is the propensity of person i to some crime at time t, n is the number
of people i such that fi jk(t)> τ1, and ω j is the collective efficacy coefficient of the
setting.
A.1.6.2 Exposure
The exposure transition occurs when person i spends a non-zero amount of time in
a criminogenic setting j. The exposure transition is defined to be the way the three
variables of cognitive susceptibility, criminogenic influence, and criminal propen-
sity (comprising morality and self-control) interact. The following two functions
were used for the exposure transition in this thesis:
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The Negative Binomial Version:
pi(t) = 1−
(
1
1+0.1228e−0.23+0.25x1(i,t)−0.13x2(i)+0.15x1(i,t)x2(i)+0.69x3(i,t)
)8.14
where x1(i, t) is i’s susceptibility to peer influence at time t, x2(i) is i’s self-control,
and x3(i, t) is a measure of the amount of exposure to criminogenic settings that
person i has had at time t. For the default simulation x3(i, t) was defined as the
mean average of the criminogenity of each setting visited by person i that time
step. x3 is transformed into a z-score using µ = E(pi(t)) = 0.5314549 and variance
0.04.
The Alternative Version:
pi(t) = mi(t)− x2(i)
where person i’s morality is
mi(t) = x1(i, t)+θx3(i, t)e−γx2(i)
x1, x2 and x3 are as before, and θ and γ are model parameters.
A.1.7 One Time Step
One time-step in the simulation represents one week. Each time-step the simulation
goes through the following steps:
1. Every 52 time-steps increase people’s ages by 1. Decrease the SPI for indi-
viduals between the ages of 14 and 18.
2. Calculate each individual’s activity field
3. Calculate the mean propensity of the people visiting each setting, and the
mean criminogenity of the settings visited by each person
4. Call the emergence transition
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5. Calculate the amount of exposure to criminogenic settings each person expe-
riences, and transform to a z-score
6. Call the exposure transition
7. Record criminogenities and propensities in output files.
A.2 Radicalisation Model
The radicalisation model is identical to the criminality development model except
that in place of “criminogenic settings” and “criminally-minded people” the agents
are “radicalising settings” and “radicalised people”. The transitions are also differ-
ent, as described in Chapter 6, with the final versions used in the analysis being as
follows:
Exposure: After the exposure transition the propensity p of person i for terrorist
activity at time t is:
pi(t) = 1−
(
1
1+0.1228e−6.91+0.9x1(i,t)−0.45x2(i)+0.05x1(i,t)x2(i)+0.028x3(i,t)
)8.14
where x1(i, t), x2(i) and x3(i, t) represent person i’s susceptibility to peer influence,
self-control, and exposure to radicalising settings at time t respectively (as in the
criminality development model).
Emergence: After the emergence transition the radicalisation level r of setting j at
time t is:
r j(t) =
ω0.5j
n
 ∑∀i s.t.
fi jk(t)>τ1
& pi(t)>ε/ω j
pi(t)

for τ1 = 1 hour and ε = 0.1.
Appendix B
Activity Field Generation Look-Up
Table
The look-up table below shows the value of the selection quotient Qik for each type
of setting k and for people with different socio-demographic characteristics. It is
calculated using the following assumptions:
• Person i is awake for 112 hours per week;
• If person i attends school they do so for 35 hours per week;
• If person i attends university or a workplace they do so for 40 hours per week;
• If person i has a religion they attend their place of worship for 2 hours per
week;
• For person i under the age of 20, i’s remaining waking hours are equally split
between their home, a friend’s house, high streets, leisure centres, and youth
clubs;
• For person i over the age of 20, i’s remaining waking hours are equally split
between their home, friend’s house, high street, and leisure centre.
For the default model, each person is considered to have one main friend, and it is
this person’s house that they visit. Person i’s best friend is defined to be the person
who has the most similar activity field to i for non-residential settings.
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Age(i) Religion(i) Occupation(i) Setting Type( j) Q
Under 18 Christian Student School 0.3125
University 0
Office 0
Church 0.0179
Mosque 0
High Street 0.1339
Youth Club 0.1339
Leisure Centre 0.1339
Home 0.1339
Friend’s Home 0.1339
Under 18 Muslim Student School 0.3125
University 0
Office 0
Church 0
Mosque 0.0179
High Street 0.1339
Youth Club 0.1339
Leisure Centre 0.1339
Home 0.1339
Friend’s Home 0.1339
Under 18 None Student School 0.3125
University 0
Office 0
Church 0
Mosque 0
High Street 0.1375
Youth Club 0.1375
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Age(i) Religion(i) Occupation(i) Setting Type( j) Q
Leisure Centre 0.1375
Home 0.1375
Friend’s Home 0.1375
18-19 yrs old Christian Student School 0
University 0.357
Office 0
Church 0.0179
Mosque 0
High Street 0.125
Youth Club 0.125
Leisure Centre 0.125
Home 0.125
Friend’s Home 0.125
18-19 yrs old Muslim Student School 0
University 0.357
Office 0
Church 0
Mosque 0.0179
High Street 0.125
Youth Club 0.125
Leisure Centre 0.125
Home 0.125
Friend’s Home 0.125
18-19 yrs old None Student School 0
University 0.357
Office 0
Church 0
Mosque 0
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Age(i) Religion(i) Occupation(i) Setting Type( j) Q
High Street 0.1286
Youth Club 0.1286
Leisure Centre 0.1286
Home 0.1286
Friend’s Home 0.1286
Over 20 Christian Student School 0
University 0.357
Office 0
Church 0.0179
Mosque 0
High Street 0.1563
Youth Club 0
Leisure Centre 0.1563
Home 0.1563
Friend’s Home 0.1563
Over 20 Muslim Student School 0
University 0.357
Office 0
Church 0
Mosque 0.0179
High Street 0.1563
Youth Club 0
Leisure Centre 0.1563
Home 0.1563
Friend’s Home 0.1563
Over 20 None Student School 0
University 0.357
Office 0
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Age(i) Religion(i) Occupation(i) Setting Type( j) Q
Church 0
Mosque 0
High Street 0.1607
Youth Club 0
Leisure Centre 0.1607
Home 0.1607
Friend’s Home 0.1607
Under 20 Christian Employed School 0
University 0
Office 0.357
Church 0.0179
Mosque 0
High Street 0.125
Youth Club 0.125
Leisure Centre 0.125
Home 0.125
Friend’s Home 0.125
Under 20 Muslim Employed School 0
University 0
Office 0.357
Church 0
Mosque 0.0179
High Street 0.125
Youth Club 0.125
Leisure Centre 0.125
Home 0.125
Friend’s Home 0.125
Under 20 None Employed School 0
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Age(i) Religion(i) Occupation(i) Setting Type( j) Q
University 0
Office 0.357
Church 0
Mosque 0
High Street 0.1286
Youth Club 0.1286
Leisure Centre 0.1286
Home 0.1286
Friend’s Home 0.1286
Over 20 Christian Employed School 0
University 0
Office 0.357
Church 0.0179
Mosque 0
High Street 0.1563
Youth Club 0
Leisure Centre 0.1563
Home 0.1563
Friend’s Home 0.1563
Over 20 Muslim Employed School 0
University 0
Office 0.357
Church 0
Mosque 0.0179
High Street 0.1563
Youth Club 0
Leisure Centre 0.1563
Home 0.1563
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Friend’s Home 0.1563
Over 20 None Employed School 0
University 0
Office 0.357
Church 0
Mosque 0
High Street 0.1607
Youth Club 0
Leisure Centre 0.1607
Home 0.1607
Friend’s Home 0.1607
Under 20 Christian Unemployed School 0
University 0
Office 0
Church 0.0179
Mosque 0
High Street 0.1964
Youth Club 0.1964
Leisure Centre 0.1964
Home 0.1964
Friend’s Home 0.1964
Under 20 Muslim Unemployed School 0
University 0
Office 0
Church 0
Mosque 0.0179
High Street 0.1964
Youth Club 0.1964
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Age(i) Religion(i) Occupation(i) Setting Type( j) Q
Leisure Centre 0.1964
Home 0.1964
Friend’s Home 0.1964
Under 20 None Unemployed School 0
University 0
Office 0
Church 0
Mosque 0
High Street 0.2
Youth Club 0.2
Leisure Centre 0.2
Home 0.2
Friend’s Home 0.2
Over 20 Christian Unemployed School 0
University 0
Office 0
Church 0.0179
Mosque 0
High Street 0.2456
Youth Club 0
Leisure Centre 0.2456
Home 0.2456
Friend’s Home 0.2456
Over 20 Muslim Unemployed School 0
University 0
Office 0
Church 0
Mosque 0.0179
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Age(i) Religion(i) Occupation(i) Setting Type( j) Q
High Street 0.2456
Youth Club 0
Leisure Centre 0.2456
Home 0.2456
Friend’s Home 0.2456
Over 20 None Unemployed School 0
University 0
Office 0
Church 0
Mosque 0
High Street 0.25
Youth Club 0
Leisure Centre 0.25
Home 0.25
Friend’s Home 0.25

Appendix C
Geographical and People Input to the
Simulation
C.1 Geographical Input
The default area programmed into the model is Peterborough. The settings included
in the model and their attributes are in the table below:
Name Size 1 Location Location Type
x-coord y-coord
Arthur Mellows Village 1400 14.97 105.71 School
College
Hampton College 750 17.79 94.39 School
Jack Hunt Trust 1466 16.91 99.25 School
Ken Stimpson Community 1100 16.86 103.89 School
School
King’s School 1000 19.43 99.67 School
Nene Park Academy 1200 16.6 96.63 School
Ormiston Bushfield 950 15.19 95.43 School
Academy
1Size is measured in terms of the number of people visiting the setting, unless otherwise specified.
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Name Size 1 Location Location Type
x-coord y-coord
St John Fisher RC School 750 20.54 99.67 School
Stanground Academy 1450 20.34 96.03 School
Thomas Deacon Academy 2200 19.72 100.33 School
Voyager Academy 1645 17.49 102.15 School
Peterborough Regional 15500 20.07 100.21 University
College
University Centre 850 20.07 100.21 University
Peterborough
Perkins Engines 2848 16.11 103.13 Office
Company Ltd
Indesit Company Ltd 2445 18.45 96.68 Office
British Sugar Plc 1994 18.07 97.53 Office
Vital Recruitment Ltd 1821 17.72 99.97 Office
Produce World Ltd 1341 23.6 93.56 Office
Fairline Boats Ltd 1040 4.66 88.18 Office
Diligenta Ltd 964 14.1 96.55 Office
Interecruit Ltd 850 18.82 100.34 Office
Faidhan-e-Madina 3000 18.74 99.38 Mosque
Markazi Jamia 1650 18.59 99.95 Mosque
MKSI Community 550 20.2 99.01 Mosque
Hussaini Islamic Centre
Masjid Khadijah 500 18.8 99.82 Mosque
Islamic Centre
Dar-as-Salaam 500 19.06 100.26 Mosque
Al-Mustafa 100 18.72 100.31 Mosque
International
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Name Size 1 Location Location Type
x-coord y-coord
Qasimani 100 18.71 99.78 Mosque
Peterborough Cathedral 500 19.26 98.71 Church
Kingsgate Community 1400 21.89 100.95 Church
Peterborough Internat- 150 18.63 100.58 Church
ional Christian Centre
Oundle Road Baptist 150 18.87 97.89 Church
Church
Westgate Church 150 18.98 99 Church
Pentecostal Church 150 18.31 99.22 Church
St Andrew’s URC 150 17.04 99.39 Church
Church
St Mary’s Church 150 19.63 99.04 Church
Werrington Centre 4204 m2 17.08 104.12 High Street
Millfield Centre 8040 m2 18.91 100.25 High Street
Bretton Centre 13425 m2 16.31 100.51 High Street
Orton Centre 17418 m2 15.25 95.31 High Street
Serpentine Green 25687 m2 17.9 95.08 High Street
Shopping Centre
Queensgate Centre 81000 m2 18.97 98.79 High Street
Hampton Leisure Centre 10000 17.99 94.51 Leisure Centre
Vivacity Premier Fitness 10000 18.26 95.05 Leisure Centre
Werrington Leisure Centre 10000 16.86 103.89 Leisure Centre
Bushfield Leisure Centre 10000 15.19 95.43 Leisure Centre
Regional Fitness Centre 10000 19.9 98.56 Leisure Centre
Big Up Youth Club 100 18.85 99.46 Youth Club
Eye Youth Club 100 22.86 103.17 Youth Club
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Name Size 1 Location Location Type
x-coord y-coord
PARCA Drop-In 100 18.73 100.61 Youth Club
Spinney Youth Club 100 16.73 100.4 Youth Club
PYA Youth Club 100 18.41 100.21 Youth Club
Welland Youth Club 100 20.9 101.42 Youth Club
Wittering Drop-In 100 5.94 102.36 Youth Club
Werrington Church 100 16.96 103.16 Youth Club
Youth Club
Person i’s Home 4 xCoord(i) yCoord(i) Residence
The location of these settings on a map of Peterborough is displayed in Figure
C.1.
C.2 People Input
The attributes of the people input to the simulation are evenly distributed, as are
the geographical locations of their homes. The locations of each person’s home is
displayed in Figure C.2, and the number of people with each attribute is shown in
Table C.2.
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Figure C.1: Locations of settings in Peterborough
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Table C.2: Distribution of attributes in people input
Religion Occupation Gender No. People
Muslim Employed Male 5
Muslim Employed Female 6
Muslim Unemployed Male 6
Muslim Unemployed Female 5
Muslim Student Male 5
Muslim Student Female 6
Christian Employed Male 6
Christian Employed Female 6
Christian Unemployed Male 5
Christian Unemployed Female 6
Christian Student Male 6
Christian Student Female 5
None Employed Male 6
None Employed Female 5
None Unemployed Male 6
None Unemployed Female 5
None Student Male 5
None Student Female 6
Muslim Employed 11
Muslim Unemployed 11
Muslim Student 11
Christian Employed 12
Christian Unemployed 11
Christian Student 11
None Employed 11
None Unemployed 11
None Student 11
Muslim Male 16
Muslim Female 17
Christian Male 17
Christian Female 17
None Male 17
None Female 16
Employed Male 17
Employed Female 17
Unemployed Male 17
Unemployed Female 16
Student Male 16
Student Female 17
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Figure C.2: Location of people’s homes in Peterborough
